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A b s t r a c t
This dissertation analyzes the role and determinants of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. A 
number of papers have stressed th a t educational and labor market outcomes are largely pre­
determined by the cognitive and non-cognitive skills accumulated during early childhood. Some 
of these papers recommend investing in this type of skills to  raise educational enrolment and 
attainm ent, to reduce disparities between ethnic groups or to weaken the intergenerational trans­
mission of socio-economic status. Yet a number of questions are still open: Is early investment 
in skills always the best option? Do cognitive and non-cognitive skills account for most of the 
intergenerational t r ansm ission of socio-economic status? WTiat are the most important inputs of 
these skills? The first essay compares the efficiency of two alternative policies aimed at fostering 
educational enrolment. The results indicate that a direct grant in the form of a tuition subsidy 
is more efficient than  an equally expensive unconditional parental income subsidy given when 
individuals are still in their childhood. The shift in the cognitive skills distribution following the 
latter subsidy is too small to generate a large increase in college enrolment. The second essay 
tests for stochastic monotonicity in intergenerational socio-economic mobility tables. The results 
provide evidence of monotonicity both unconditional and conditional on educational attainment, 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills. The third essay shifts the attention to the determinants of 
these skills, and in particular to the effect of using a computer at home on children’s develop­
ment. The results indicate that time spent on the computer has a positive effect on cognitive 
skills. For the non-cognitive skills the evidence is more mixed, with the direction of the effect 
depending on the type of skill and the age of the children.
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C h a p t e r  1
I n t r o d u c t io n
In the last decade a number of papers have stressed tha t educational and labor market outcomes 
are largely pre-determined by the cognitive and non-cognitive skills accumulated during early 
childhood. Keane and Wolpin (1997, 2001) and Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001) have found 
th a t in the US individual educational decisions are mainly driven by cognitive skills such as maths 
and verbal skills. Those with good skill endowments by age 16 are much more likely to enrol 
and complete college education. Financial constraints are either not binding or most individuals 
manage to  oflFset them  by working part-time and borrowing. Their results suggest that policies 
targeting educational attainm ent or educational disparities between Black, Hispanic and W hite 
youth must act on these skill inputs to be effective. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) find 
th a t a low-dimensional model of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities explains a diverse array of 
outcomes such as schooUng choices, wages, employment, work experience, choice of occupation 
but also a variety of adolescent risky behaviors such as criminality, cigarette smoking and alcohol 
use.
Chapter 2 investigates how educational choices are affected by cognitive skills accumulated 
during childhood. In particular, a specific policy question is addressed “I f  the Government aims 
to increase enrolment in post-compulsory education which policy is more effective? should the 
Government subsidize parents at an early stage, to increase their investment in the child’s cog­
nitive skills during childhood, or should it instead subsidize individuals directly through grants 
in post-compulsory education?”. Previous studies have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of fi­
nancial incentives and short-term liquidity constraints at age 16 or later, but rarely found them 
to be relevant for educational and occupational choices. Their concluding remarks pointed to
ex-ante heterogeneity as the main determinant of these choices. However not many papers have 
compared the effectiveness of alternative policies. The main contribution of this chapter is to 
test the effect of early pohcy intervention on cognitive skills and evaluate the impact on educa­
tional decisions. To tackle this issue I exploit the information provided by the National Child 
Development Survey (NCOS), a U.K. cohort study following individuals from birth onwards 
th a t collected information on skills and parental background information at different stages of 
childhood. WTien targeting an increase in Higher Eklucation enrolment equal to  1% of the pop­
ulation, the results indicate that a subsidy (grant) at the age of 18 is the most efficient way. A 
subsidy of the same amount, but given to parents when the individual is still in its childhood, 
would instead increase cognitive skills and in turn enrolment into Higher Eklucation. However 
enrolment would not increase as much as after a direct Higher Eklucation subsidy at the age 
of 18. This result does not imply that additional investment in cognitive skill accumulation is 
wrong, but tha t such investments should be well structured and ensure a high return, otherwise 
they risk being inefficient.
If childhood is so important for later labor market outcomes than surely parental investment 
plays a key role. Starting with Becker and Tomes (1979) researchers have proposed economic 
models of intergenerational mobility to uncover the mechanism behind the transmission of social 
status. Becker and Tomes (1986), Solon (1999), Mulligan (1999), Han and Mulligan (2001) and 
Restuccia and U rrutia (2004) are all attem pts in that direction. Currently, it is widely accepted 
tha t parental transmission of skills, beliefe, motivation and social connections are all important 
in explaining the strong dependence between the social status of father and son.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Valentino Dardanoni and Antonio Forcina. Our objective is 
to  test for stochastic monotonicity in intergenerational socio-economic mobility tables, th a t is 
whether having a parent with a higher socio-economic status is never worse than having one 
with a lower status. We first apply the test to a set of 149 intergenerational mobility tables in 35 
different countries, where it emerges tha t monotonicity cannot be rejected in almost any table. 
We then address the following question: Does stochastic monotonicity still hold once we account 
fo r  education, cognitive and non-cognitive skills? One main contribution of this chapter is to 
formalize and apply tests of dependence in mobility tables, using both continuous and discrete
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control variables. Our results using the UK NCOS cohort data  confirm that education, cognitive 
and non-cognitive skills do explain a substantial share of the mobility mechanism. Nevertheless 
we find evidence of monotonicity both unconditionally and conditionally.
Given this evidence on the importance of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, there is a growing 
interest in estimating the skills production function. Researchers are trying to uncover the main 
inputs and their time varying effect (see Todd and Wolpin (2003, 2007) and Cunha and Heckman 
(2007) for a discussion). However estimating the causal effect of these inputs is difficult because 
all sorts of endogeneity problems might lead to inconsistent estimates and economists have mainly 
focused on a few inputs tha t are either very important or for which experimental designs are 
available. To mention only a few recent studies tha t have looked at the determinants of m ath and 
reading achievements, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) analyze the effect of teacher quality, 
Dahl and Lochner (2005) and Belley and Lochner (2007) estimate the effect of parental income, 
Bernal and Keane (2008) and Berlinski, Gahani, and Manacorda (2008) evaluate the effect of 
respectively child care and pre-primary education while Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) identify 
the effect of pre-school television exposure.
Chapter 4 investigates the effect of using a computer at home on children’s development. In 
most OECD countries 70% or more of the households have a computer at home and children 
use computers quite extensively, even at very young ages. Yet, little is known about the effect 
of computer usage on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills. This chapter seeks to answer 
the next question: Is time spent using a computer an important input of the skills production 
function?  Time spent using a computer can affect skills because of the way children use the 
computer, i.e. content, because computer time inevitably displaces other activities, and because 
most software requires interaction and is therefore intellectually stimulating. I use data from the 
Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC), which follows an Australian cohort born in 
2000. Skills and computer usage information is collected when children are approximately 5 and 
7 years old. For cognitive skills, the results indicate that computer time has a positive effect. 
The effect is large relatively to other inputs such as child care, and is not shared by other media 
devices, such as television and video games which instead produce a negative effect. For the 
non-cognitive skills the evidence is more mixed, with the direction of the effect depending on
11
the specific skill and the age of the children. I test the robustness of the results comparing OLS, 
IV and Value Added estimators. Generally, the IV estimates are larger and the Value Added 
estimates lower than the OLS ones. However the pattern of the results is quite consistent.
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C h a p t e r  2
F o s t e r in g  E d u c a t io n a l  E n r o l m e n t  T h r o u g h  S u b s id ie s : 
THE Is s u e  o f  T im in g
2.1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate how educational choices are affected by cognitive 
skills accumulated during childhood. In particular, we address a specific policy question ”I f  
the Government aims to increase enrolment in post-compulsory education which policy is more 
effective? should the Government subsidize parents at an early stage, to increase their investment 
in the child’s cognitive skills during childhood, or should it instead subsidize individuals directly 
through grants in post-compulsory education?
The relevance of this question is proved by recent poUcies introduced in the United States and 
in the United Kingdom. Specifically, in September 2004 the U.K. has introduced the Education 
Maintenance Allowance (EMA) to increase participation in education at the age of 16, the 
minimum school leaving age. In 2006 the University tuition fee system has changed, the so 
called Top-Up fees project, with a combination of higher tuition, loans and grants to induce 
enrolment in Higher Education.
Previous studies have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives and short-term 
Uquidity constraints at age 16 or later, but rarely found them to be relevant for educational and 
occupational choices. Their concluding remarks pointed to ex-ante heterogeneity as the main 
determinant of these choices. This ex-ante heterogeneity has always been treated as exogenous 
and called skill endowment. ^
^In this paper we distinguish between ability, that we consider innate, and skills, that are instead the result
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Our contribution is to test the effect of early policy intervention on cognitive skills and evalu­
ate the impact on educational decisions. To tackle this issue we exploit the information provided 
by the National Child Development Survey (NCDS), a U.K. cohort study following individuals 
from birth onwards tha t collected information on skills and parental background information at 
different stages of childhood. We are therefore able to observe the skills accumulation process 
together with educational and occupational choices up to the age of 41. These data are unique, 
because they follow individuals from birth while the majority of other cohort studies, such as 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), follow individuals from the age of 14 or 
later, therefore lacking childhood information. The NCDS data give us the unique opportunity 
to test the effect of variation in cognitive skills measured as early as age 7. ^
In our approach we consider both the investment of parents into the child’s cognitive skills, 
through a production function capturing the causal effect of parental income on skills, and the 
educational choices determined by preferences and accumulated skills.
We model the educational choices with a dynamic structural model. The advantage of this 
approach Ues in the possibUity of inferring the preferences and beliefs of individuals, modelling 
the selection into schooling based on observables and unobservables and leaving us the option of 
evaluating the effect on educational decisions of changes in key parameters such as the distribu­
tion of cognitive skills and tuition fees.
Since we do not have a plausible exclusion restriction, identifying the return to parental 
income in cognitive skills is problematic. W hat we do instead is to use the structure of the model 
and the comparison of the two education subsidies, the tuition subsidy (grant) and the parental 
income subsidy, to  identify which return to parental income would make the two subsidies 
equix'alent.  ^ We focus on men as the educational decisions and wage outcomes are gender 
specific. We further restrict the sample by excluding self-employed individuals since their wages 
are not always well reported.
Finally, our set up is a partial equihbrium model, and therefore does not take into account
of ability and the learning process. Therefore ability and skills are identical only at birth.
^The NCDS follows individuals bom in 1958 matching closely the NLSY79 which follows individuaJs born 
between 1957 and 1965.
^The Data include some measure of investment such as paurentail interest in the child’s education (assessed 
by school teachers) but, the adm of the paper being to simulate alternative policies, it is not straiightforward to 
im a^ne how this form of pairentad investment could be affected by Government policy. What we have in mind 
are financial forms of paurental investments that could be chamged through monetaury subsidies.
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the consequences of increased skill levels or higher qualifications on their relative returns. As 
an implication our model can be used to assess the eflFect of only relatively small changes in the 
stock of human capital.
Wlien we target an increase in Higher Eklucation (college or equivalent) enrolment equal to 
1% of the population, our results indicate that a subsidy (grant) at the age of 18 is the most 
eflScient way. The same subsidy, given to  parents when the individual is still in its childhood, 
would increase cognitive skills and in turn  enrolment into Higher Education, but not as much as 
a direct Higher Eklucation subsidy at the age of 18. The same conclusion is reached if we instead 
target an increase in education enrolment between age 16 and 18.
Our result does not imply that additional investment in cognitive skill accumulation is wrong, 
but that such investments should be well structured and ensure a high return. Otherwise they 
risk being ineflBcient.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2.2 we review the main findings of the Uterature. 
The literature on the economics of education being quite vast, we focus on those papers investi­
gating the importance of short term financial constraints and of comparative advantage, which 
are the most rele\'ant to  our pohcy question. Section 2.3 describes the UK education system. 
Section 2.4 presents the cohort data tha t we use. In Section 2.5 we go through the economics 
of the model, while in Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 we explain respectively its identification and 
estimation. Section 4.5 first presents the maximum hkelihood estimates and the model fit, and 
then it describes our simulations. Section 4.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The recent US literature on educational choices has looked at the importance of financial incen­
tives and budget constraints in schooling decisions.
Keane and Wolpin (1997) investigate the educational and occupational decisions of a US male 
cohort born in the 60’s (NLSY 79) in a dynamic discrete choice structural model estimating the 
impact of a tuition fees subsidy on the college participation decision. In the model individuals 
are not financially constrained and from age 16 onwards decide year by year whether to stay
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in education, stay home, work in a white or blue collar occupation. The model allows for ex- 
ante (age 16) heterogeneity in endowment. Keane and Wolpin find that a $2000 college fees 
subsidy would increase high school graduation by 3.5 percentage points and increase college 
graduation rates by 8.4 percentage points. However, when analyzing the life-time utility effects, 
those who would benefit most from the subsidy are the individuals with high endowment for 
school education and white collar occupations, who would have gone to college even without the 
subsidy. Those induced to go to college by the subsidy are individuals with low endowment for 
education and a comparative advantage in blue collar occupations, with only a minor increase 
in their lifetime utUity. This is due to part of the subsidy being spent to compensate the pre- 
pohcy larger utUity from a no-college choice. They conclude tha t ex-ante heterogeneity in skill 
endowment is a  major determinant of responses to subsidies and effects in lifetime utility.
Keane and Wolpin (2001) extend their previous work to  account for financial constraints at 
the age of 18, with the model also allowing for parental transfers from age 16 onwards and mar­
riage as im portant factors affecting the decisions. They find tha t borrowing constraints exist and 
are tight but have a limited effect on college attendance decisions, since individuals adjust their 
behavior working part-tim e or reducing consumption while a t school. Hence, subsidizing poor 
parents would have httle effect on college participation. The latter results support the hypothesis 
tha t ex-ante heterogeneity plays a central role in educational and occupational decisions.
Cameron and Heckman (1998) use an ordered choice dynamic model to explore whether the 
importance of family background factors in educational decisions decreases as individuals move 
towards higher grades. They look at five US cohorts born between 1907 and 1964. They find 
that these background factors have a rather constant importance across cohorts, but that family 
income is not so relevant once controlling for observed cognitive skills. Their conclusion is that 
parental factors are important mainly because they shape child’s skills and taste for education 
early in life, and these latter characteristics determine educational choices.
Cameron and Heckman (2001) estimate a dynamic model of schooling attainm ent in the US, 
investigating the sources of educational disparities between Black, Hispanic and W hite Males. 
While it is often found that these disparities are linked to parental income differentials, the 
paper tests whether this effect is due to long-term effects or short term financial constraints. 
They estimate the model separately for the 3 ethnic groups and find that parental income is
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important, but its effect is largely diminished once they control for AFQT scores. They also test 
the effect of variation in costs, equalizing the tuition fees across ethnic groups, but again do not 
find large effects. On the other end, equalizing the AFQT, would lead to blacks and hispanics 
having higher enrolment rates than whites.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) look a t the same US cohort as the Keane and Wolpin studies, 
and investigate in a static model the importance of short run and long run factors influencing 
the college attendance decision. Short run factors are associated with liquidity constraints at 
age 18, while long run factors are linked to permanent differences due to  parental background. 
Once again, conditioning on skills measured in early teenage years, short term constraints play 
only a minor role. Their results suggest that at most 8% of American youth face short term 
Uquidity constraints that affect post secondary schooUng.
Cameron and Taber (2004) measure the importance of borrowing constraints on education 
decisions. Their intuition is that opportunity costs and direct costs of schooUng affect borrowing 
constrained and unconstrained persons differently. Direct costs need to be financed during school 
and impose a large burden on credit-constrained students. By contrast, gross forgone earnings 
do not have to be financed. They explore this idea using both a reduced form IV strategy and 
a structural model approach. However, in no case they find evidence of borrowing constraints.
Bearden, McGranahan, and Sianesi (2004) repUcate the analysis of Carneiro and Heckman 
(2002) using UK data, the National Child Development Survey (NCDS) data and find that once 
controlling for test scores in mathematics and reading, individuals do not seem to suffer from 
short-term  credit constraints. Their findings suggest that poUcies aimed at reducing the impact 
of credit constraints on education decisions should target individuals at the age of 16 (or possibly 
earlier) when staying-on decisions are made, rather than at age 18 when individuals are making 
Higher Education decisions. * However, given the reduced form approach and no information 
on schooUng direct costs, they can not simulate the possible impact of a Government financial 
subsidy to parents or individuals on their educational decisions.
Attanasio, Fitzsimons, and Meghir (2004) apply a dynamic structural model with ex-ante (age 
16) heterogenous individuals to estimate the impact of the Education Maintenance Allowance on
‘An example of this policy is the Eklucation Maintenance Allowances programme.
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the decision to either stay in education, stay in education and work part time, or leave education 
and work full time. They use the data  provided by the experiment conducted in 1999 when the 
EMA was introduced in ten Local Eklucation Authorities. This survey followed individuals for 
only 3 consecutive years from age 16. They find tha t the EMA program increased participation 
in education without a part time job from age 16 to 18 and increasing the generosity of the EMA 
would further augment such participation. However, the EMA would have only negligible effects 
on the participation in Higher Education. ^
All together these studies provide a strong indication th a t poUcies aimed at increasing edu­
cation attendance through monetary subsidies might not be very effective. Only a small fraction 
of individuals appears not to  enroll because of short term  financial constrains, and those who 
enroll because of the subsidy do not have big gains in utiUty. Instead, these papers point to  the 
comparative advantage hypothesis as originally described by Roy (1951) and subsequently by 
Willis and Rosen (1979). If an individual has accumulated enough skills then staying in edu­
cation will be rewarding, while if the individual did not accumulate the skills staying on would 
actually lead to  lower utiUty than otherwise obtained entering the labor market immediately.
An education subsidy could change the participation decision for those at the margin, but part 
of the subsidy would be lost in compensating the difference in utiUty caused by the comparative 
advantage.
The policy recommendation for a Government aiming to  increase enrolment into education is 
to  intervene not at age 16-18, when staying-on decisions are made, but during childhood, when 
individuals accumulate their skills, cognitive and non-cognitive. The same subsidy given at the 
age of say 11 could foster the accumulation of skills and be therefore more effective on schooUng 
choices then if given at age 18. Nevertheless, these studies do not compare the effectiveness of 
the two alternative poUcies: the fees subsidy (grant) and alternative early intervention.
Estimating the impact of Government intervention so early in Ufe is, however, a hard task 
given the shortage of surveys monitoring parental decisions and skills accumulation. The NLSY 
longitudinal da ta  used in many of the papers mentioned above follow individuals at best from 
the age of 14 onwards, with a measure of skills given by the AFQT test score and with parental
^The EMA was only given until age 18.
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income measured at the age of 16. Therefore it does not allow testing the impgict of subsidy to 
individuals or their parents anytime before.
2.3 The UK Education System
Before introducing the model, we give a brief overview of the UK Education System in order to 
understand the individual decision process and the assumptions behind our model.
We focus on the English and Welsh education system, which are identical, and omit the 
Scottish Education System, which is shghtly different from the previous ones. This choice is 
driven by the diflSculty of modelling the educational decisions for both types of systems.
Schooling is compulsory up to  the age of 16, when individuals can, at the end of the scholastic 
year, stay in education or enter the labor market. If they stay, there are two main educational 
paths that they can follow: the Academic and the Vocational one. We describe both in turn 
although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, i.e. individuals might take both Academic 
and Vocational Qualifications.
We discuss the system faced by individuals born in 1958 which, with some differences, also 
reflects the current one.
2.3.1 The A cadem ic Path
The Academic path is mainly full-time. Those who stay on at age 16 enrol for the O Levels or 
CSE qualifications, which are taken immediately at the end of the scholastic year. These students 
are still aged 16 when they obtain the qualification. O Levels are single subject examinations 
reflecting the single disciplines of the university departments and faculties. They are designed 
for more able secondary school students and are necessary for progression into further education 
(A-level). The Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE) qualification was intended for students 
whose skills were not considered suflBcient for O level courses. Nevertheless, there was an overlap 
between these two types of certificates in that a CSE grade 1 result was regarded as equivalent to 
an O-level pass. Even though there was no formal requirement, students would be expected to 
pass a t least 5 O Levels graded A-C or CSE graded 1st, in order to stay in education afterwards.
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In the Autumn term  of the same year, those who successfully obtained 5 or more O Lev- 
els/CSE can enrol for A Levels. These would last 2 years, until individuals are aged 18. Advanced 
levels have their origins in quahhcations constructed by groups of universities in the first half of 
the century, designed to identify candidates suitable for degree courses and to provide a foun­
dation for advanced teaching in a single subject area to degree level. These characteristics still 
distinguish A levels. They are still awarded by independent examining bodies with close links 
to  the universities. Passing 2 A-level constitutes the minimum level required for entry in Higher 
Eklucation. Normally two or three A-levels are studied.
Once the student has completed A Level, he can gain admission to the Universities, Poly­
technic or Colleges of Higher Eklucation where a first degree is obtained. The time needed to 
gain a degree varies by subject but in the majority of cases it takes 3 years.
Therefore a student who completes the Academic path with no interruption will normally 
enter the labor market at the age of 21 or 22. ® Hereafter we use OL, AL and HE for O Levels, 
A Levels and Higher Eklucation respectively. ^
2.3.2 T he Vocational Path
The Vocational P ath  is quite different from the Academic one, mainly in the types of qualification 
awarded and in the timing. Vocational qualification are more specialists and often linked to 
the acquisition of a competence requested for a specific kind of job. They range from advanced 
food technology, catering degrees to lower levels dog grooming and cake decoration ones. Some 
of these qualification are taken while in full-time education while others are taken later on in 
life, even after entering the labor market. Yet, vocational qualifications are grouped in O Level 
equivalents, A Level equivalents and Higher Education equivalents to match them with the 
Academic ones.
^Individuals might stay in education even further to complete a post-graduate degree. However this was very 
unlikely among the older cohorts such as the NCDS one.
^Another important feature of the British education system was the early selection of pupils into different 
types of schools. Prior to. and during the 1960s, the British education system was selective. Pupils were tracked 
into different schools, according to their ability at age 11. The most able, who passed an entrance examination 
at age 11, went to grammar schools. The rest went to secondary modern or technical schools. The selection of 
around only 20 per cent of the cohort for a grammar school education (which could lead to university entrance) 
was progressively challenged in the 1960s. From 1965 onwaurds (Circulaur 10/65), Labour governments encouraged 
locaJ authorities to develop comprehensive schools which accepted all children from a neighborhood, regawdless 
of ability. Comprehensive education slowly gained ground amd by the end of the 1970s over 80 per cent of all 
children in maûntaûned schools were in comprehensive schools.
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2-4 Data and descriptive statistics
The National Child Development Study (NCDS) targets over 17,000 babies born in Britain in 
the week 3-9 March 1958. Surviving members of this birth cohort have been surveyed on six 
further occasions in order to monitor their changing health, education, social and economic 
circumstances: in 1965 (age 7), 1969 (age 11), 1974 (age 16), 1981 (age 23), 1991 (age 33) and 
1999 (age 41). At the age of 7, 11 and 16 mathematics, reading and general skills tests were 
taken by the cohort member. Information about parental background including education and 
occupation was also collected during those years, with a measure of parental income included 
at the age of 16. Moreover, in 1978, when individuals where aged 20, a survey was conducted 
among the secondary schools where they had taken their qualifications up to  A Levels. This 
school survey allows to  distinguish between enrolment in OL and AL and the actual achievement 
of the qualification.
Although the surveys were not conducted on yearly basis, information on labor market his­
tory, including employment status and occupation, was gathered for each month of the cohort 
members life from age 16 onwards through retrospective questions. Data on wages instead were 
only collected at the time of the interviews.
These data  sets therefore bring together information on educational and occupational choices, 
skills and parental background measures collected in the childhood years of the cohort members.
We select all males for which we observe parental income, skills test scores at age 16 and 
educational choices.
Table 2.1 shows the coding and the composition of our sample by status and age. We select 
those individuals observed for at least two periods. Given the education system we start our 
analysis with the period April 1974 up to September 1974, entry 16“ in our table, when indi­
viduals were already 16 and could leave education. This is the moment we can observe their 
first decision. Because this period is mainly within the scholastic year and summer hohdays, we 
assume that individuals either enrolled in education or stayed home, and are therefore assumed 
to  be unemployed. The following period runs firom October 1974 until September 1975, entry 
16^, when individuals could have studied A Levels, found a job or be unemployed. We classify 
individuals as employed if the number of months spent working was larger than  time in unem­
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ployment. This period and ail the following ones are yearly time periods, starting in October 
and ending in September of the following year. Above age 21, tha t is after O Levels, 2 years of 
A Levels and 3 years of Higher Education individuals are supposed to be in the labor market. 
® We do not model re-entry in education. Among those in full-time education more than 93% 
of the individuals did not have any break from full-time education, where a break is arbitrarily 
defined as a six months or longer period outside full-time education before going back. This 
percentage raises to  95% when we consider a break as 12 months or longer period. We drop 
those individuals who have a break of 12 months or longer.
From the data  it is clear tha t the unemployment rate in the sample rose suddenly around 
the age of 22, firom 5% to 10%, only to go down again two years later, at age 24. The work rate 
mirrored the unemployment one given that all individuals were already in education. This was 
the time when Margaret Thatcher was prime minister with improved productivity but soaring 
unemployment in the UK. W hat casts a shadow though is the peak in the series. Since individuals 
were interviewed at the age of 23 and 33, the reported unemployment from the age of 24 onwards 
comes from the age 33 survey, with a risk that individuals under-reported their unemployment 
in those years, particularly if that occurred for short periods. ^
Figure 2.1 shows the educational choices and the obtained qualifications. Although 63% of
men in the sample enrolled for O Levels, only 28% obtained suflScient grades to progress to A
Levels. Part of these individuals left education anyway. In the end only 7.3% of the sample
obtained a HE qualification. Note tha t we do not distinguish between individuals who enrolled
and individuals who successfully completed Higher Eklucation. This is because, while data were
collected from secondary schools, no data  were collected from HE institutions. In our sample
therefore we code as being enrolled all those individuals tha t reported having a HE qualification. 
10
*By the age of 23, less then 1% reported having a post graduate qualification. This percentage raised to almost 
4% by the age of 33. We exclude these individuals from our sample.
®Wé have done some investigation on this, though we could not find a reliable unemployment statistic in the 
early 80’s for those born in 1958. (i.e. a cohort specific statistic.) Nevertheless using available statistics or some 
other data set such as the FES. it seems that my data underestimate unemployment by around 3% between the 
age of 24 to 26.
^®We have also tried to investigate this issue using some self-reported data at age 23, but the results are not 
fully convincing. It seemed that up to 16% of individuals might have failed an Higher Education course. It is 
hard to say whether we could do more on this because not all individuals in the sample actually took part in the 
age 23 survey, and for the missing ones we would not know whether they failed an HE course.
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Figure 2.1; Educational choices
Table 2.3 shows sample statistics for the mathematics and reading test scores at the age of 
16 and 7, and for parental income at the age of 16. At age 7 individuals were administered 
four tests (reading, mathematics, copying and drawing) while only reading and mathematics 
tests were administered at age 16. Between age 7 and 16 the tests were changed to take into 
account the age difference. We only use the mathematics and reading scores. In order to 
reduce the number of state variables we summarize the mathematics and reading test scores 
using the first principal component of the standardized test scores. The assumption that one 
factor captures cognitive skills is quite widespread in the literature and in line with the g theory 
used by Herrnstein and Murray (1994). Not reported here, the first principal component for the 
age 16 scores explains 82% of the total variance while the age 7 principal component explains 77 
% of the total v'ariance. The loading factors of the standardizes scores are identical and equal to 
0.70711, both at age 16 and 7. Higher values of the principal component correspond to higher 
scores.
Figure 2.2 shows the obtained qualifications by principal component (quintiles). It is clear 
that both age 16 and age 7 cognitive skills are good predictors of educational achievement. Those
^^The questionnaires, including the tests can be downloaded from the UK data archive website. The age 7 
questionnaire can be found at http://)*T\Tk .data-archive.ac.uk/doc/3148/mrdoc/pdf/aL3148uab.pdf, while the aige 
16 questionnaire can be found at http://%-%-w.data-aurchive.ac.uk/doc/3148/mrdoc/pdf/a3148ucb.pdf.
*^The loading coefficient of the original, non-stamdardized scores were also very close and equail to 0.71 and 
0.69 respectively for the math and reatding scores.
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in the lower quint lies have virtually no academic qualification.
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Figure 2.2: Qualifications by Skills.
Figure 2.3 reports mean log yearly wages by obtained qualification (in January 2001 prices). 
The wages are monotonically increasing. In table 2.2 we report separate statistics for the three 
age points when we can actually measure wages. In the first line we report the mean wage by 
age: as expected it is increasing as the individuals grow older. The following lines decompose 
the first one by highest qualification obtained. Higher qualifications are usually associated with 
higher wages.
The British NCOS cohort is comparable to the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79) cohort, composed of individuals born between 1957 and 1965. The NCOS though 
followed the individuals from birth, while the NLSY first surveyed individuals in 1979 when 
they were between 14 and 22 years old. The NCOS study reports reading and mathematics test 
scores at the age of 7, 11 and 16. This is unique. The NLSY79 reports the AFQT test but 
this was administered in 1980 to all. Individuals in the NLSY were therefore aged between 15 
and 23 when they took the test. The NCOS has also age 0, 7 and 11 information on parental
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Figure 2.3: Log wages by qualification 
background characteristics which is not present in the NLSY.
2.5 The M odel
In modelling the educational choices we only look at the Academic Path. This is because the 
qualifications are quite homogenous and the timing is very similar across individuals. In the data 
only 2% of indi\iduals had Vocational qualifications without any Academic one at the age of 23. 
Conlon (2001) found that the wage returns to Academic qualifications are usually much larger 
than to Vocational qualifications. We choose to model an optimal stopping problem, where 
at the age of 16 (OL and AL) and 18 (HE) individuals decide between staying on or leaving 
education and enter the labor market. The labor market is an absorbing state. Given the low 
number of individuals that re-enter education after a year long break, an optimal stopping model 
should match fairly well the choices made in the Academic path.
^^The Armed Forces Qualifications Test score (AFQT) is a composite score derived from select sections of 
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), a battery of 10 tests that measure knowledge and 
skill in the following areas: (1) general science. (2) arithmetic reasoning. (3) word knowledge, (4) paragraph 
comprehension, (5) numerical operations. (6) coding speed, (7) auto and shop information. (8) mathematics 
knowledge, (9) mechanical comprehension and (10) electronics information.
25
2.5.1 The D ecision Process
At the age of 16 individuals are free to  leave education. Before they take the decision they are 
assumed to  know the probability of receiving a job oflFer (6). They remain in education whenever 
the expected lifetime utility from schooling is higher than from entering the labor market. If 
they decide to stay in education they enrol in OL exams, with a certain probability (A) they 
succeed and in the next period choose between AL or leaving education. If they fail (1 — A) 
then they have to leave. As long as in education, this decision process is repeated up to HE, the 
highest possible level.
Once this is obtained individuals have to enter the labor market. Given that we focus on 
men, we assume th a t once out of education individuals always choose to work. Nevertheless, 
they could be unemployed if they do not receive a job offer (provided they were in education or 
unemployed in period t — 1) or if they get fired (provided they were working in period t — 1 ) 
which occurs with a probabUity (<^ ). The only decision in the model is between staying or leaving 
education. The work/unemployement status is not a decision.
This process being sequential, we model it as a discrete Markov decision process (DMDP) 
where at each point the choice depends only on the current level of the individual characteristics 
or state space. See Ekkstein and Wolpin (1989) and Rust (1994) for a review of DMDP models 
and estimation strategies.
2.5.2 Instantaneous U tility
We follow Keane and Wolpin (1997) and model the rewards in monetary terms. This choice is 
dictated by the absence of variation in tuition fees in the data. The linear utility in income 
implies that the individuals are not liquidity constrained and are risk neutral. In the conclusions 
we discuss possible implications of these assumptions. Individual and time specific subscripts 
are suppressed for clarity of exposition.
The reward from work is given by the annual wage:
‘^*Ichimura and Taber (2002) discuss semiparaunetric identification of tuition subsidy effects wfienever the 
researcher can observe variation in tuition. While in England and Wales education at every stage was free, 
individuals enrolled in Higher Education were entitled to a grant linked to parental income. The amount of the 
grant was between 200 and 5000 pounds in 2001 prices. Since a tuition subsidy is equivalent to a grant, we could 
try to use variation across individuals. However, given its link to parental income, it is not easy to identify the 
effect of the grant net of income.
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R w  — w — exp < ^  ] ocqjQj +  olxX  4- ^   ^dx jX Q j  +  +  OLkiXj 4- 4- u > (2.1)
l j= i  ;= i J
The effect of schooling is represented by the 3 dummies (Q_, ), corresponding to obtained OL, 
AL and HE qualifications and their interaction with experience (X). The equation also includes 
skills at age 16 (ATie), age 7 {Ki). We interact qualification with experience to  better fit the wage 
profile. We include K j  since it is a good proxy for innate abihty and in the policy counterfactual 
we test the effect of a change in its distribution.
The unobserved component includes a type specific constant and measurement error u: 
u ~  N{0,cr^). We model the unobserved heterogeneity with a mixture model and Z  types.
Provided {0 ^2, ctti} are positive and the return to schooling are monotonically increasing 
in Q, the exponential functional form ensures a positive cross-derivative between schooling and 
cognitive skills.
The reward from unemployment is
Ru  =  R  (2.2)
tha t is individuals receive a fixed amount in unemployment benefit if they are unemployed. 
R  is set equal to 3000 pounds, approximately the 1975 benefit in 2001 prices. Until 1995 the 
benefit was not a function of income.
The latent reward fi'om schooling is given by
Rsj  =  4- 7z 4- t j  j  = OL, AL, H E. (2.3)
which indicates th a t the reward is qualification specific. In the case of O Levels, the first 
schooling stage, 7 0 L is set equal to zero because we already have the type specific constant term. 
The reward is expressed in monetary terms and includes the costs as well as the consumption
^®See Everitt and Hand (1981), McLachlan and Peel (2000) and Heckman and Singer (1984) for a discussion 
of mixture models.
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies , http://www.ifs.org.uk/ff/indexben.php
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value of education as measured by the constant term 7 0^ and 7^, the persistent unobserved 
heterogeneity common to  all schooling levels. The taste shock (e) is assumed to be i.i.d. and 
normally distributed N { 0 ,a^). Tuition fees are imposed on the model but set equal to zero to 
reflect free education in the UK at that time. Note that there is no observed heterogeneity 
in the latent reward from schooling. Cognitive skills are excluded to help identification as we 
explain later on. This restriction holds if parental transfers and effort are not skill specific, or 
if they offset each other, i.e. less skilled individuals make more effort but also receive more 
resources from parents to  compensate for their skill gap. We do not include parental income 
either. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Dearden et al. (2004) have found that parental income 
does not affect educational decisions once cognitive skills are controlled for. Moreover, it is a 
continuous variable and would increase computational time.
Finally define the latent index generating the probability of obtaining a qualification once 
enrolled A, the probability of receiving a job offer Ô, the probability of being fired 4> as
A* =  \ j  4- Afc2-Ki6 +  +  A2 +  Pa
3
5* =  ^ 2  ^qjQj +  ^k2 K i 6  +  SkiKj  4- 6 x X  + Sz + gs
j=i
3
4>* = ^qjQj <^ fc2^ 16 +  (t>k\K’r 4- 4>xX 4- 02 4-
j=\
such tha t the unobserved heterogeneity enters each probability and g is normal.
2.5.3 Solving the Sequential Decision Problem
Define the state space Ü = [Kie, K 7 , Q, X ,  e, q^, 7%, A ,^ 6^ ,02] where [Kie, K 7 , e, a^, 7 ,^ A ,^ 02]
are exogenous states in the model. Define the decision space D = [Schooling, Non — Schooling], 
the status space Z  =  [5, W, U\ which differs from D  since work and unemployment are not a 
choice. Finally define the choice set C  = {|D(D)|} because individuals have a choice only if they 
are still in education and hold a qualification lower than HE. Individuals are therefore ex-ante 
heterogeneous in observed skills K ,  persistent unobserved heterogeneity {o2, 7z,'^z,^z,0 z} and
^^Even though cognitive skills do not enter directly the utility of schooling they do affect schooling decisions 
as we explain later.
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serially uncorrelated unobserved taste shocks for education e.
We characterize the problem of a finitely hved individual as maximizing the expected present 
value of lifetime rewards. The value function V of an individual of age a is defined as the solution 
to Bellman’s equation
V(Q,a) = max 
dec(n)
R{Ü,d)+(3 (2.5)
where we integrate over the support of e only since all the other states have deterministic
dynamics. Equation (2.5) also highlights the advantage of not modelhng the work/no-work
choice since this way we only have a univariate integral.
Statu s Specific V alue Functions
Define by V5 the value function from schooling, Vw the value function from work and Vu the 
value function from being unemployed. Then
V w u i^ )  = S{ü)Vw{n)  +  [1 -  0{Q )]V um  (2.6)
is the value function if the individual exits education and enters the labor market.
Vswui^)  =  J  max {Vs{0,),Vwu{^)}  (2-7)
is the value function for an individual deciding between staying-on or leaving education.
Having in mind that OL, AL and HE have a different time length and that e is updated every 
year, the value function from Schooling is therefore defined as:
Vo l W  =  R o U n )  -h )9{A (n)V ^sw f/(n ') +  [1 -  A (H )]V w t/(n)}
V a l W  =  R A L m  + 0 E . [ R A L m  +  0  ^{X{Q]Vswu{(l') +  | 1 -  A(n)]V,v(;(fi)}
V h e W  = R n s m  + 0 E,\RHE(n)] + { \ (9 )V w u (ü ')  +  [1 -  A(fi)]VH,[,(n)}
(2 .8)
where for clarity we use rather than fl' if e is the only state to be updated. An individual’s
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value function is specified as the current reward plus future expected utility, which depends on 
the probability of success in school A and the probability of receiving a job offer S. The next 
period choice between school and labor market (Vswu)  vanishes when entering HE.
From our value function specification it can be seen that we update educational qualification 
to a higher level {Q') only if the individual was successful once enrolled. Given what we said in 
section 2.3, this occurs if he obtained 5 or more OL-CSE at the first stage, 3 or more AL a t the 
second stage. The impUcation is that enrolling for a qualification but achieving anything less 
than th a t has no effects on utUity.
It might seem incorrect to assign an annual reward for O Levels even though they do not 
require an additional year of schooling. Nevertheless, we believe that the decision to take O 
Levels is actually taken around age 15 because it involves specific preparation to the exams. 
Hence, we still consider R s  as an annual reward, where the year goes from age 15 to 16. We 
instead set to  zero the working reward for not taking O Levels, since the individual would 
formally still be in education or unemployed for a few months in the summer.
Value function from work:
Vw(fi) =  R w m  + 0{4>{n')Vu{n') + [1 -  (2.9)
so an individual working has current utUity given by the annual wage and future utility from 
work or unemployment, weighted by <^ , the probabUity of being fired. Here Q.' captures the new 
level of experience.
Value function from unemployment:
Vir{Q) = R u in )  + (3{SiQ)Vw{n) +  [1 -  (ÿ(n)]Fb(n)} (2 .10)
We do not assume any depreciation of experience so the state space does not change after a 
period of unemployment.
Note that there is no randomness in either Vw or Vu since both 0 and 5 do not contain any 
stochastic component and under the assumption of rational expectations the probabilities are 
always known by the individual.
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2.5.4 Econom ies o f the m odel
Being in school has a direct utility given by R s,  a cost given by the foregone earnings and a return 
given by the higher wage productivity. Taking O Levels and A Levels is also valuable because it 
allows access to  higher qualifications (option value). Finally, schooling affects the probabilities 
of being employed in the labor market. Individuals select themselves in education based on their 
characteristics. Given the exponential form of R w  and conditional on V k R w  > 0, V q R w  > 0 
as it usually found in the literature, V q k R w  > 0- Individuals with high values of K  have larger 
foregone earnings but also larger returns to schooling in the future. They will enroll in education 
as long as these returns are large enough.
The sign of A, Ô and 0 gradients with respect to Q and K  are also very important in driving 
the educational decisions. A large value of A induces individuals to stay longer in education. 
Enroling in education but failing to get the qualification is very costly in the model because there 
is no change in human capital. The cost is the foregone wage weighted with the probability of 
finding a job. Thus if V^A > 0 skilled individuals would be more likely to enrol. The effect of 
6 and <f> depends on their interaction with the qualifications. If V q S  > 0 and V g0  < 0 then 
individuals have incentives to enrol. The sign of the cross-derivatives Vqk<5, V q k 0  determines 
the selection based on observable skills.
Selection on unobserved heterogeneity works in a very similar way. High wage types (q^) 
have larger forgone earnings but also larger returns to schooling if V qR w  > 0. Enrolment 
in education is also caused by larger utUity of schooling (%), success at the exams (A^), larger 
probability of finding a job (S^) if V q S  > 0 and a lower probability of being fired (<pz) if V q0  < 0.
This class of problems can easily be solved by backward induction. Our problem is partic­
ularly simple because u is just a measurement error and because decisions are made only at 
3 points in life. Therefore the computation of the max in equation (2.5) occurs only at these 
points.
j2. 6 Identification
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) show that without unobserved heterogeneity these models are not
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non-parametrically identified as long as the following structural parameters are not set: the 
distribution of unobserved shocks, the discount rate, and the current and future preferences 
in one reference alternative. When unobserved heterogeneity is introduced, non-parametric 
identification is prohibitive unless very strong restrictions are imposed. We fix the discount factor 
(3 to 0.95 and we impose an exponential function for the utility of work in line with Keane and 
Wolpin (1997). In the utifity of schooling we only impose the additivity of the shocks. Normahty 
is imposed on measurement error, the schooling shock and over the transition probabiUties A, 
<5 and <f>. We make no assumption on the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Overall the 
model is heavily parametric because we are interested in the effect of different schooling levels 
and in the selection of individuals based on observable skills.
Parameters in Rw-, ((%), are identified from data on wages and the state variables skills, 
education and experience. The unobserved heterogeneity {az) is identified by cross-section vari­
ation in wages, conditional on the states, at each of the three wage points available in the data. 
Because we model selection on unobservables, the return to schooling, to observed skills and 
to  experience are different from OLS ones. No parameter is estimated in Ru- In R s  the pa­
rameters (7 ) are estimated to match the proportions enrolling for each qualification. The otc 
vector is identified by a model’s constraint: the net opportunity cost has a negative effect on the 
probabUity of enroUing.
Identifying the scale of the parameters is necessary to test the effect of variation in tuition fees, 
given tha t we do not observe this variable nor the utility of schooling. The identification of (Tg is
^®To see clearly why. let us focus on the HE participation decision auid assume for simplicity that the probability 
of success in school A =  1 and the probability of having a job offer 6 = 1 .  Therefore an individual enrols in HE if:
Rh e {^) + E
2
L t = l
+  Vw'(Q =  H E , n . a  =  21) >  R w i Q  = AL,Q)  +  (3Vw{Q =  A L , Q ' , a =  19)
Define the net opportunity cost as
A{i i)  =  R w i Q  =  AL,  D) +  0 V w i Q  =  AL, Q', a =  19) — V w i Q  =  HE,  D, o =  21)
An individual with A Levels enrols in Higher Education with probability
/  A (fi) -  f ^ ( D )  -  E \ Y . U i 0 ' R H E m ]  \
1 - $   ^ ^  (2.11)
f^e,HE J
where R h e  ^  the utility of schooling net of the current realization of the shock. Since A(f2) is determined by 
wage data and its coefficient is implicitly normalized to 1 in (2.11) by the model structure, Ogjyg is identified. 
The same reasoning can be generalized to identify for the other educational categories.
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helped by excluding {K iq, K j ) from the utility of schooling. Formally this exclusion restriction is 
not needed given the non-linearity of Vwu, but without a restriction multi-collinearity would lead 
to large standard errors. The unobserved heterogeneity in the utility of schooling is identified 
by cross-section variation in schooling choices, conditional on the state variables, at each of the 
three schooling stages.
The parameters in A, vector (A), are identified merging individual characteristics to the school 
data, the latter providing information on the number of OL and AL taken and those obtained. 
Here the unobserved heterogeneity is identified through cross-section variation, conditional on 
the state variables, in O Levels and A Levels exam success. The parameters in 6 , vector (d), and 
0, vector (0 ), are identified from yearly data on employment status. Unobserved heterogeneity 
is identified by cross-section variation in the transitions, conditional on the states, at each point 
in the labor market. Once again the returns to schooling, to skills and to experience take into 
account selection on unobservables and are therefore different from reduced form estimates.
2.1 Estimation
Define with L^. the likelihood from the wage density, with L x ,L s ,L ^  the likelihoods from the 
probabUity of success in school, having a job offer and being fired, and with L q l  ^L a l -, L h e  the 
likelihoods from the probability of enrolling in O Level, A Level and Higher Education. In the 
absence of unobserved heterogeneity and with uncorrelated error terms the log likelihood would 
be:
N
£{fto,  0 )  =  I n J ^  (Z-u, X L \  X Ls X L q l  x L a l  x L h e )
t = l
N
=  ^  { tw  +  t x  +  t s  +  £((, +  t o L  +  £a l  +  £h e )
i = l
Given the additivity of 0), estimation could be easily carried out by fast sequen­
tial maximum likelihood estimation using the backward induction nature of the problem. The 
{ a , A, Ô, <p} parameter vectors could be identified by running separate likelihood maximization 
of Lw, L \ ,  Ls and Then we could sequentially maximize L h e (ô , A, 7 /ff;), solving 
the problem of an individual with A Levels who chooses whether to enroll in Higher Educa­
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tion, given the known wage returns to schooling and experience, and job probabilities. W ith 
I H E  estimated, L a l ( 0 , Â,d , 7 m £ ; , 7 a l )  and then L o l { o c , \ , 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ h E ’>1 aL', 1 o l )  could 
be maximized sequentially with the same logic. The inconsistent standard errors, due to the 
estimation error, could be corrected with one Newton step over the whole likelihood, (see Rust 
(1994) for a  discussion on sequential estimation.)
However, when we introduce unobserved heterogeneity the log likelihood becomes:
; = ‘ V ; '  \  (213)
= ^2 ^ ^  X L \  X L g  X X L q i  ^ x  x  |
i = l  \ z = l  J
with Tfz being the proportion of individuals of type z. Ekjuation (2.13) can no longer be 
estimated sequentially, because now we have the log of a sum.
However, Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) show how to  extend the Expectation Maximization 
(EM) algorithm to  solve the likelihood maximization sequentially. The EM algorithm consists 
of two steps:
•  E Step. Compute the conditional probability of being the zth type:
P (z \ t l 0 , e,, )  =
|^lZz=l ^ -^ A ^ ^ ^ ^OL ^ ^AL ^
•  M Step. Estim ate 0  by maximizing the expected likelihood function and update the vector 
of unconditional probabilities n ,  holding the conditional probabilities fixed.
N  Z
0  =  arg max ^  ^  P{z\no,  0 ,  tt) In (L^  x x L | x LJ x x x
i = l  z = l  
N  Z
— arg max ^  ^  P{z\flo, 0 , t t ) [ i l ,  4- + i o L  +  ^ a l  + ^ h e )
t = l  2 = 1
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(2.16)
The two steps are repeated until convergence is achieved. The EM algorithm restores the 
additive separabiUty at the maximization step in equation (2.15). Therefore estimation can be 
done sequentially. Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) name this procedure Expectation Sequential 
Maximization because it appUes the EM algorithm to  a sequential maximization problem. They 
show th a t this method produces consistent estimates of the parameters with large computational 
savings.
2.8 Results
2.8.1 The D ynam ic M odel
We first show the fit of the model and then present the estimated coefficients. A likeUhood ratio 
test suggests th a t 3 types are sufficient to capture the unobserved heterogeneity: 60% of the 
individuals in our cohort are estimated to be type 1, 35% of type 2 and 5% of type 3. So far 
we have remained silent on what is unobserved heterogeneity. In structural schooling models 
like ours, researchers call it skill endowment (Keane and Wolpin (1997), Keane and Wolpin 
(2001)), or ability (Belzil and Hansen (2002) and Arcidiacono (2005)). There is also growing 
attention to the importance of non-cognitive skills as determinants of labor market outcomes and 
schoohng (see Heckman et al. (2006)). Since in our model we include early measures of cognitive 
skills among the observed characteristics, we do not consider the unobserved heterogeneity as 
ability. Rather we prefer to think of unobserved heterogeneity as those non-cognitive skills 
tha t are uncorrelated with cognitive ones. Figure 2.4 shows the true and simulated educational 
choices. The model fits quite well the educational choices. From the figure we can see that 
type 2 are the more likely to go into education, followed by type 1. Table 2.4 reports the fit by 
education, work and unemployment status. The model fits less well the way individuals allocate 
themselves between work and unemployment. The reason for this latter result is the peak in the 
unemployment series in period 8, at the age of 22, which the model can not really fit given that 
the job offer (Ô) and job firing (<f>) probabilities are not period specific.
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However we only model the staying-on choice. Having left the education system, work or 
unemployment are not choices. Moreover, our main focus is to predict the decision of leaving 
school, which our model does reasonably well excluding the case of A Levels enrolment where 
there is a 1.7% gap between true and predicted data.
Figure 2.5 shows the wage fit. The model predicts quite well the wages by education groups 
with the exception of the A Level case, where there is a 2800 pounds difference. Unfortunately, 
given the low enrolment rates in A Level and Higher Education, we do not have many wage 
observ'ations for these qualification so the imperfect fit is not fully surprising. Table 2.5 shows 
the true and predicted wage by time and qualification. The average wage is quite well predicted 
for all the 3 age points available in the data. However, when we decompose it by qualification, 
our model slightly under-estimates the unconditional wage return to A Levels and HE at the 
age of 33 and 41.
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Figure 2.4: True and simulated educational choices
Figure 2.6 and 2.7 show how the model fits the educational outcomes by cognitive skill. In 
both cases the model matches fairly well the data, even though the simulation slightly over­
estimates the educational outcomes of the lower quantiles. Even conditioning on unobserved
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Figure 2.5: True and simulated log wages by qualification
heterogeneity observ'ed cognitive skills are important schooling predictors.
Table 2.6 reports the wage equation estimated coefficients and standard errors. For compu­
tational reasons we divided the wages by a thousand, therefore all the coefficients in this table 
and in the following ones are also scaled by the same factor. The three constant terms show that 
t>q>e 1 ranks last with the lowest intercept, followed by type 3 and t\q)e 2 with the highest. The 
cognitive skills coefficients are positive and highly significant gis expected. The estimated return 
to schooling depends on the level of experience. With ten years of experience the return to O 
Levels is 5%, to A Levels is 13% and to Higher Education is 30%. These returns are lower than 
what we found by running a simple OLS. The difference is due to the selection on unobservables.
Table 2.7 reports the coefficients in the utility of schooling. The model suggests that in­
dividuals had a negative utility from O Levels, with the utility being the highest for type 2. 
The negative utility is due to the relatively high return to O Levels and the absence of foregone 
earnings for this choice. Given fi^ ee education, the only reason not to take O Levels must be their 
relatively high effort cost. The utility from A Levels and Higher Education are instead positive 
because of foregone earnings and its not surprising because education was totally free.
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Figure 2.6: Qualifications by age 16 skills, true and simulated
Data — Age 7 cognitive skills
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Figure 2.7: Qualifications by age 7 skills, true and simulated
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The A coefficients in table 2.8 indicate that the probability of success in obtaining a qual­
ification once enrolled is increasing in both age 16 and age 7 cognitive skills. The difference 
across types do not appear to be statistically significant. Since we can not distinguish between 
enrolment and achievement in Higher Ekiucation we can not estimate A3. Nevertheless, rather 
than fixing A3 =  1, in the model we set A3 =  A2. This should be a more realistic approximation 
of the true A3.
The Ô coefficients in table 2.9 have the expected sign. We estimate an age 16 specific constant 
(<5oi) and O Levels interaction (6n ) . From the data, we observed that those who entered the 
labor market hnmediately had a very large chance of finding a job, even with no academic 
qualification. Perhaps they already had a job or some link to a work place. The additional 
parameters correct for this. Type 3 individuals are the most likely to  have a job offer, followed 
by type 2 and type 1.
The coefficients in table 2.10 show the expected sings. Being skilled, educated and expe­
rienced all reduce the probabUity of being fired. Again type 3 individuals are the least likely to 
be fired, followed by type 2 and type 1.
2.8.2 A Policy Experiment
As a policy experiment we simulate the effect of two alternative subsidies: a reduction in tuition 
fees, at any stage of the post 16 education process, or a subsidy to families when the individuals 
are still in their early chUdhood. The question we have in mind is which of the two would be 
more effective if we want to increase the education attainm ent of a new-born cohort or, given 
our data, a cohort tha t is stiU in the first decade of its life.
To start off, let us assume that the Government aims to increase Higher Education enrolment 
by 1% of the sample. We then use our model to compute the level of a tuition fees subsidy (grant) 
that would ensure such an increase. We alternate a Higher Ekiucation subsidy with an A Levels 
and O Levels ones.
W ith the exception of the last two columns, discussed later on, table 2.11 shows the result 
of performing this experiment. The upper part of the table reports the fraction of individuals
^®Eîssentially we force individuals to believe there is a possibility of failing in Higher Education even though in 
the likelihood no one does.
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enrolled in education at each age with or without subsidy. We just report the results up to 
age 18 because this is when individuals enroll in higher education. The second part of the table 
reports respectively the amount of the subsidy, its ratio with the median parental income, and 
the per-capita cost. The latter takes into account the length and eligibility of each subsidy. An 
HE subsidy would be given for 3 years but only to those who enroll in HE. An AL subsidy would 
be given for 2 years to those who enroll in AL. An OL subsidy would be given once to those who 
enroll in OL.
Both an HE and AL subsidy succeeded in raising Higher Education enrolment by 1%, but 
the HE subsidy is more eflBcient. It is lower both in absolute terms and per-capita. The 1402 
pounds subsidy correspond to 9.5% of the median parental income, costing 389 pounds each. We 
could not find an OL subsidy that would satisfy our initial requirement. The algorithm failed to 
find any improvement when it reached a subsidy worth more than 16824 pounds. For that value 
86% of the individuals are enrolling in O Levels and yet the vast majority leave before Higher 
Education.
This result is clearly not surprising and embedded in the dynamic model. Subsidizing O 
Levels and A Levels does not change the incentives to get into Higher Education. The reason 
why some would enroll in Higher Ekiucation with OL and AL subsidies is that once the subsidy 
has brought them into O Levels or A Levels, they might get a large and positive taste shock for 
schooling and therefore stay even longer. Thus the main reason to test the effect of the grant 
at different educational levels is to show its overall effect. Even though these different subsidies 
are all raising HE enrolment by 1% (but in the OL case), they have different effects on AL and 
OL enrolment. As the second and third rows of table 2.11 show, the AL grant leads to higher 
AL enrolment than a HE grant. A similar argument applies to the OL grant. In defining the 
most efficient subsidy we are therefore assuming that the Government is only aiming for an 
increase in Higher Ekiucation while the externalities generated by higher OL and AL enrolment 
are negligible.
It is worth noting tha t Keane and Wolpin (1997) find a 8.4% increase in college graduation
^°Note that even without subsidy the figures in table 2.11 are different from those in table 2.4. This is because 
table 2.4 takes into account sample attrition: i.e. sample attrition is changing the distribution of skills and 
parental income over age in our sample, and the simulation in table 2.4 corrects for that. In table 2.11 instead 
we keep the initial distribution of skills and parental income at age 16“ to simulate the whole process.
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rates following a $ 2000 grant in a similar set up, a much bigger effect that we find. It is also true 
that pre-grant college graduation rate in their sample is 24.2%, also much larger than our 8.2%. 
It is hard to say whether this difference is due to  differences in the educational systems and 
education incentives between the US and the UK, to different years of birth or to  the different 
way we model the choices.
Next, we try  to test whether a parental income subsidy would be more efficient than the 
HE one in pursuing our 1% increase. Our hypothesis is that a parental income subsidy would 
increase the age 16 cognitive skill endowment, and in tu rn  enrolment in education. In figure 2.6 
we have seen tha t our model predicts that highly skilled individuals are more likely to enroll. 
There is no other direct effect of a parental income subsidy on educational choices, not even 
through the unobserved heterogeneity. Although this might appear restrictive, it is in line with 
the current hterature findings that educational choices are affected by parental income only 
indirectly through the stock of skills.
We assume that our age 16 skill level is a function of innate abihty // and a history of parental 
background inputs PB:
Kie = f { n ,P B i , . . ,P B i 6 ) (2.17)
in particular, we are interested in disentanghng the effect of parental income among the 
parental background factors. If we assume /  to be linear in its arguments then:
E (K i6 |K i,..,ri6 ) =  T?K (2.18)
where 17 is a 1 x 16 vector of coefficients, and Y  is a 16 x 1 vector of parental income inputs. 
Ideally we would like to know max{rj} to subsidize parents a t the most efficient point in time. 
We could think of a one off monetary subsidy, or voucher, tha t has to be spent within the year.
Unfortunately, our data do not provide us which such a long history of parental income: 
income is reported only at age 16. However, we have rich information on parental background 
characteristics a t age 16, 11 and 7. These time varying variables would include father’s social 
class, whether the mother was working, region of residence and of course age. Call P B C t  the
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vector including these variables at any time t.
We then try  to infer parental income at a few points in time by first estimating a reduced 
form
^16 =  ( i 6 ^  B C 16 + ( 2 . 1 9 )  
and, under the assumption that Cie ~  Cii ~  C71 by computing
Ÿt = C ie P B C t  (2.20)
for i =  7,11,16. Here includes the constant and therefore the permanent income compo­
nent.
Finally we take
E (A :i6 |^ ,Y li,y i6 ,K 7) =  v Y  + <^K-r (2.21)
where we include K 7  as a proxy of innate abihty. A simple OLS estimation gives:
r/7 = 0.01; 7711 =  0.026; r/ie =  0.066; (2.22)
all being statistically significant.
There is no need to say that these estimates are quite rough approximations of the true 77 s 
Upward bias is hkely to be induced by omitted variables and downward bias by measurement 
error. The economic literature on the topic is still far from being able to clearly establish the true 
link between parental income and skills. Dahl and Lochner (2005) use the Earning Tax Credit 
scheme as an instrument for parental income. They estimate that a 10000 dollars increase in
income raises m ath test scores by 21% and reading test scores by 36% of a standard deviation.
Their estimated is above what usually found in the literature using other instruments, fixed 
effects or simple OLS. Our results suggest that an increase of 10000 pounds in 2001 prices
Income is in 1000 pounds.
^^See Todd auid Wolpin (2003), Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov 
(2006) for a discussion on the skills production function.
^^Their data are the children of the NLSY79 cohort, aged 9.5 on average.
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(around 15000 dollars), would push up the principal component by 50% of a standard deviation, 
close to their result. In any case, we do not feel in the position of claiming a consistent estimate 
of Tf either. We only have limited information on parental income, and we do not believe any of 
the variables at our disposal could be a valid instrument.
Therefore we use the model to compute the value of rj for which a one-off parental income 
subsidy would be as powerful as the HE tuition fees subsidy. Given that the two subsidies would 
have to cost the same, we set the parental income subsidy to 389 pounds, the per-capita cost of 
the HE subsidy. The result is reported in the fourth colunm of table 2.11 (P. Inc. Sub (1)). We 
do manage to get an increase in HE enrolment by 1%, but this occurs for a value of fj equal to 
0.216. This would be 3.24 times our estimated //le implying that an increase of 10000 pounds 
would push up the score by 168% of a standard deviation. This is far above any estimate found 
in the skill hterature, making it unlikely that even with a consistent estimate of r] the parental 
income subsidy could have been as powerful as the HE one.
It is instructive to compare the age 16 cognitive skills distribution before and after the 
parental income subsidy. The mean skill after the parental subsidy is 6.5% of a standard deviation 
larger then before the subsidy. This impUes tha t any policy aiming to achieve our 4-1% in 
enrolment only through cognitive skill accumulation would have to increase skills by at least 
6.5% of a standard deviation.
Given the non-linearity of the schooling choice model, this result depends inevitably on the 
targeted raise in Higher Education enrolment. The ratio between fj and our estimated 7716 
monotonically decreases as we target a larger augment in Higher Education enrolment, going 
down to 2.15 when we move from a 4-1% to a 4-5% enrolment. However such an increase would 
hkely have a strong effect on the return to education and cognitive skills, which our model 
does not account for. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) and Lee (2005) predicts a smaller 
impact of tuition subsidies once the general equilibrium effect, i.e. a lower return to schooling, 
is considered. Intuitively, if a general equilibrium effect was to appear in our model, the result 
of our comparison should be reinforced. While both kinds of subsidy would lead to a lower 
return to schoohng, shifting the distribution of cognitive skills towards the right would also 
lower its return and therefore weaken the positive link between cognitive skill and education.
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Thus, a larger increase in cognitive skills would be needed to  reach the targeted increase in 
Higher Education enrolment.
Next, we check what would happen if rather than targeting the age 16 cognitive skills stock, 
we were to target the age 7 one. If cognitive skills are shaped early in life, and if age 7 cognitive 
skills have an eflFect on schoohng choices even conditioning on age 16 ones, as the coefficients 
indicate, than  targeting the age 7 skills stock might be more efficient. This assumes that is not 
exogenous and therefore not a good proxy of innate abihty. The ç coefficient in the production 
function, equation (2.21), would be inconsistent and hkely upward biased. Nevertheless, keeping 
this in mind, it is interesting to ask what change in age 7 cognitive skills is needed to  match 
the effect of a 389 pounds Higher Ekiucation subsidy. We actuahy faU below the target by 0.86 
percentage points since the effect of age 7 skills on educational choices is not strong enough. 
However, when the algorithm stops the return to parental income is already 0.21, that is 3.15 
our OLS estimate. If ç is upward biased then ^ is a lower bound.
We also try  to  set a -1-1% target for A Level and O Level achievement. The Government might 
just value raising education to post-compulsory levels without necessarily increasing Higher 
Ekiucation enrolment. The results are shown in tables 2.12 and 2.13. As we would expect, the 
best way to reach the target is to give a grant at the target level, that is subsidize A Levels if the 
target is 4-1% enrolment in A Level, or similarly for O Levels. The parental income subsidy still 
require very high returns to be efficient, respectively 3.03 (A Levels) and 2.40 (O levels) times 
our OLS estimate when targeting age 16 skills.
A few more points worth noting. One could argue that this pohcy experiment is not very 
informative given tha t this cohort was born in 1958 and participation in Higher Ekiucation is 
much higher for the current cohorts. The importance of cognitive skills might have changed 
over time. Yet higher participation, either due to larger supply or demand, is likely to decrease 
the importance of cognitive skills, given that a now less elitarian group of individuals staying 
on. Therefore, our model is likely to over-estimate the impact of cognitive skills and, as a 
consequence, of the parental income subsidy, strengthening our conclusions.
The linear utifity implies no borrowing constraints and no risk aversion. If the individuals 
did face a borrowing constraint then tuition fees subsidies (grants) would be even more effective
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than our model predicts. Concerning risk aversion, the only source of randomness in our model 
is the taste shock in the utihty of schooling. There is no a priori reason why a tuition subsidy 
or an increase in cognitive skills should have very diflFerent effects due to risk aversion.
2.9 Conclusions
In this paper we build a dynamic structural model of educational choices and exploit rich cohort 
data  to investigate the importance of observed cognitive skills, ffnancial incentives and unob­
served heterogeneity in educational choices. The model predicts that highly skilled individuals 
stay longer in education and it does well in rephcating the choices conditional on the skill group.
We then simulate the effect of two educational subsidies equal in cost but different in timing. 
The first consists of grants assigned directly to the individuals aged between 16 and 18. The 
second is a subsidy assigned to the parents earlier on, when the cohort is still in its childhood. 
Our aim is to test whether an unconditional parental subsidy, with its indirect effect on cognitive 
skills, could be more eflBcient in fostering educational enrolment than a direct educational grant. 
When we target an increase in Higher Education enrolment equal to 1% of the population, 
our results suggest tha t this is not the case. Unless the effect of parental income on skills is 
implausibly high, a direct grant in the form of a tuition subsidy seems more eflBcient even in 
the absence of short term financial constraints. Although cognitive skills accumulated during 
childhood play a key role in the educational decisions, an unconditional financial subsidy to 
parents is not the best pohcy. This result is robust even if we target a different increase in 
Higher Ekiucation enrolment or if we target an increase at a lower education level.
The overaU result does not call a halt to additional investment in cognitive skill accumulation 
during childhood. We only consider the link between cognitive skills and parental income, surely 
weaker than between skills and parental investment, such as child care or parental time. In our 
opinion, the insight of the paper is the opposite, cognitive skills are important but changes in 
educational choices demand a sizeable shift in the cognitive skills distribution.
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Table 2.1: Status by age (Number of observations)
Age Education Work Unemployment Total
16“ 1,811 0 1,063 2,874
( 63.01 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 36.99 ) ( 100.00 )
IB*» 535 2,178 161 2,874
( 18.62 ) ( 75.78 ) ( 5.60 ) ( 100.00 )
17 535 2,222 109 2,866
( 18.67 ) ( 77.53 ) ( 3.80 ) ( 100.00 )
18 197 2,349 153 2,699
( 7.30 ) ( 87.03 ) ( 5.67 ) ( 100.00 )
19 197 2,341 129 2,667
( 7.39 ) ( 87.78 ) ( 4.84 ) ( 100.00 )
20 197 2,318 129 2,644
( 7.45 ) ( 87.67 ) ( 4.88 ) ( 100.00 )
21 0 2,407 153 2,560
( 0.00 ) ( 94.02 ) ( 5.98 ) ( 100.00 )
22 0 2,208 267 2,475
( 0.00 ) ( 89.21 ) ( 10.79 ) ( 100.00 )
23 0 2,190 252 2,442
( 0.00 ) ( 89.68 ) ( 10.32 ) ( 100.00 )
24 0 1,729 120 1,849
( 0.00 ) ( 93.51 ) ( 6.49 ) ( 100.00 )
25 0 1,714 119 1,833
( 0.00 ) ( 93.51 ) ( 6.49 ) ( 100.00 )
26 0 1,692 123 1,815
( 0.00 ) ( 93.22 ) ( 6.78 ) ( 100.00 )
27 0 1,687 113 1,800
( 0.00 ) ( 93.72 ) ( 6.28 ) ( 100.00 )
28 0 1,692 100 1,792
( 0.00 ) ( 94.42 ) ( 5.58 ) ( 100.00 )
29 0 1,686 92 1,778
( 0.00 ) ( 94.83 ) ( 5.17 ) ( 100.00 )
30 0 1,686 81 1,767
( 0.00 ) ( 95.42 ) ( 4.58 ) ( 100.00 )
31 0 1,676 83 1,759
( 0.00 ) ( 95.28 ) ( 4.72 ) ( 100.00 )
32 0 1,654 101 1,755
( 0.00 ) ( 94.25 ) ( 5.75 ) ( 100.00 )
33 0 1,458 81 1,539
( 0.00 ) ( 94.74 ) ( 5.26 ) ( 100.00 )
34 0 1,413 78 1,491
( 0.00 ) ( 94.77 ) ( 5.23 ) ( 100.00 )
35 0 1,407 76 1,483
( 0.00 ) ( 94.88 ) ( 5.12 ) ( 100.00 )
36 0 1,400 78 1,478
( 0.00 ) ( 94.72 ) ( 5.28 ) ( 100.00 )
37 0 1,391 82 1,473
( 0.00 ) ( 94.43 ) ( 5.57 ) ( 100.00 )
38 0 1,381 85 1,466
( 0.00 ) ( 94.20 ) ( 5.80 ) ( 100.00 )
39 0 1,372 87 1,459
( 0.00 ) ( 94.04 ) ( 5.96 ) ( 100.00 )
40 0 1,360 90 1,450
( 0.00 ) ( 93.79 ) ( 6.21 ) ( 100.00 )
41 0 1,332 108 1,440
( 0.00 ) ( 92.50 ) ( 7.50 ) ( 100.00 )
Total 4,047 45,943 4,251 54,241
( 7.46 ) ( 84.70 ) ( 7.84 ) ( 100.00 )
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Table 2.2: Wage (Sample averages)
age=23 age=33 age=41
Wage 12326.47 19175.00 23904.71
( 3220.47 ) ( 7209.19 ) (11409.47 )
Wage by qualification.
Wage — No Qualif. 12094.48 17607.02 21381.15
( 3233.81 ) ( 6115.98 ) ( 9011.91 )
Wage — O Levels 13125.45 22878.02 28981.42
( 3050.66 ) ( 7750.02 ) (12156.04 )
Wage — A Levels 13415.03 25742.56 37967.17
( 2670.46 ) ( 6602.89 ) (18981.43 )
Wage — H.E. 13403.48 28595.93 38780.83
( 3022.19 ) ( 7964.21 ) (15630.93 )
Standard Deviations in brackets.
Yearly wages are derived by first computing hourly wages and then 
multiplying them by 52. Wages are in January 2001 prices.
Table 2.3: Cognitive Skills and Parental Income (Sample averages)
age 16 age 7
Math Score 13.68 5.33
( 7.26 ) ( 2.44 )
Reading Score 25.70 23.15
( 7.10 ) ( 7.00 )
Principal Component -2.28e-10 -2.34e-09
( 128 ) ( 117  )
Parental Income 16226.79 ---
( 6128.49 ) ( — )
Standard Deviations in brackets.
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Table 2.4: Model Fit - Status (Proportions)
Age
Education 
TVue Predicted
Work 
TVue Predicted
Unemp.
True Predicted
16“ 0.6301 0.6241 0 0 0.3699 0.3759
16*’ 0.1862 0.1688 0.7578 0.7805 0.0560 0.0507
17 0.1867 0.1675 0.7753 0.7850 0.0380 0.0475
18 0.0730 0.0701 0.8703 0.8688 0.0567 0.0611
19 0.0739 0.0672 0.8778 0.8794 0.0484 0.0534
20 0.0745 0.0657 0.8767 0.8798 0.0488 0.0545
21 0 0 0.9402 0.9442 0.0598 0.0558
22 0 0 0.8921 0.9436 0.1079 0.0564
23 0 0 0.8968 0.9418 0.1032 0.0582
24 0 0 0.9351 0.9422 0.0649 0.0578
25 0 0 0.9351 0.9431 0.0649 0.0569
26 0 0 0.9322 0.9426 0.0678 0.0574
27 0 0 0.9372 0.9430 0.0628 0.0570
28 0 0 0.9442 0.9437 0.0558 0.0563
29 0 0 0.9483 0.9454 0.0517 0.0546
30 0 0 0.9542 0.9451 0.0458 0.0549
31 0 0 0.9528 0.9452 0.0472 0.0548
32 0 0 0.9425 0.9448 0.0575 0.0552
33 0 0 0.9474 0.9465 0.0526 0.0535
34 0 0 0.9477 0.9473 0.0523 0.0527
35 0 0 0.9488 0.9475 0.0512 0.0525
36 0 0 0.9472 0.9481 0.0528 0.0519
37 0 0 0.9443 0.9490 0.0557 0.0510
38 0 0 0.9420 0.9484 0.0580 0.0516
39 0 0 0.9404 0.9471 0.0596 0.0529
40 0 0 0.9379 0.9460 0.0621 0.0540
41 0 0 0.9250 0.9443 0.0750 0.0557
Table 2.5: Model Fit - Wage (Sample average)
True Predicted TVue Predicted TVue Predicted lYue Predicted
Overall Age 23 Age 33 Age 41
17750 18003 12326 12635 19175 18094 23905 23518
No Qualif 16381 16590 12094 12338 17607 16749 21381 20866
O Levels 20987 20722 13125 13463 22878 20756 28981 28299
A Levels 25297 22413 13415 13061 25743 22089 37967 32532
HE 26341 25299 13403 13797 28596 24786 38781 37809
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Table 2.6: Estimated Coefficients - Wage Equation
E^stimate S.E. ratio
<Tu 0.2789 ( 0.0027) (104.5020)
Type 1 2.2286 ( 0.0147) (151.1216)
Type 2 deviation from type 1 0.3229 ( 0.0118) ( 27.3637)
Type 3 deviation from type 1 0.0249 ( 0.0644) ( 0.3862)
Otk2 0.0654 ( 0.0073) ( 8.9546)
ajti 0.0190 ( 0.0056) ( 3.4003)
-0.0614 ( 0.0356) (-1.7277)
Otq2 -0.0676 ( 0.1227) ( -0.5511)
OtqZ 0.0354 ( 0.0559) ( 0.6331)
OLx 0.0278 ( 6.7610e-004) ( 41.0976)
« I l 0.0118 ( 0.0017) ( 6.7742)
« i 2 0.0202 ( 0.0060) ( 3.3557)
« x 3 0.0271 ( 0.0030) ( 9.0672)
Table 2.7: Estimated Coefficients - Utility of Schooling
Estimate S.E. ratio
18.0527 ( 2.5486) ( 7.0834)
14.9309 ( 4.1329) ( 3.6127)
CTea 21.9125 ( 9.3737) ( 2.3376)
Type 1 -5.5077 ( 1.1841) ( -4.6512)
Type 2 deviation from type 1 4.1302 ( 1.6581) ( 2.4909)
Type 3 deviation from type 1 2.6691 ( 2.4009) ( 1.1117)
lA L 12.0880 ( 3.2117) ( 3.7637)
If HE 11.8215 ( 3.3493) ( 3.5295)
49
Table 2.8: Estimated Coefficients - Probability of Success in School
Estimate S.E. ratio
Type 1 -0.9936 ( 0.0816) (-12.1709)
Typ>e 2 deviation from type 1 0.0754 ( 0.1477) ( 0.5108)
Type 3 deviation from type 1 -0.0412 ( 0.2444) ( -0.1687)
1.3638 ( 0.0371) ( 36.7728)
0.1081 ( 0.0382) ( 2.8314)
^AL 0.5481 ( 0.1631) ( 3.3613)
^2k2 0.4946 ( 0.0857) ( 5.7715)
^2kl 0.1357 ( 0.0387) ( 3.5074)
Table 2.9: Estimated Coefficients - Probability of having a Job OflFer
E^stimate S.E. ratio
Type 1 0.4841 ( 0.0674) ( 7.1855)
Type 2 deviation from type 1 0.2103 ( 0.1264) ( 1.6633)
Type 3 deviation from typ»e 1 1.3726 ( 0.0599) ( 22.9256)
<5fc2 0.1211 ( 0.0305) ( 3.9739)
0.0054 ( 0.0258) ( 0.2090)
0.0986 ( 0.0911) ( 1.0829)
Sq2 0.0229 ( 0.2003) ( 0.1145)
q^3 0.9012 ( 0.1520) ( 5.9292)
-0.0741 ( 0.0050) (-14.8447)
<*01 1.2630 ( 0.0726) ( 17.4067)
<*11 -0.7956 ( 0.1354) ( -5.8780)
Table 2.10: Eîstimated Coefficients - Probability of being fired
Eistimate S.E. ratio
Type 1 -1.7899 ( 0.0335) (-53.4109)
Type 2 deviation from type 1 -0.6224 ( 0.0836) ( -7.4437)
Type 3 deviation from type 1 -1.0765 ( 0.0778) (-13.8312)
<t>k2 -0.1378 ( 0.0198) ( -6.9570)
<t>k\ 0.0034 ( 0.0159) ( 0.2120)
<>q\ -0.1980 ( 0.0588) ( -3.3684)
4>q2 0.0741 ( 0.1616) ( 0.4585)
<t>q3 0.0526 ( 0.1138) ( 0.4619)
4>x -0.0200 ( 0.0024) ( -8.4790)
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Table 2.11: Policy Experiment - -1-1% in HE enrolment
No Sub O Levels Sub. A Levels Sub. HE Sub P. Inc. Sub (1) P. Inc. Sub (2)
16“ 0.6241 0.8611 0.6278 0.6255 0.6363 0.6326
IG*» 0.1642 0.1747 0.1876 0.1717 0.1773 0.1712
17 0.1642 0.1747 0.1876 0.1717 0.1773 0.1712
18 0.0825 0.0852 0.0925 0.0925 0.0925 0.0839
Subsidy 0 16824 1932 1402 1402 1402
% of Median Income 0 1.1306 0.129 0.094 0.094 0.094
Per-Capita Cost 0 14487 725 389 389 389
Table 2.12: Policy Experiment - -1-1% in AL enrolment
No Sub O Levels Sub. A Levels Sub. HE Sub P. Inc. Sub (1) P. Inc. Sub (2)
16“ 0.6241 0.8779 0.6259 0.6256 0.6328 0.6305
IG*" 0.1642 0.1742 0.1742 0.1742 0.1742 0.1724
17 0.1642 0.1742 0.1742 0.1742 0.1742 0.1724
18 0.0825 0.0849 0.0870 0.0949 0.0912 0.0866
Subsidy 0 18529 877 1724 877 877
% of Median Income 0 1.245 0.059 0.115 0.059 0.059
Per-Capita Cost 0 16267 305 490 305 305
Table 2.13: Policy Experiment - 4-1% in OL enrolment
No Sub O Levels Sub. A Levels Sub. HE Sub P. Inc. Sub (1) P. Inc. Sub (2)
16“ 0.6241 0.6341 0.6341 0.6341 0.6341 0.6335
16*» 0.1642 0.1653 0.2158 0.2187 0.1747 0.1672
17 0.1642 0.1653 0.2158 0.2187 0.1747 0.1672
18 0.0825 0.0827 0.1054 0.1423 0.0863 0.0857
Subsidy 0 689 4319 8563 689 689
% of Median Income 0 0.046 0.290 0.575 0.046 0.046
Per-Capita Cost 0 437 1864 3655 437 437
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C h a p t e r  3
T e s t in g  S t o c h a s t ic  M o n o t o n ic it y  in  In t e r g e n e r a t io n a l  
M o b il it y  T a b l e s
3.1 Introduction
The extent to  which individuals inherit their socio-economic status in a society has important 
imphcations for poUcy debates on equal opportunities and social justice. The analysis of the 
causes and consequences of the intergenerational transmission of social status from one genera­
tion to the next has traditionally been one of the most active areas of research by economists, 
sociologists and social scientists alike.
Inspection of typical mobihty tables and theoretical reasoning indicate that in most societies 
there is a general tendency for children from higher status parents to somehow fare “better” in 
social achievement than children from lower status parents. To substantiate this general idea, 
first, one needs to agree on the exact meaning of this statement, second, one has to devise a 
sort of testing procedure for verifying the hypothesis, and finally, one has to apply the testing 
procedure with real world data.
In this paper we will consider this characteristic of the intergenerational transmission of 
social status, which implicitly or explicitly underlines most research on intergenerational social 
mobihty. The first section of this paper will propose a precise definition of the idea that a child is 
better off by having a parent with a higher social status, based on the theory of monotone Markov 
chains as developed by Keilson and Kester (1977) and Conlisk (1990). We then employ a rich data 
set on intergenerational social mobility, which has been made available in Ganzeboom, Luijkx, 
and Treiman (1989), to test the monotonicity assumption using the stochastic dominance testing
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procedure of Dardanoni and Forcina (1998). This large data set contains 149 mobility tables 
combining information from 35 different countries and different years. It is a very comprehensive 
data  set for comparative mobility analysis, and it has the distinctive advantage of employing a 
consistent and well defined definition of social status. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that for 
most societies the monotonicity assumption cannot be rejected.
In the second part of the paper, we consider testing for stochastic monotonicity conditional 
on some appropriate set of covariates z . Starting with Becker and Tomes (1979), researchers 
have proposed economic models of intergenerational mobility. It is by now widely accepted that 
parental transmission of skills, behefe, motivation and social connections are all important in 
explaining the strong dependence between father and son social status. It is therefore natural to 
test whether the positive dependence between father’s and son’s status is still present after con­
ditioning for some of these characteristics. On a similar line of thought, some researchers have 
turned their attention to the concept of equafity of opportunity (EoP).^ Dardanoni, Fields, Roe- 
mer, and Puerta (2006) for example, following the seminal contribution of Putterman, Roemer, 
and Silvestre (1998) and Roemer (2000), describe EoP by distinguishing between circumstances 
and effort. Circumstances are aspects of the environment affecting the socio-economic status 
and for which society does not wish to hold individuals responsible. Effort is the set of actions 
affecting the status for which individuals are responsible. EoP implies that differences in status 
are ethically acceptable if they are due to differential effort but not if they are due to differential 
circumstances. This requires independence conditional on those covariates z  that we consider 
effort.
Extending the Unear regression model to control for some covariates z  is straightforward. 
However, the transition matrix literature has reported indices of mobility based on uncondi­
tional distributions, or at most conditional on a few discrete covariates. The main theoretical 
challenge is to devise statistical inference procedures to test for stochastic monotonicity condi­
tional on observed covariates. To this purpose, we extend the Dardanoni and Forcina (1998) 
test for stochastic monotonicity by allowing for conditioning on covariates. Technically, our 
approach employs recent advances in marginal modelling (see e.g. Bergsma and Rudas (2002)
^Defining the appropriate concepts of equality of opportunity and testing them empirically is an area which 
is undergoing much current research, see e.g. Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Menendez (2003), Peragine (2004), 
Lefranc. Pistolesi, and TVannoy (2006) and Fleurbaey (2008).
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and Bartolucci, Colombi, and Forcina (2007)), along the lines of Bartolucci, Forcina, and Dard­
anoni (2001), who consider (unconditional) testing for a notion of positive dependence {positive 
quadrant dependence) which is weaker than the monotonicity assumption analyzed in this paper.
We apply our methodology using the National Child Development Survey (NODS), a UK 
cohort data set, which follows a cohort born in 1958 over its lifetime. Information on social 
class and wages is available both for the cohort members and their parents. The data also 
provide information on the educational attainment, cognitive and non-cognitive skills of the 
cohort members. Given the amount of characteristics observable to the researcher, the data are 
particulary fit to test for conditional dependence and different notions of equality of opportunity. 
Our results indicate that even though our control variables explain part of the intergenerational 
mobihty mechanism, stochastic monotonicity holds both unconditionally and conditionaUy.
3.2 Monotone transition matrices
Let X  and Y  denote, respectively, father’s and son’s lifetime socio-economic status, and assume 
they take k possible values, which correspond to the k socio-economic classes that are ordered 
from best to worst. Consider then a standard discrete Markov chain of intergenerational social 
mobihty: if the unit of observation is a family of father and child, the chain can be described by 
the equation p*' =  p* P ,  where P  denotes the {k x k) transition matrix, with typical element 
Pij = Pr(son in  j  | fa th e r  in i) > 0, and p*, p^ denote respectively the marginal distributions 
of father’s and son’s social status. The typical row i of an intergenerational transition matrix 
indicates the probability distribution faced by a son whose father belongs to social class i. As 
argued above, it is natural to expect that when social states are ordered, sons whose fathers are 
in a higher social class are somewhat at an advantage with respect to the sons whose fathers are 
in a lower class. In a stochastic setting, this translates into the assumption that the “lottery” 
faced by the son of a father in class i is better than the “lottery ” faced by the son of a father in 
class z +  1. A natural definition of a “better lottery ” in this context is given by the stochastic 
dominance ordering given two ( &x l )  probability vectors and q 2 , we say that qi h  92 if 
9ii +  Qi2  +  • • • +  Qii ^  Q2 i 4- 922 +  • • • +  92/ for &U f =  1,2, ^k — 1.
The stochastic dominance ordering gives a precise definition to the intuitive notion of dif­
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ferential advantage. Let s denote a real valued ( k x l )  vector of “social status scores” , where 
the typical element si reflects a quantitative measure of the value of social class /, and let Pj (a 
row vector) denote the ith  row of P.  A son whose father is in class i will have with probability 
Pii  social status si, so that his expected social score is given by p^s. An equivalent characteri­
zation of the stochastic dominance ordering is obtained in terms of expected social status: p^s 
> PjS  (here and hereafter, when an inequahty symbol involves vectors and matrices, we mean 
that the inequality is satisfied elementwise) for any increasing vectors s if and only if p^ y  Pj.^ 
The intuitive notion of background advantage is captured in the discrete Markov chain by the 
so called ‘monotonicity’ assumption. The transition matrix of a discrete Markov chain with 
ordered states is called monotone (see Keilson and Kester (1977), Conlisk (1990), Dardanoni 
(1993) and Dardanoni (1995) for applications) if each row stochastically dominates the row be­
low it. Pi y  P2  y  ■ • y  Pk- i t  follows that in a monotone mobility process each son at time t is 
better off, in terms of expected social status, by having a parent from state i than by having a 
parent from state i 4-1.^
A key monotone transition matrix is the so-called “equal opportunities” transition matrix 
(see e.g. Prais (1955)), where at time t each son faces an identical probability distribution 
regardless of his father’s background. Given the transition equation p^ — p^ P , the equal 
opportunities mobility matrix is equal to Ip*' , so tha t the stochastic dominance constraint is 
satisfied as an equality. This particular monotone mobility matrix will play an important role 
in the hypothesis testing of the monotonicity assumption.
3.3 Testing unconditional monotonicity: An application
There is now an extensive statistical literature (see e.g. Robertson, Wright, and Dykstra (1988) 
and Silvapulle and Sen (2005)), on estimation and hypothesis testing in problems involving 
stochastic orderings. In particular, Robertson and Wright (1982) derive testing procedures 
based on maximum likelihood estimates of two stochastically ordered distributions, and Dykstra, 
Kochar, and Robertson (1991) obtain the maximum hkelihood estimates of several multinomial
^This is a well known result in the stochastic dominance literature; see e.g. Lehmann (1955).
^Under the assumption of a constant transition matrix, this relationship also holds for the grandfather, grand- 
grandfather and so on. This follows from the fact that if P  is monotone, so is P* for t =  1, 2, - ■ ■.
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distributions under uniform stochastic ordering, which is stronger than stochastic dominance. 
Dardanoni and Forcina (1998) extend these results and propose a nonparametric test for stochas­
tic dominance which can be used to test monotonicity of the Markov chain of intergenerational 
mobility. In particular, Theorem 2 in their paper gives conservative bounds to the distribution 
of the likeUhood ratio test statistic for testing monotonicity against an unrestricted alternative.
We perform Dardanoni and Forcina's procedure on a sample of cross-classification tables 
presented in Ganzeboom et al. (1989). This data set, which contains 149 intergenerational class 
mobility tables fi"om 35 countries, is one of the most comprehensive and well structured data 
set on intergenerational social mobihty to date. Ganzeboom, Luijks and Treiman present the 
cross-classification of father’s occupation by son’s current occupation for representative national 
samples of men aged 21-64, with the characteristic that the tables conform to a well specified 
six category scheme. The six social classes, in descending order of socio-economic status, are the 
following: 1) Large proprietors, higher and lower professionals and managers; 2) Routine non- 
manual workers; 3) Small proprietors with and without employees; 4) Lower grade technicians, 
manual supervisors and skilled manual workers; 5) Unskilled and semiskilled manual workers; 
6) Self employed farmers and (unskilled) agricultural workers. The use of a conunon and well 
structured classification of social classes results in a substantial degree of comparability among 
the different tables.
Maximum likelihood estimation of each mobility matrix subject to the monotonicity con­
straint has been carried out by the iterative quadratic programming algorithm described by 
Dardanoni and Forcina (1998). Convergence to the fifth decimal place of the likelihood function 
is usually obtained within the first three iterations. The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic 
is reported in table 3.11 in the appendix, along with the number of monotonicity constraints 
actually binding in the sample.
Following Dardanoni and Forcina (1998, Theorem 2), the q critical values of the conservative 
unconditional chi-bar-squared test can be found by solving the equation
t = 0
2 (*: 1) Pr[xi = c] = a.
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By numerical integration we obtain a value c =  22.78 at the 95% significance level, while it equals 
28.61 at the 99% level. Comparing these significance levels with the value of the likehhood ratio 
test statistic, it emerges that out of 149 intergenerational class mobility tables, monotonicity is 
rejected at the 99% significance level only for the transition matrices of Hungary 1963, Philippines 
1968, Poland 1972 and Spain 1975. In addition, the monotonicity hypothesis is rejected at the 
95% level for Hungary 1973 and 1983 and India 1963c. Thus, it appears that monotonicity 
of the intergenerational transmission mechanism can generally be considered as an assumption 
supported by the real world.
3-4 Conditional Stochastic Monotonicity
A large number of studies have investigated the degree of intergenerational mobility. Irrespective 
of country, time period, measure of socio-economic status and measure of association, almost 
all studies have found that parent’s and offspring’s adult status are not independent, but ex­
hibit some form of positive dependence. The previous section has confirmed this “fact of life ”, 
where positive dependence is precisely formulated in terms of stochastic dominance, and formal 
statistical inference procedures have been employed.
Starting with Becker and Tomes (1979) researchers have proposed economic models of inter­
generational mobihty to uncover the mechanism behind the transmission of social status. Becker 
and Tomes (1986), Solon (1999), MuUigan (1999), Han and MuUigan (2001) emd Restuccia and 
Urrutia (2004) are all attempts in that direction. At a basic level, a simple model that assumes 
intergenerational transmission of ability and a human capital return to parental investment that 
is increasing in the child’s ability can already generate a high degree of immobility. Adding 
imperfect capital markets to the model results in even less mobility. These models also show 
that the degree of mobihty can be highly non-linear across the father and child’s socio-economic 
distribution, whether socio-economic status is measured by wage, consumption or education. 
On a more intuitive ground, Bowles and Gintis (2002), Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002) and 
Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan (2007) suggest that more than a simple transmission of abil­
ity might be in place. Other factors such as race, geographical location, wealth, risk aversion, 
discounting of the future, non-cognitive skills, but also height and beauty can be transmitted
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and generate the correlation in status. Not surprisingly most of these papers have also tried to 
empirically investigate the black box. However, none of these studies can explain more than 60% 
of the overall correlation. Bjorklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006) use unique Swedish data with 
information on adopted children’s biological and adoptive parents to estimate intergenerational 
mobility associations in earnings and education. They find tha t both pre- and post-birth factors 
contribute to intergenerational earnings and education transmission. The distinction between 
nature and nurture is particularly important if we are asked to judge meritocracy and equality 
of opportunity.
On a shghtly different fine of thought Dardanoni et al. (2006) discuss different notions of 
equafity of opportunity based on the distinction between circumstances and effort: “Agreement 
is widespread th a t equafity of opportunity holds in a society if the chances that individuals have 
to succeed depend only on their own efforts and not upon extraneous circumstances tha t may 
inhibit or expand those chances. W hat is contentious, however, is what constitutes effort and 
circumstances” . In their paper they describe four channels through which parents affect status 
in an intergenerational context: social connections, the formation of social beliefe and skills, the 
transmission of native ability and the instillation of preferences and aspirations. Various notions 
of EoP  depend on whether these channels are regarded as circumstances or effort. In other 
words, if we consider all those channels as circumstances out of an individual’s control, than 
EoP  implies perfect intergenerational mobility. This is perhaps the strongest definition of EoP 
where parent’s and offspring’s status must be independent. Less stringent notions of EoP allow 
for some of those channels to be influenced by the offsprings. In turn this requires independence 
conditional on those covariates z  that we consider individual effort, z  could include measures 
of preferences and aspirations, native ability, social beliefs and skills, and social connections.
3.5 Testing conditional monotonicity: Theory
Recall that X  and Y  denote, respectively, father’s and son’s social class, and let z  be a vector 
of covariates which may affect the joint distribution and denote with 7r(z) the vector containing 
the joint distribution of X  and Y  conditional on z, with Y  categories running faster. If z was 
discrete and a sufficient number of observations were available for each distinct configuration
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of z, Dardanoni and Forcina (1998)’s unconditional test procedure could be performed for each 
subpopulation. However these conditions are unlikely to be satisfied whenever the number of 
covariates is reasonably large and/or certain covariates assume a large number of distinct values. 
Therefore, a meaningful approach is to model the effect of covariates by a suitable link function 
and a regression model.
The link function that we propose is based on the mapping of the conditional distribution of 
X ,Y  I z  into a set of row and column marginal parameters and (k — 1)^ association parameters. 
Both the row and column marginal parameters are Global Logits (see e.g. Agresti (2002)):
Pi{z) = log
^j{z) = log
P {X  >  i I z)
P { X < i \ z ) \
p ( y > j | z ) , j  — 1 , . . . ,  A: 1,P ( y < ;  |z)J
while the association parameters are Local-Global Log-Odds Ratios (see e.g. Agresti (2002)):
Tij{z) = log
P {X  = i , Y < j \  z )P {X  =  i +  l , y  >  j  I z)
[P {X  = i , Y > j \  z )P { X  =  i +  l , y  <  j  I z) J
Douglas, Fienberg, Lee, Sampson, and Whitaker (1990) show that 7 t ( z )  is monotone if and only 
if the set of {k — 1)^ LG-log odds ratios are nonnegative. Global logits can be seen as the natural 
generalization of the standard binary logits when the variable is ordered; in fact, global logits can 
be interpreted as binary logits computed on successive splits of the ordinal response categories 
into “low” and “high” levels.
Collect now the corresponding parameters into the vectors p (z ) ,( (z )  and r (z )  (by letting 
the j  index run faster than i), then let A(z) = \p{z) , ( (z )  , r ( z )  ] ; this has dimension 2(A: -  
1) + (A: — 1)^ =  A:^  — 1, which equals the number of free parameters in 7r(z). The results of 
Bartolucci et al. (2007) on marginal parameterizations may be applied to this context and imply 
that there exists a matrix of row contrasts C  and a matrix M  of zeros and ones such that, Vz
A (z)= C log[M 7r(z)]
and the mapping from 7r(z) to A(z) is invertible and differentiable for all strictly positive 7t(z)
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(see their Theorem 1). Thus, the set of marginal and association parameters A(z) is a one-to-one 
mapping of 7r(z) with no modelUng restriction. However, as argued above, when z  takes a large 
number of distinct configurations, to gather information from such sparse data, the different 
A(z) may be constrained to satisfy a linear model
7r(z) =  p[A(z)] =  g[Z^]  (3.1)
where the design matrix Z  and the model parameters ^  are derived by stacking the following 
system of linear equations
Pi ~  Ck* "t" ’ i — . . .  1 k 1
~  Oij "t" ’ j  — ^ 1  ••••> k — 1
T i j  = OL^j Z ^ Y 0 i j  5 h j  = • 1 k — 1
where z%, z y  and z x v  denote respectively the subset of observed covariates z  which are sup­
posed to affect the marginal distribution of X  and Y  and their dependence structure.
3.5.1 H ypotheses of interest
A convenient feature of the parametrization defined above is that the hypothesis of stochastic 
monotonicity conditionally on relevant covariates can be expressed in the form of linear inequality 
constraints on the appropriate sub-vector of the x/j. In particular, the hypothesis of stochastic 
monotonicity can be written as
H i : Tij = 4- z 'xy l^ fj^  > 0 V z%y; i, j  =  1 , . . . ,  A: -  1. (3.2)
If we rewrite the set H i compactly in terms of the model parameters as {xj) : Dxf) > 0}, 
notice that in typical applications the matrix D  may have many more rows than columns and 
thus many inequahties are likely to be redundant. For example, in the application discussed 
below,there are more than 4000 inequalities with only 64 variables. There are algorithms, like 
the Fourier-Motzkin (see e.g. Schrijver (1986)) that could be used to spot and remove redundant
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inequalities; however, in our experience, redundant constraints do not slow significantly down 
the estimation algorithm anyway.
On the other hand, the hypothesis of equality of opportunities is equivalent to
Ho'.Tij = ^XY\ i, j  =  -  1; (3.3)
which can be equivalently rewritten in the standard form as
H q : =  0 &  =  0 .
Finally, by %  we will denote the unrestricted model.
3.5.2 Param eter estim ates
Suppose now we have independent observations (%*, l i ,  Zi) for a sample of n units. Let t{zi) be 
a vector of size obtained by stacking one above the others the rows of a table having 1 in the
cell X i,Y j  and 0 elsewhere. To simplify notations, in the sequel we write t{i) instead of t{zi);
a similar convention will be adopted for any vector which depends on z,. Under independent 
sampling, conditionally on z ,^ t{i) has a multinomial distribution with vector of probabilities 
7r(i). An algorithm for maximizing the multinomial log likehhood
L = '^ t{ i) 'lo g [n {i)]  (3.4)
is described by Colombi and Forcina (2001) and Dardanoni and Forcina (2008), and is based on 
an extension of an algorithm due to Aitchison and Silvey (1958). Essentially, at each step the 
algorithm does the following, until convergence:
•  compute a quadratic approximation of the log likelihood in terms of the canonical (log- 
linear) parameters;
•  compute a linear approximation of the canonical parameters in terms of
•  solve a weighted least square problem.
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When inequality constraints are present, the weighted least square problem to be solved at 
each step requires a quadratic optimization which is itself iterative: there are many algorithms 
for quadratic optimization under inequality constraints, which are usually very fast and reliable.
3.5.3 H ypotheses testing
In the following let ^2 denote the unrestricted maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of be
the MLE of tj) under the stochastic monotonicity hypothesis Tii and the MLE of ^  under
the equaUty of opportunity hypothesis Mq. Let denote the expected information matrix
with respect to xf). From standard asymptotic results it follows that, if as n increases, F{xj))/n is 
of full rank, an asymptotic normal distribution iV(^, Therefore, hypotheses on
single elements of xj) may be tested by comparing the estimate with the corresponding standard 
error. Joint testing may be based on the asymptotic distribution of the L R  statistic. Recall the 
well known result that the L R  for testing the unrestricted model against Tio
To2  = 2(L(V»2) -  L{^o)) (3.5)
has asymptotic \ r  distribution where r  is the sum of the dimensions of and .
WTien inequalities are involved, the testing problem may be split into testing the unrestricted 
model H 2  against H i and testing H i against Hq. The corresponding L R  statistics may be written 
as
Toi = 2 (L (^ i) -  L(V'o)) (3.6)
Ti2  = 2{L{x/^2) -  L{xPi)) (3.7)
It is also useful to recall the following:
D efinition 1 Let b ~  iV(0, V) be a k-dimensional normal random vector, and let C be a poly­
hedral cone in R ^ . The squared norm of the projection of b onto C is a chi-bar-squared random
variable x^(C, V)
X^ {C, V) = b'v~^b -  m iU a e d b  -  a ) ' v ~ \ b  -  a) (3.8)
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and has distribution function:
k
P t(x H C ,V ) < x )  = Y ,W i(C ,V )F ^{xA )  (3.9)
t= 0
where Fj^{x,i) denotes the distribution function of a chi-square unth i d.f. and Wi(C,V)  is the 
probability that the projection of b onto C belongs to a face of dimension i.
We recall the following, which can be derived e.g. from Shapiro (1985) or Dardanoni and 
Forcina (1999):
P ro p o s itio n  1 Under the assumption that the true value belongs to the interior of TÏq, the 
asymptotic distributions o/ T qi andT \ 2  are:
Toi
Ti2 (3.10)
where dnaZ of Tii in the metric determined by the information matrix at .
Asymptotic critical values for these statistics depend on the probability weights Wi{Hi,  (-0®)); 
unfortunately, except in very small problems, no closed form expression is available for the 
computation of these weights. However, reUable estimates may be obtained by Monte Carlo 
simulations as described by Dardanoni and Forcina (1998).
II is worth recalUng briefly the idea upon which the estimation of the probability weights is
based. Let b denote the projection of 6 ~  iV(0, V)  onto H i, D{b) be the subset of rows of D
such that D{b)b = 0, and Z{b) the orthogonal complement of D (6 ). Then Wg{H\, F ~ ^ is 
the probability that Z{b) has rank g. Clearly, only non redundant rows can appear in D{b) and 
thus the presence of possibly redundant inequalities has no effect on the estimation of weights.
Since H i is a composite hypothesis, one should search for the value of ^  € H i which gives 
the least favorable asymptotic null distribution for T12 and, as Wolak (1991) has shown, this 
value does not necessarily belongs to H q. Dardanoni and Forcina (1998) discuss some practical 
solutions to this problem. Finally, notice that the joint distribution of Tqi and T12 can also be 
derived (see Dardanoni and Forcina (1999) for details), where use of this joint distribution for
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hypotheses testing is also compared with alternative testing procedures.
3.6 Testing conditional monotonicity: An application
In order to test for conditional monotonicity we use the National Child Development Study 
(NODS), an ongoing survey that originally targeted over 17,000 babies born in Britain in the 
week 3-9 March 1958. Surviving members of this birth cohort have been surveyed on seven 
further occasions in order to monitor their changing health, education, social and economic 
circumstances: in 1965 (age 7), 1969 (age 11), 1974 (age 16), 1981 (age 23), 1991 (age 33), 1999 
(age 41) and 2004 (age 46). At the age of 7, 11 and 16 mathematics, reading and general skills 
tests were taken by the cohort member, while at the age of 7 and 11 information on non-cognitive 
skills was also collected.
From the age of 16 individuals could leave education and enter the labor market. For those 
who stayed, the surveys from 1981 onwards together with a 1978 school survey provide informa­
tion on the qualifications attained. Data on wages and social class were gathered at age 23, 33, 
41 and 46. To study intergenerational mobility we also need data on parental socio-economic 
status. The first 4 surveys (1958,1965,1969,1974) contain data about parental background in­
cluding age, education (1974), wage (1974), social class of father (1965, 1969, 1974) and mother 
(1974). These data  sets therefore bring together information on socio-economic status for two 
consecutive generations.^
3.6.1 C hoosing how to  m easure socio-econom ic statu s
To apply our stochastic monotonicity tests we first have to find suitable variables representing 
socio-economic status X  and Y.  Since true socio-economic status is not observed, intergenera­
tional mobility scholars typically employ either wage (income) or social class in their analysis.
Economists often look at wages or income as the most important observed measure of socio­
economic status. However both can be very sensitive to measurement error or temporary shocks 
such as short periods of unemployment, health shocks, or even short business cycles. In the
'^The NCDS data managers have also collected information on the cohort members’ children in 1991. However, 
back then these children were still very young and had not entered the labor market yet. No further information 
on these and new children of the cohort members was gathered in the 1999 and 2004 surveys.
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standard linear model, using current wages rather than true lifetime socio-economic status can 
result in attenuation bias. Researchers try  to solve this problem either by using average wage 
(income), whenever the data provide repeated observations, or by using an instrumental variable 
approach.^ Notice that the attenuation bias holds also in our discrete mobility tables setting 
(Carroll, Ruppert, Stefanski, and Crainiceanu (2006) contains a thorough discussion of measure­
ment error in non linear models); see e.g. Neuhaus (1999) for an analysis in the logit model.
On the other hand, sociologists prefer to  use social class as a measure of lifetime socio­
economic status (see for instance Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002)). They argue that not only 
social class is less sensitive to temporary shocks but also tha t it includes immaterial aspects such 
as prestige and power. The main limitations of social class originate from its subjectivity, since 
it is the researcher, using a combination of labor market occupation, education and other factors, 
that imputes the social class of the individual, sometimes also in an ordered manner, from the 
more prestigious occupation downwards. The way occupations are coded into social classes can 
sometimes aflFect the results. Moreover, the prestige associated with a social class can be time 
varying, i.e. being in, lets say, the skilled manual category in the 1960’s is very much different 
than being in this category today, and this is a relevant problem in the case of intergenerational 
mobility where we look at individuals born twenty to forty years apart. Finally, within a class 
there could clearly be a large degree of heterogeneity; a painter and a carpenter may both be 
defined as skilled manual workers, but of course the socio-economic status of, say, Picasso is very 
different from that of an unknown painter. Yet, some of these problems affect wages (income) 
too. A miner might earn even more than an Academic professor due to the risk associated to 
his job, yet not many professors would choose to become miners.
Choosing how to measure socio-economic status inevitably depends on the data available. In 
our data there is not enough information to construct a reliable measure of father’s permanent 
wage since this is observable only at one point in time. To overcome this problem Dearden, 
Machin, and Reed (1997) regress current wage on non time-varying factors such as education 
and social class, and then use the predicted variable as a measure of permanent wage. However, 
while there is no guarantee that this procedure eliminates attenuation bias, it also leads to a
®See Zimmerman (1992) for a discussion on the effect measurement error on measured mobility in the linear 
regression model.
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mix of wage and social class mobility (because social class is used to predict wages) and it is 
not really suited to test for conditional mobility (because it directly uses education to  predict 
wages). Moreover, as we show below, there are several individuals for whom wages are not 
available while we can observe social class. For these reasons, we consider social class a more 
rehable measure of hfetime socio-economic status than wages.
In this application we use the 1991 data on the cohort member socio-economic status coupled 
with the 1974 data on father’s status. These are also the NCDS surveys used by Dearden et al. 
(1997) and Blanden et al. (2007) in their studies on wage mobility. We first select all male cohort 
members for which we observe cognitive and non-cognitive skills at age 7, 11 and 16 (cognitive 
skills only), educational attainment and father’s age. We then select those individual’s for whom 
we observe both social class in 1991 and father’s class in 1974.®
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the social class measures. Social Class is a status 
variable grouping occupations into six broad categories, ordered on a skill basis.^ In the data, 
sons are more skilled than their parents were. The distribution of son’s socio-economic status 
actually stochastically dominates the father’s one.
Table 3.1: Social Class - Males
Son Father
Professional 7.21 ( 7.21) 5.97 ( 5.97)
Intermediate 35.84 ( 43.05) 21.63 ( 27.60)
Skilled Non-manual 12.92 ( 55.97) 10.87 ( 38.47)
Skilled Manual 28.89 ( 84.86) 45.01 ( 83.47)
Semiskilled 12.77 ( 97.63) 13.18 ( 96.65)
Unskilled 2.37 (100.00) 3.35 (100.00)
Observations 1942 1942
Values are in percentages. Numbers in brackets are cum ulated  
percentages.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for parent’s and son’s weekly net wages, son’s highest 
educational qualification and father’s age. The NCDS collected information on parental net 
wages only in 1974, with separate questions about father’s and mother’s wages and other sources 
of income. Note that in the original coding wage was grouped into 12 wage bands and we assign
®We select males only to make our results comparable to previous studies.
^Social Class variables £u-e derived according to the Registrar Classification (RG). This classification imputes 
social class using only information about occupation. This is a quite common and simple grouping methodology, 
even though some sociologists have proposed alternative ones. The Goldthorpe class schema for instance (see 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002)) aims to capture qualitative differences in employment relations. Unfortunately, 
the classes distinguished by this schema are not consistently ordered according to some inherent hierarchical 
principle. Therefore the Goldhtorpe class schema does not suit our statistical model.
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to each observation the median value of the observed band. Finally, in the data there are several 
individuals for whom father’s social class are available but wages are not, while the opposite is 
quite rare. There are a number of explanations. Some individuals (or their fathers) are self- 
employed, and their wages are not reliable. For other individuals the wage is not available either 
because they were unemployed or because they chose not to report it.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean S.D.
Son’s Net Wage 1341 301.07 102.79
Father’s Net Wage 1486 232.56 83.93
No Qualification 1942 0.45 0.49
O Levels 1942 0.33 0.46
A Levels 1942 0.09 0.29
Higher Ekiucation 1942 0.13 0.33
Father’s Age 1942 46.55 6.12
Father and Son net wages are in January 2001 
prices.
3.6 .2  M obility  Tables
In this section we present some unconditional transition matrices. We group social classes into 
three categories roughly corresponding to a high/ medium/low skilled partition.
3 Professional 4-Intermediate 
2 Skilled Non-Manual 4- Skilled Manual 
1 Semiskilled 4- Unskilled
There is no compelling reason to use three categories rather than two, four or any other 
number. Having more categories allows the researcher to have a better understanding of the 
heterogeneity across the joint distribution but at the same time it can make the identification 
of the parameters cumbersome. The larger the number of categories the lower the sample size 
within each cell. This problem only exacerbates when conditioning on other covariates. Given 
the sample size of our data, the likelihood function failed to converge when using more that 
three categories and our preferred set of control variables.
Table 3.3 shows the mobility tables using son’s social class in 1991 and father’s class in 1974. 
In the table we also include the Person’s chi-square statistic for independence, with the degrees
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of freedom in brackets. The chi-square statistic is very large leading to reject the hypothesis of 
independence.
Table 3.3: Social Class Mobility Table
Father/Son Class 1 2 3
1 4.53 8.08 3.91 16.53
2 8.81 26.06 21.01 55.87
3 1.80 7.67 18.13 27.60
15.14 41.81 43.05 100.00
1942 observations. Numbers on table are percentages. 
Chi-Square (4) =  192.73
Table 3.4 shows the Local-Global Log-Odds Ratios in the unconditional table. The first two 
odds correspond to the first two rows of the mobility table. If both r n  and r i 2 are positive than 
the first row (low class) is stochastically dominated by the second one (medium class). The same 
reasoning apphed to T21 and T22 (medium class is stochastically dominated by high class). All 
the odds in the table are positive. Yet the odds [rii,r i2] are smaller than the [r2i,T22] indicating 
stronger stochastic dominance towards the top of the joint distribution.
Table 3.4: Local Global Odds Ratios
Row Log-Odds
R i 2 m 0.7181
T12 0.6641
R-23 T21 0.9851
T22 1.1551
3.6 .3  C ontrol Variables
As we explained in the section 3.5, our aim is to test for dependence conditional on some 
characteristics of the parents and offsprings. Since most economic models of intergenerational 
mobility assume that the transmission of the ability endowment across generations is one of 
the main reasons behind immobility (see Becker and Tomes (1979) or Grawe and Mulligan 
(2002) for instance) a starting point is to investigate monotonicity conditional on cognitive 
skills. However, as Becker and Tomes (1979), Bowles and Gintis (2002), Erikson and Goldthorpe 
(2002), Dardanoni et al. (2006) suggest, cognitive ability is just one dimension of the endowment 
stock. Recently Heckman et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) show that non-cognitive 
skills can also explain a diverse array of outcomes such as schooling choices, wages, employment
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and work experience. It is quite likely that non-cognitive skills are also transmitted across 
generations, if not genetically, because of parental behavior and education. Finally, the human 
capital models predicts that high-status parents invest more in their children. In turn this implies 
that these children have more human capital. Therefore we choose to test for monotonicity 
conditional on the educational attainment, cognitive and non-cognitive skills of the offspring 
(son). Since the fathers were of different ages at the moment of the survey, we also control for 
father’s age.
Given the education system faced by the 1958 cohort, its educational attainment is measured 
by 4 ordered categories corresponding to ‘No Qualification’, ‘O Levels’, ‘A Levels’ and ‘Higher 
Ekiucation’.® To control for cognitive skills we use the mathematics and reading test scores. 
These tests were taken by the cohort members at the age of 7, 11 and 16. We use all these 
multiple age-skills observations but in order to reduce the control variables space, at each age 
we replace the original maths and reading scores with the principal component. In all cases 
the principal component explains no less than 90% of the total variance. In the case of non- 
cognitive skills things are a bit more complex. Both at age 7 and age 11 there are 12 scores for 
non-cognitive skills, such as depression, anxiety, hostility etc., as reported by teachers in schools. 
(No score is available at age 16.) In order to keep our problem computationally tractable, we do 
a factor analysis of the non-cognitive scores using the iterated principal factor method. Out of 12 
scores, only two eigenvalues are larger than 1, with the third being sensibly smaller. Therefore, 
at each age point, we retain only two factors. In Table 3.5 we show the rotated loading factors. 
The first factor captures the skill to relate to other individuals, either adults or other children. 
The second factor captures emotional problems. There are no large differences between age 7 
and 11. The final factors are obtained using the regression method. ^
Finally, since father’s age was recorded only in the original 1958 survey, we restrict our sample
®In the UK schooling is compulsory up to the age of 16, when individuals can, at the end of the scholastic 
year, stay in education or enter the labor market. Those who stay on at age 16 enrol for the O Levels or CSE 
qualifications, which are taken immediately at the end of the scholastic year. These students are still aged 16 
when they obtain the qualification. In the Autumn term of the same year, those who successfully obtained 5 or 
more O Levels/CSE can enrol for A Levels. These last 2 years, until individuals are aged 18. Passing 2 A-level 
constitutes the minimum level required for entry in Higher Education. Once the student has completed A Level, 
he can gain admission to the Universities, Polytechnic or Colleges of Higher Education where a first degree is 
obtained. The time needed to gain a degree varies by subject but in the majority of cases it takes 3 years.
®Note that for the factor analysis we use a much larger sample since we do not have to take into account 
missing values in social class or other covariates.
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Table 3.5: Loading Factors - Non-cognitive scores
FI
Age 7 
F2 Uniquens. FI
Age 11 
F2 Uniquens.
U nforthcomingness -0.0690 0.7279 0.4654 -0.0807 0.7161 0.4807
Withdrawal 0.0649 0.6693 0.5478 0.0908 0.6856 0.5217
Depression 0.2727 0.6757 0.4691 0.3496 0.6305 0.4802
Anxiety for acceptance of adults 0.4061 -0.1096 0.8230 0.4257 -0.0487 0.8164
Hostility towards adults 0.6042 0.2118 0.5901 0.6455 0.1988 0.5438
Writing off adults and standards 0.4362 0.5162 0.5433 0.4696 0.4690 0.5595
Anxiety for acceptance by kids 0.6662 -0.0429 0.5543 0.6862 -0.0386 0.5276
Hostility towards children 0.6736 0.0942 0.5373 0.6593 0.1311 0.5481
Restlessness 0.5467 0.1447 0.6802 0.5258 0.1190 0.7093
Inconsequential behavior 0.7761 0.2020 0.3569 0.7771 0.1931 0.3588
Miscellaneous symptoms 0.2354 0.5894 0.5972 0.3329 0.5408 0.5967
Miscellaneous nervous symptoms 0.2636 0.1910 0.8941 0.3057 0.1689 0.8780
Number of obs =  14931 (Age 7), 14158 (Age 11). Retained factors =  2. Number of params =  23.
to those cohort members hving with a biological father during their childhood.
3 .6 .4  E quality o f  O pportunity
Table 3.6 presents results when we test for equality of opportunity (independence) as shown in 
section 3.5.1 (equation 3.3) and section 3.5.3 (equation 3.5). To begin with we do not condition 
on any covariates, and test for equahty of opportunity by restricting the odds to be zero. This 
is done by setting the constant terms equal to zero. Since we are ultimately interested 
in stochastic dominance, that is whether one row “dominates” the other, we first impose the 
restrictions by looking at pairs of rows. Therefore, we first impose [ t i i , t i2] =  0 {R\2 ) and then 
[T21, T22] =  0 {R2 2,) • We then impose the restriction on all rows simultaneously: r  =  0 (AR). The 
numbers in the table are the p-values (hkelihood-ratios in brackets) from a standard chi-square 
distribution. The numbers in bold indicate the number of restrictions. In the unconditional 
case there are only the constant terms to restrict. All the p-values are equal to zero at the 
fourth decimal digit. When imposing the equality of opportunity restriction on all the rows the 
hkelihood ratio is very close to the chi-square statistic in table 3.3 as expected.
Next, we test independence conditional on our set of covariates: cognitive skills (measured 
at age 7, 11 and 16), non-cognitive skills (measured at age 7 and 11) up to the third principal 
component, educational attainment (at age 23) and father’s age. There are 13 variables in 
total. Table 3.12 in the Appendix presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the 
unrestricted model.
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Table 3.6: P-values Independence
Row Unconditional Conditional
P-values Restrict. P-values Restrict.
R i 2 0.0000 2 0.0160 24
( 31.3557) ( 41.1642)
R 23 0.0000 2 0.0007 24
(114.3083) ( 52.4605)
AR 0.0000 4 0.0000 48
(189.9833) (103.1234)
Likelihood ratios in brawzkets.
We model the four odds ratios ( r )  and two marginal parameters for the son (() as a function 
of the full set of covariates. On the other hand we model the two marginal parameters for the 
father (p) as a function of father’s age only, that is we rule out that father’s class can be a function 
of son’s education, cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Note also that since all the covariates are 
centered, the constant terms have a direct interpretation. They measure the Local-Global Log- 
Odds Ratios for the average individual. For education and cognitive skills coefficients have 
the expected positive sign, meaning that those sons with better education and cognitive skills 
are more likely to have a higher status. None of the non-cognitive skills factors is statistically 
significant on its own. When interpreting the coefficients for the four odds ratios ( r) ,  one has to 
remember that a larger r  indicates less mobility. For instance, the Higher Education coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant for t u  and t i 2 - Intuitively, this result suggests that those 
individuals with Higher Education in the medium class were very unlikely to have a father in 
low class, and at the same time those individuals with Higher Education in the low class were 
unlikely to have a father in medium class.
In last two columns of Table 3.6 we present the conditional p-values. To test for independence 
we impose 12 restrictions given by 1 constant term 4- 11 coefficients (one for each covariate) for 
each LG log-odds ratio. Thus the total number of restrictions equal 12 times the number of 
odds. Once we condition on this rich set of covariates the p-values become larger. At a 1% 
significance level independence is no longer rejected in the first row. This result confirms that 
our set of covariates do explain part of the mobility mechanism.
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3.6.5 C onditional stoch astic  m onotonicity
We now formally test our mobility tables for equality of opportunity against stochastic mono­
tonicity, as explained in section 3.5.3, equation (3.6). To test the null hypothesis we need to 
compute the distribution function. Being one-directional, this test is more powerful than 
the previous one where the null hypothesis of equality of opportunity (independence) is tested 
against the unrestricted model. Table 3.7 colunm {EoP vs SM) shows the computed p-values 
obtained under the null hypothesis of equality of opportunity against stochastic monotonicity 
conditional on our rich set of control variables. As expected, since this test is more powerful, all 
the conditional p-values are now smaller than in table 3.6. We now reject independence even at 
a 1% significance level.
Since this results suggests that independence is rejected even conditionally on a rich set of 
controls, we now test whether our data give evidence of conditional stochastic monotonicity. In 
column {SM vs Unr) we display the p-values obtained under the null hypothesis of stochastic 
monotonicity agmnst the unrestricted model as shown in section 3.5.3, equation (3.7). The 
p-values are all very high meaning that there is strong evidence of stochastic monotonicity, 
or in other words very few Local-Global Log-Odds Ratios are negative in the sub-tables when 
conditioning on z .
Table 3.7: P-values Stochastic Monotonicity
Row EoP vs SM SM vs Unr
R\2 0.0003 0.8450
R 23 0.0000 0.8284
AR 0.0000 0.9460
Numbers in table are p-values.
3.6 .6  W age M obility
For completeness, in this section we replicate the analysis using the wage mobility table illus­
trated in table 3.8. As we discussed above, the sample size is much smaller. As in the case 
of social class, we group the individuals into three categories based on their wage percentile. 
Unfortunately, given that the original father’s wage variable was coded into 12 bands, it is not 
possible to exactly partition it in three terciles. The chi-square statistic is smaller than for social
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class (table 3.3) though we still reject independence.
Table 3.8: Wage Class Mobility Table
Father/Son Class 1 2 3
1 14.04 10.78 8.79 33.61
2 12.41 10.51 10.42 33.33
3 7.61 11.32 14.13 33.06
34.06 32.61 33.33 100.00
1104 observations. Chi-Square (4) =  37.03.
In table 3.9 we test for equality of opportunity (independence) both unconditional and con­
ditional on our rich set of control variables. In the Appendix, table 3.13, we show the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors for the unrestricted model. Anew, the p-values become larger 
once we condition on z . Note however, that for R \ 2  we can not reject unconditional indepen­
dence. Overall the p-values are larger than in the case of social class. From a comparison of 
tables 3.12 and 3.13 we also notice that three out of four Local-Global Log-Odds Ratios constant 
terms (the odds for the average individual) are larger when using social class. This difference 
between wage and social class might be due to measurement error or temporary shocks affecting 
wages more than social class. However, we can not rule out that sample selection might also 
be driving this difference. While a full comparison of social versus wage class is beyond the 
scope of the paper, we tried to investigate this issue further by re-estimating the odds using only 
those son/father pairs for whom we observe both social and wage class. Unfortunately, given 
the further restriction in the number of observations and the still large number of covariates, the 
hkeUhood failed to converge.
Table 3.9: P-values Independence - Wage Mobility
Row Unconditional Conditional
P-values Restrict. P-values Restrict.
R\2 0.3267 2 0.4808 24
( 2.2372) ( 23.6668)
R2 3 0.0001 2 0.0002 24
( 18.8047) ( 55.8950)
AR 0.0000 4 0.0044 48
( 36.0567) ( 77.5813)
Likelihood ratios in brackets.
In table 3.10 we show the p-values obtained while testing for stochastic monotonicity. As 
for social class, when testing EoP  against stochastic monotonicity, column {EoP vs SM), all the 
conditional p-values are now smaller than in table 3.9, though we still can not reject independence
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in the first row (i2i2)- Column {SM vs Unr) provide again evidence of conditional stochastic 
monotonicity.
Table 3.10: P-values Stochastic Monotonicity - Wage Mobility
Row EoP vs SM SM vs Unr
R \2 0.3342 0.5574
R-2Z 0.0005 0.0701
AR 0.0007 0.3064
Numbers in table are p-values.
3.7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to test for stochastic monotonicity in intergenerational socio-economic 
mobUity tables. To do so we apply and extend the methodology discussed in Dardanoni and 
Forcina (1998) and Bartolucci et al. (2001). We first test for unconditional stochastic mono- 
tonicity using a set of 149 intergenerational mobiUty tables in 35 different countries, where it 
emerges that monotonicity cannot be rejected in hardly any table.
We then explain how a number of controls such as education, cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills can be used to investigate whether monotonicity still holds after conditioning on these 
factors. One main contribution of this paper is to formalize a test of dependence in mobility 
tables, using both continuous and discrete control variables. In the economic literature, no pre­
vious work on intergenerational mobility tables has dealt with continuous controls. Since current 
research on mobility is focussing on the determinants dependence in socio-economic status be­
tween parents and offspring, conditioning on discrete and continuous covariates is increasingly 
important. We consider our methodology an important tool for future research, with potential 
applications to other empirical fields besides intergenerational mobility.
To apply our test of conditional monotonicity we use the NCDS, a UK cohort data with 
information on the socio-economic status of the cohort members and their parents, individ­
ual’s educational qualifications, cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Our tests show evidence of 
stochastic monotonicity both unconditionally and conditionally. While it is not surprising that 
the unconditional joint distribution exhibits monotonicity, it is interesting to find that such a 
strong form of dependence subsists even conditional on educational achievement, cognitive and
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non-cognitive skills. This result reinforces the findings of Solon (1999), Bowles and Gintis (2002), 
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Dardanoni et al. (2006), Blanden et al. (2007) indicating that part 
of the mechanism linking parent’s and ofispring’s socio-economic status is still a black box.
Finally, we observe only minor differences between social and wage class tables, where if 
anything there seems to be more dependence when using social rather than wage class.
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Table 3.11: Ganzeboom, Luijks and Treiman tables
Country/yr LR constr. Country/yr LR constr. Country/yr LR constr.
AUS65 16.6230 6 GER80a 3.3808 4 NOR721 5.6674 8
AUS67 4.5578 5 GER80p 4.1145 9 NOR72S 3.0935 3
AUS671 5.1737 8 GER80Z 4.5121 7 NOR73 8.9025 4
AUS73 11.239 4 GER82a 12.5920 6 NOR82W 4.2696 8
AUS87 3.8706 6 GER84a 1.6064 4 NZE76 2.8615 4
AUT69n 5.2945 4 HKG67 1.8590 8 PHI68 66.9629 1
AUT74p 5.0644 5 HUN62 70.2130 2 PHI73 9.2018 2
AUT78 15.4645 4 HUN73 28.5077 4 POL72 50.5442 4
BEL71e 13.7803 6 HUN731 16.5144 4 POL82 3.5511 5
BEL75 11.0925 5 HUN82 1.3950 3 POL87 9.7428 6
BEL76 5.4211 4 HUN83 26.3894 3 PUE54 0.1228 1
BRA73 9.4740 3 HUN86 5.3734 6 QUE60 9.7055 8
CAN73 4.4114 4 IND62C 8.3105 6 QUE73 4.9998 3
CAN82W 3.9487 5 IND63a 14.2253 8 QUE77 1.4496 6
CAN84 3.4051 3 IND63C 26.7984 7 SC074 8.9427 6
CSK67 21.2481 2 IND71n 5.2398 4 SC075 16.0839 5
DEN71 6.4718 9 IRE74 8.1673 3 SPA65 2.8188 2
DEN721 7.5135 6 ISR62C 8.9032 7 SPA67t 9.1810 7
DEN72S 1.7511 4 ISR74 4.6268 1 SPA75 68.8972 4
ENG51 5.0602 4 ITA63 6.5001 4 SWE50 9.1278 5
ENG63 1.2945 5 ITA68 4.3434 6 SWE60 1.9379 4
ENG67t 0.2951 6 ITA72 9.5852 6 SWE721 5.5451 7
ENG69 0.9969 4 ITA74 6.6980 4 SWE72s 2.0677 3
ENG72 10.4063 4 ITA75p 14.7003 7 SWE73 0.2150 2
ENG74 2.7902 5 JAP55 6.6026 4 SWE83w 4.7170 5
ENG74p 6.0480 5 JAP65 1.0588 5 SWI76p 4.1620 4
ENG83 3.4236 3 JAP67 7.6923 7 TAI70 10.0489 9
ENG86 2.0181 5 JAP69t 4.3844 9 TAI701 7.6641 6
FIN67t 8.6317 10 JAP71n 2.2285 3 USA47 4.5285 4
FIN721 6.8491 8 JAP75 1.0965 5 USA471 1.7094 5
FIN72S 3.5080 8 MAL67 22.1726 7 USA59C 3.2706 5
FIN75p 2.1559 6 NET58 6.3140 6 USA620 2.3330 3
FIN80 12.2139 4 NET67t 2.6724 7 USA72g 5.7139 8
FIN82W 10.7844 9 NET70 2.6992 4 USA73g 8.7437 8
FRA58 4.6786 4 NET71 2.4754 5 USA730 7.7145 3
FRA64 9.3367 4 NET71e 3.6097 5 USA74g 3.3402 5
FRA67 7.8008 8 NET74p 1.1753 4 USA74p 8.4365 5
FRA70 11.7893 2 NET76 1.2016 4 USA75g 2.8330 7
FRA71e 7.0699 4 NET77 5.8811 4 USA 76g 3.3676 5
GER59 3.0701 5 NET77X 2.1617 3 USA77g 5.7246 4
GER69 3.3086 8 NET79p 12.1392 8 USA78g 4.8763 6
GER69k 10.5659 5 NET82 4.6030 7 USA80g 5.0530 7
GER75p 4.4880 5 NET82U 5.1157 8 USA81w 1.8263 5
GER76Z 8.3095 6 NET85 1.5353 4 USA82g 7.8830 5
GER77Z 3.6863 6 NIG71n 9.6726 5 USA83g 3.0734 4
GER78 6.0179 7 NIR68 2.5272 7 USA84g 4.5427 8
GER78X 3.5050 7 NIR73 4.1850 6 USA85g 6.5725 5
GER78Z 6.2942 5 NOR57 11.0213 7 USA86g 6.6470 8
GER79Z 2.2963 8 NOR65 1.1214 4 YUG67t 6.2877 8
GER80 4.8059 5 NOR67t 1.8285 6 — — —
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Table 3.12: Unrestricted Model - Social Class (1974)
Parameter
Pi P2
Mar;;inal
(2
Constant 1.6352 ( 26.4510) -0.9620 (-18.9698) 2.1078 ( 24.1718) -0.2674 ( -5.2418)
Father Age -0.0338 ( -3.5990) -0.0003 ( -0.0396) -0.0290 ( -2.8677) -0.0004 ( -0.0438)
O Level ---- ---- 0.5343 ( 2.9851) 0.2329 ( 1.8124)
A Level — ---- 1.6015 ( 3.0112) 1.0127 ( 4.7179)
High. Educ. — ---- 0.7777 ( 2.2970) 1.3276 ( 6.5289)
C. Skills 7 - — — -0.0798 ( -1.0457) -0.0537 ( -0.8778)
C. Skills 11 ---- — - 0.1519 ( 1.4253) -0.0109 ( -0.1395)
C. Skills 16 —- ---- - 0.4170 ( 3.9301) 0.5326 ( 6.1489)
NC. Skills 7 (1st) ---- ---- 0.0127 ( 0.1694) 0.0089 ( 0.1438)
NC. Skills 7 (2nd) ---- ---- -0.0371 ( -0.4785) -0.0749 ( -1.0838)
NC. Skills 11 (1st) ---- — 0.0309 ( 0.4194) -0.0038 ( -0.0592)
NC. Skills 11 (2nd) ---- ---- -0.1022 ( -1.4225) -0.0955 ( -1.4514)
Parameter Odds
Til T12 T21 T22
Constant 0.7785 ( 3.4852) 0.5249 ( 3.0082) 0.4118 ( 1.5316) 0.6935 ( 5.7366)
Father Age 0.0255 ( 0.9328) 0.0517 ( 2.0670) -0.0878 ( -3.1548) -0.0375 ( -1.9414)
O Level -0.4090 ( -0.8632) -0.0218 ( -0.0527) 0.4563 ( 0.9364) 0.1094 ( 0.3608)
A Level 0.9018 ( 0.6769) 0.0666 ( 0.1026) -0.1924 ( -0.1311) -0.1019 ( -0.1968)
High. Ekiuc. 1.7188 ( 1.9630) 1.7835 ( 2.9363) 0.8091 ( 0.6344) -0.1658 ( -0.3114)
C. Skills 7 0.1127 ( 0.5435) 0.0896 ( 0.4560) -0.2430 ( -1.1552) 0.0658 ( 0.4555)
C. Skills 11 -0.0001 ( -0.0004) 0.2169 ( 0.9342) -0.2386 ( -0.8128) -0.1569 ( -0.8348)
C. Skills 16 -0.0305 ( -0.1055) -0.8564 ( -2.9761) -0.0636 ( -0.2181) -0.1141 ( -0.5569)
NC. Skills 7 (1st) 0.1527 ( 0.7321) -0.0168 ( -0.0837) -0.4423 ( -2.1842) -0.1249 ( -0.8676)
NC. Skills 7 (2nd) -0.2082 ( -0.8959) -0.0596 ( -0.2756) -0.4707 ( -2.2672) -0.2638 ( -1.6378)
NC. Skills 11 (1st) -0.1114 ( -0.5616) 0.2076 ( 0.9010) 0.5944 ( 2.4360) -0.0147 ( -0.0987)
NC. Skills 11 (2nd) -0.0560 ( -0.2812) -0.1678 ( -0.8019) 0.0958 ( 0.5054) 0.0340 ( 0.2208)
Columns 1 and 2 correspond to the father’s marginals.
Table 3.13: Unrestricted Model - Wage Class (1974)
Parameter
Pi P2
Mar final
Constant 0.7025 ( 10.8281) -0.7153 (-11.0466) 0.7790 ( 11.3201) -0.7829 (-11.2551)
Father Age -0.0604 ( -5.3298) -0.0491 ( -4.1184) 0.0103 ( 0.8803) -0.0031 ( -0.2556)
O Level ---- — 0.1923 ( 1.1480) 0.0386 ( 0.2096)
A Level ---- ---- 0.6051 ( 2.0390) 0.5021 ( 1.9052)
High. Educ. -— ---- 0.7753 ( 2.7621) 0.7313 ( 2.9104)
C. Skills 7 ---- ---- 0.0499 ( 0.6402) 0.1655 ( 1.9331)
C. Skills 11 ---- ---- 0.0086 ( 0.0813) 0.0760 ( 0.7121)
C. Skills 16 ---- ---- 0.3645 ( 3.2359) 0.2502 ( 2.0866)
NC. Skills 7 (1st) ---- ---- -0.0552 ( -0.6698) -0.1992 ( -2.0448)
NC. Skills 7 (2nd) ---- ---- 0.0268 ( 0.3110) 0.1316 ( 1.4177)
NC. Skills 11 (1st) ---- — 0.0434 ( 0.5449) 0.1690 ( 1.9518)
NC. Skills 11 (2nd) ---- ---- -0.2199 ( -2.7225) -0.3527 ( -3.5865)
Parameter Odds
Til Ti2 T21 T22
Constant 0.1589 ( 0.8712) 0.1128 ( 0.5894) 0.5186 ( 2.6211) 0.3566 ( 1.9529)
Father Age -0.0529 ( -1.7568) -0.0502 ( -1.5437) 0.0973 ( 2.8043) 0.0001 ( 0.0024)
O Level 0.4536 ( 1.0696) 0.6547 ( 1.3205) 0.3801 ( 0.8438) -0.4857 ( -1.0260)
A Level 2.3471 ( 2.4014) 1.7889 ( 2.5130) -2.8069 ( -2.8402) -2.1742 ( -3.0755)
High. Educ. 0.6454 ( 0.9285) 0.6428 ( 0.9749) -0.2310 ( -0.3092) -0.3686 ( -0.5742)
C. Skills 7 0.4129 ( 2.0222) 0.2796 ( 1.1973) -0.1209 ( -0.5801) -0.3467 ( -1.5591)
C. Skills 11 -0.5185 ( -1.8872) -0.2244 ( -0.7904) 0.6906 ( 2.3944) 0.1713 ( 0.6224)
C. Skills 16 0.1640 ( 0.5558) 0.1466 ( 0.4545) -0.5773 ( -1.8904) -0.2207 ( -0.7104)
NC. Skills 7 (1st) 0.0837 ( 0.3861) 0.1728 ( 0.6398) -0.0475 ( -0.2135) -0.2570 ( -1.0288)
NC. Skills 7 (2nd) 0.2386 ( 1.0826) 0.0087 ( 0.0363) -0.0420 ( -0.1831) -0.4537 ( -1.8804)
NC. Skills 11 (1st) 0.1253 ( 0.5918) 0.4016 ( 1.5518) 0.4297 ( 1.7630) 0.0807 ( 0.3501)
NC. Skills 11 (2nd) -0.0871 ( -0.4103) 0.1781 ( 0.6943) 0.1454 ( 0.6697) -0.3068 ( -1.1944)
Columns 1 and 2 correspond to the father’s marginals.
C h a p t e r  4
T he  E f f e c t  o f  H o m e  C o m p u t e r  U se  o n  C h il d r e n ’s 
C o g n it iv e  a n d  N o n - C o g n it iv e  S k ills
4-1 Introduction
In the last decade a number of papers have stressed that educational and labor market outcomes 
are largely pre-determined by the cognitive and non-cognitive skills accumulated during early 
childhood. Keane and Wolpin (1997, 2001), Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001) have found 
that in the US individual educational decisions are mainly driven by cognitive skills such as 
maths and verbal skills. Those with good skill endowments by age 16 are much more likely 
to enrol and complete college education. Financial constraints are either not binding or most 
individuals manage to oflFset them by working part-time and borrowing. Their results suggest 
that pohcies targeting educational attainment or educational disparities between Black, Hispanic 
and White youth must act on these skill inputs to be effective. Heckman et al. (2006) find that 
a low-dimensional model of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities explains a diverse array of 
outcomes such as schooling choices, wages, employment, work experience, choice of occupation 
but also a variety of adolescent risky behaviors such as criminality, cigarette smoking and alcohol 
use. Cunha et al. (2006) review the evidence on the life cycle of human skill formation. They 
conclude that ability gaps in both cognitive and non-cognitive skills across individuals and across 
socioeconomic groups open up early in the life cycle and IQ deficits need to be addressed at very 
early ages for interventions to be effective.
Given this evidence, there is a growing interest in estimating the skills production function. 
Researchers are trying to uncover the main inputs and their time varying effect (see Todd
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and Wolpin (2003) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) for a discussion). However estimating the 
causal effect of these inputs is difficult because all sorts of endogeneity problems might lead to 
inconsistent estimates and economists have mainly focused on a few inputs that are either very 
important or for which experimental designs are available. To mention only a few recent studies 
that have looked at the determinants of math and reading achievements, Rivkin, Hanushek, 
and Kain (2005) analyze the effect of teacher quality, Dahl and Lochner (2005) and Belley and 
Lochner (2007) estimate the effect of parental income, Bernal and Keane (2008) and Berlinski 
et al. (2008) evaluate the effect of respectively child care and pre-school while Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2008) identify the effect of pre-school television exposure.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of using a computer at home. Computers 
are a relatively new input in the production function. Figure 4.1 shows OECD data on home 
computer access in a few selected countries.  ^ There is a clear upward trend. Since 2005, in 
all the countries 70% or more of the households had a computer at home and this proportion is 
likely to rise further. As we show below, children use home computers quite extensively. Yet, 
little is known about the effect of computer usage on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
Psychologists have long investigated the effect of time spent in front of the television on 
children’s development, see Schmidt and Anderson (2007) for a review, and are now shifting 
their attention to computers, see Subrahmanyam, Greenfield, Kraut, and Gross (2001). Even 
though computers and TV are different media devices, understanding why TV time can have 
an effect on children’s skills is a useful starting point to analyze the effect of computer time. 
There are three main theories in psychology. The first theory emphasizes the effect of TV 
content, that is what matters is what children watch and not TV time per se. On the one hand, 
this theory states tha t educational programs can have a positive effect on skills. On the other 
hand, if children watch mostly cartoons or general entertainment programs, TV would have no 
impact. The second theory points at the time allocation problem. Children, like adults, have 
a limited time endowment. The more time is spent watching TV, the less time is available for 
other activities. If TV time displaces other educational or social activities then it might have an 
effect even irrespectively of what children watch. The third theory points at the passive nature
^Data for the USA is available for only a few years.
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Figure 4.1: Household Home Computer Access
of television. Viewing requires little overt beha\dor, programs are visually explicit and require 
little visual imagination, and the medium is not interactive. As a result children might become 
intellectually passive. While we refer the reader to section 4.2 for a more complete review 
of the literature, we anticipate that psychology studies conclude that the effect of watching 
TV strongly depends on the content of the programs watched (educational programs having 
a positive effect) and on the socio-economic status of the parents (children with low status 
parents benefiting more firom TV), the latter reflecting the quality of those activities displaced 
by TV’ time. Computers and TV'^  share some similarities but there are also major differences. 
Computers imply more freedom with respect to content, since there is a very large variety of 
software or internet content to choose from. Computers are also more interactive than TV, with 
most software requiring continuous inputs from the users. Still, most of the above discussion 
can be extended to computer time. Content can matter, other activities will be displaced by 
computer time, and computer use cam be intellectually challenging (rather than intellectually 
passive).
In this paper we use the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC) data, which
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follows an Australian cohort born in 2000. Data for this cohort were collected in two surveys 
(2004 and 2006) when children were aged 4/5 and 6/7 years old. The advantage of this data lies 
in its longitudinal nature, coupled with information about cognitive and non-cognitive test scores 
and information on computer access. In particular information was collected not only on whether 
the child had access to a computer at home, but also on the number of hours he/she would use the 
computer on a typical weekday and weekend. The LSAC data shows that by the age of 7 around 
88% of the children had access to a computer at home. This is an even larger fraction than the 
70 % reported in hgure 4.1, probably due to the fact that these children had young parents who 
are more likely to use modern technologies. From these data it also emerges that the average 
child with access to a computer spends 3 and a half hours in front of a computer every week. 
Children also make extensive use of other devices spending 13 hours watching TV/DVD’s and 3 
and a half hours playing with video game consoles such as PlayStation, XBox and Nintendo every 
week. If we are interested in the skill production function we can not neglect the importance 
of these inputs given that they absorb a considerable amount of time. Here we mainly focus 
on computer use though we also try  to shed some light on the effect of TV/DVD’s and video 
game use. We look at both cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Both types of skills might be 
affected by the content (educational software, games, emailing or messaging, other internet use) 
but also by the displaced activities. If, for instance, computer time displaces reading books or 
time spent on homework, cognitive skills might be affected. Similarly, if computer time displaces 
social activities, with parents or other children, non-cognitive skills could be influenced.
Previous research has focused on the effect of TV on skills, of computers in schools or on 
the effect of a home computer on high school completion. Our paper contributes to the existing 
human capital literature by focusing on the effect of home computer use on early childhood 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills. To our knowledge no other economic study has tried to 
address this question so far.
In the remaining of the paper we first discuss the skills production function and the assump­
tions needed to identify the causal effect of computer use on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. 
We rely on a rich set of controls available in the LSAC, and assess the robustness of our results 
by comparing alternative estimators. Our results indicate that children using computers are
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more likely to score high in cognitive skill tests but less well in terms of non-cognitive skills. 
Computer use matters mainly during the weekend, and the effects are larger for girls and for 
children with highly educated parents.
The paper unfolds as follows: In section 4.2 we review the main findings of the computer 
literature. Section 4.3 introduces the skill production function and then discusses the identifica­
tion of the parameter of interest. Section 4.4 presents the cohort data that we use. Section 4.5 
presents our findings. Section 4.6 concludes.
4-2 Literature
The literature evaluating the impact of computer access and use on children’s outcomes is still 
quite limited, probably due to the fact that computers entered schools and houses on a large 
scale only in the last 10 to 15 years. In this section we give a short summary of those studies 
evaluating the effect of computer use on labor market outcomes, educational attainment and 
cognitive skills.
4.2.1 Effect o f Computer use on Labor Market Outcomes
Krueger (1993) uses Current Population Survey data to examine whether workers who use a 
computer at work earn a higher wage rate than otherwise similar workers who do not use a com­
puter at work. Given the cross-section data, he estimates the causal effect through OLS where 
identification relies on a rich set of controls, including 2 digits occupational sectors. Estimates 
suggest that workers who use computers on their job earn 10 to 15 percent higher wages.
DiNardo and Pischke (1997) revisit Krueger’s analysis and investigate whether his estimates 
reflect a true return to computer skills or just selection: i.e. higher wage workers use computers 
on their jobs. They do so using three large cross-sectional surveys from Germany. Like in 
Krueger’s paper, they estimate an OLS model where identification relies on a rich set of controls. 
They find that the estimated wage differential associated with computer use in Germany is 
very similar to the U. S. differential. However, they also find large differentials for on-the- 
job use of calculators, telephones, pens or pencils, or for those who work while sitting down. 
They conclude that these returns to office tools, including computers, are probably driven by
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substantial selection.
4.2.2 Effect of Computer use on Educational Attainm ent
Schmitt and Wadsworth (2006) explore the link between ownership of a home computer at ages 
15 and 17 and subsequent educational attainment in the principal British school examinations 
taken at ages 16 (GCSEs) and 18 (A-levels). Using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 
they estimate the causal effect using a probit model where identification relies on a rich set of 
controls such as household income, mother and father’s education, mother and father’s age and 
number of dependent children living in the household. The data show a significant positive 
association between PC ownership and the qualifications obtained. The frequency of PC use 
also appears to be weakly correlated with positive educational outcomes at age 16.
Beltran, Das, and Fairhe (2006) look into the relationship between computer ownership and 
high school graduation in the US, using recent panel data from matched CPS files and the 
NLSY97. Using a probit model with a rich set of controls they find that home computers 
are associated with a 6-8 percentage point higher probability of graduating from high school. 
They also estimate a bivariate probit model for the joint probability of computer ownership and 
high school graduation using parental use of the Internet at work and the presence of another 
teenager in the household as instruments. The bivariate probit leads to coefficient estimates 
that are similar to the original probit estimates, although statistically insignificant.
4.2.3 Effect o f Computer use on Skills
Angrist and Lavy (2002) assess the short-run consequences of increased computer-aided instruc­
tion (CAI) technology in Israeli schools. The causal effect is estimated using an OLS model and 
a 2SLS where the IV is given by an Israeli Government program that funded a large-scale com­
puterization effort in many elementary and middle schools. The schools that received support 
were more likely to use CAI. Their results do not support the view that CAI improves learning, 
at least as measured by pupil test scores. They find a consistently negative and marginally 
significant relationship between the programme induced use of computers and 4th grade Maths 
scores. For other grades and subjects, the estimates are not significant, though also mostly
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negative.
Rouse, Krueger, and Markman (2004) present results from a randomized study of a well- 
defined program of computers use in US schools (grade 3 to 6): a popular instructional computer 
program, known as Fast ForWord, which is designed to improve language and reading skills. They 
assess the impact of the program using four different measures of language and reading ability. 
The causal effect is estimated using an OLS model where identification relies on randomization:
i.e. in selected schools some students were randomly assigned Fast ForWord. Their estimates 
suggest that while use of the computer program may improve some aspects of students’ language 
skills, it does not appear that these gains translate into a broader measure of language acquisition 
or into actual reading skills.
Banerjee, Cole, Dufio, and Linden (2007) look at the results of a randomized experiment 
conducted in schools in urban India (grade 3 and 4). A computer-assisted learning program was 
randomly assigned to some schools for up to two years. They find that the program was very 
effective, increasing m ath scores by 0.36 standard deviations the first year, and by 0.54 standard 
deviation the second year. However, they find that the effect of the program decays fast after 
the program ends, but this result is common to another treatment that provided teacher support 
rather than computer-assisted learning.
Subrahmanyam et al. (2001) survey the psychology literature. Several studies provide pre- 
hminary evidence that computer use is positively correlated with academic achievement. Few 
studies have examined the effect of children’s time on computers on their social skills and fi-iend- 
ships. The existing research suggests that fi-equent game players actually meet friends outside 
school more often than less frequent players and no differences have been found in the social 
interactions of computer game players vs. non-players. However most of these results apply 
mainly to teenagers.
4.2.4 Effect o f TV  use on Skills
To conclude our literature review we summarize the main findings on the effect of TV time on 
children’s skills.
85
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) look at the effect of preschool television exposure on standard­
ized test scores later in life. Using heterogeneity in the timing of television’s introduction as a 
source of identification, they find that an additional year of preschool television exposure raises 
average test scores by about .02 standard deviations. These effects are largest for children from 
households where English is not the primary language, for children whose mothers have less than 
a high school education, and for non-white children.
Schmidt and Anderson (2007) provide an overview of the findings in the psychology litera­
ture. Exposure to educational programs, such as Sesame Street, has positive effect on children’s 
vocabulary learning and this effect is long lasting. They do not find evidence tha t TV displaces 
intellectually valuable activities. In fact TV replaces activities similar to TV viewing such as 
radio listening, comic book reading and moviegoing.
4.3 The Production Function
In our data we observe the children at two points in time, when they are aged 4/5 (2004) and 
6/7 (2006). Since it is unlikely that they made extensive use of a computer before age 4, let 
us start with a simple two period model t = 1, 2 . Denote by Ct computer time at time f, by 
F i t  a vector of family inputs, by Sit  a vector of school inputs and by OMt  time spent using 
other media devices such as TV and video games. Let also /r denote children’s unobserved time 
constant endowments (like innate abilities). Here ^  is not 1 dimensional but rather a vector 
including a range of cognitive and non-cognitive innate abilities. Finally denote by Tjt the 
test score measured at time t  and by Ct the measurement error in T j t -  As well as for / / ,  there is 
a vector of test scores T  that can summarize the main cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
4.3.1 Period 1
The production function of each test score in period 1 can be written as:
Tj\ =  5j(C 'i, F / i ,  5 / i ,  OA/i,/x, ei) (4.1)
where we are assuming that any non-media input enters either F I \  or S I i . In this paper our
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parameter of interest is the effect of C\ on Jÿi, holding all other inputs constant. It is easy to see 
why the identification of this parameter is complicated by endogeneity problems. C\ depends 
on the parental decision to own and make available a computer but also on the child decision to 
spend some time using it. Unobserved family, school and media inputs together with the child’s 
innate abilities might be correlated with C\  but also Tj\.  Measurement error in C\ can instead 
cause attenuation bias. In the data the parents were asked to report the time spent by their 
children using the computer. It is possible that some parents could only provide a rough guess. 
Therefore ei can include measurement error in Ci. ^
Todd and Wolpin (2003) discuss alternative estimation strategies under the assumption that 
the g function is linear, an assumption that we also make. Let X \  denote observed family, school 
and other media inputs and let U\ denote the unobserved ones.
Tji =  aji  4- PjiCi  +  X i j j i  4- Vji (4.2)
whereuji =  UiSji+fxpji+ei {'jji.Sji, pji are vectors). The simplest way to estimate equation
(4.2) is to use the OLS estimator and assume that we can control for the most important inputs 
influencing both C\  and Tji such that E{vjiCi)  = 0. The LSAC survey designers put a lot of care 
in collecting very detailed information regarding parental background, home and school care. In 
the results section we discuss what variables we can use to approximate the family, school and 
other media inputs. Yet even rich data can rarely allow to control for the innate abilities of 
the child p. One possibility is to assume that the parental decision to own a computer is not a 
function of p. That is parents own a computer mainly for their work, internet browsing or other 
personal uses so that the ownership decision does not depend on the children’s characteristics.  ^
If this is the case, and there are no other unobservable entering both the parental decision and 
the production function, than computer ownership HC\  can serve as an instrument for C\ since 
E{vj iHCi)  = 0 but E{HC[Ci)  7^  0. Using an IV is also the only way to solve the measurement
^Test scores are the best available proxy of true skills, but they are still likely to measure these skills with 
errors. Thus skills’s measurement error might also enter e i .
^In the data, parents were not asked whether they had a home computer but rather whether the child had 
access to one. Therefore parents had to take two decisions: whether to own a home computer and whether to 
make it available to the child. The latter could be correlated with p. From the data, we only know whether the 
child had access to a computer at home. However, since in wave 1 (wave 2) 77% (88%) of the children had access 
to one, it is unlikely that many parents had a computer but did not make it available. That reduces the choice 
space to a simple ownership decision.
^One argument against H C i satisfying the exclusion restriction is time displacement. Since the parents own
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error problem. Angrist and Imbens (1995) show that under heterogenous treatment effects, the 
IV estimator will identify the LATE, that is the return for those children who actually use the 
computer (since some children have access to a computer but do not use it, so that Ci is not 
affected by the instrument). In period 1 it is also possible to test the robustness of OLS estimates 
by including a future measure of computer use C2  in equation (4.2). Conditional on Ci, future 
computer use should not be correlated with Tji unless n ox U\ are correlated with C2 . ^
4.3.2 Period 2
The production function in period 2 is:
Tj2 =  9j{C2:\i Fl2:i, 5/2:1, OM2;l, /i, ^2) (4.3)
where the subscript 2 : 1 indicates that we include both period 2 and 1 inputs. Every input 
of the production function at time 2 can have an effect on Tj 2  through its contemporaneous or 
lagged level, that is we do not restrict past inputs to drive Tj 2  only indirectly through the current 
inputs. This is true also for computers where use in period 1 (age 4/5 in our data) might have 
permanent effects on the test scores besides the effect on C2 . In other words we are interested 
in the timing of these inputs. If we only include C2 its coefficient would pick up the effect of the 
whole computer history but we would not know when this input is most effective. According to 
Cunha et al. (2006) the timing of inputs matters because some skills can be shaped only when 
children are very young. Once again we assume that the production function is linear in its 
inputs:
Tj2 = 0 2 +  C2:l(3j2 +  X2-.\lj2 +  ' j^2 (4.4)
where Vj2  =  U2 .\Sj2  4- /xpj2 +  ^2 - Therefore in equation (4.4) we are interested in estimating 
^  which is a 2 X 1 vector. The estimation of this equation is once again plagued by endogeneity
a computer, presumably they spend some time using it. If parental computer time displaces time with the child, 
or time otherwise invested in producing T j\ inputs that we do not control for, then E{v'j^HC\) #  0. However, 
if parental computer time displaces “unproductive” time, for instance parental TV time, then the exclusion 
restriction holds.
^However, even if =  E fC gf/i) =  0, C 2 might be correlated with ei. This would happen if C2 is a
function of previous period test scores T \ .
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problems potentially even more severe since now we are interested in the causal effect of the two 
endogenous variables C\  and C2. Besides OLS, Instrumental Variable estimation is still possible 
using HCi  and H C 2  as instruments provided they are not multicollinear. However, consistency 
of the IV estimator now requires very strong restrictions on the time 2 parental decision. For 
E{vj 2 HC 2 ) =  0 to hold, the parental decision to own a computer must be uncorrelated with Ci 
and Ti, since these are a function of /x, and Ti is also a function oiU\.  Todd and Wolpin (2003) 
discuss the estimation of the production function (4.4) using the Value Added model. The idea 
is to include a lagged test score Tji  on the right hand side. Intuitively, since the lagged test 
score is a function of /x, including it among the control variables one might reduce the omitted 
variable bias. However Todd and Wolpin (2003) also show that the Value Added model solves 
the endogeneity problem only if the impact of the ability endowment /x declines over time at 
a rate equal to  the first order correlation across test scores. ® Finally it is also possible to 
estimate the production function through the First Difference (or Fixed Effect) estimator. This 
estimator relies on other strong assumptions. The first two terms of v must be time constant, 
that is {U2 :iSj2  + /xpj2) -  {UiSji + HPji) — 0. Even if C2;i was orthogonal to U2 ,i, the ability 
endowment must have a constant effect over time, pj2  =  Pji- In principle there is no reason why 
this should be the case and this equality holds for all the cognitive and non-cognitive abilities in 
the /X vector. Also, First Difference requires strict exogeneity. However this would be violated 
whenever C2 is a function of T\ either through the parental or children choice functions, since 
in that case ^(C ^ei) ^  0 .
Later in the paper we provide estimates of the linear production functions in period 1 and 2. 
There are two main reasons why we estimate both functions rather than just the one in period
2 . First, we are interested in the determinants of cognitive and non-cognitive skills because they, 
in turn, will act as determinants of educational choices and labor market outcomes. As much as 
both C\ and C2  might enter the period 2 production function, with Ci still having a direct effect
®This can be easily seen under linearity. Using equations (4.2) and (4.4), and letting ' and " indicate the first 
and second element of the vectors /3,7, 6 :
T /2  ~  = ( Q 2  — 4 > O tl)  +  0 2 ^ 2  +  (/?2  ~  <A/3l)C'l +  -^ 2 7 2  (? 2  ~  * ^ l )
+  U2 S2 +  Ui{02 — <Ml) +  (P2 ~  0Pi)M  +  Ê2 ~
This also shows that U2 and Ui still enter the error term unless 6  ^ =  {62 — (j>S\) =  0. Moreover, C 2 will be 
correlated with ei if previous test scores enter the parental or children choice functions.
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conditional on C2 , then we can also imagine a schooling or wage function where both Ti and T2 
enter as inputs. If some learning processes, investments or choices are made at very young ages, 
Ti might have a role even conditional on T2 . For this reason we are interested in the production 
functions of both and T2 . Second, in the data the vector of cognitive skill scores between 
period 1 and 2 is not the same, since some tests are age specific. Therefore the outputs of the 
production functions are not identical in the two periods. We refer to the data section for a 
more complete explanation of the cognitive skills measures.
4.4 Data
The data comes from the Growing Up in Australia, the Longitudinal Study of Australian Chil­
dren (LSAC). This study aims to examine the impact of Australias unique social and cultural 
environment on the next generation. During 2004, over 10,000 children and their families were 
recruited to the study from a sample selected from the Health Insurance Commissions Medicare 
database. It is intended that these children and their families will be interviewed biannually until 
2010, and possibly beyond. During 2004, the study recruited a sample of 5,107 infants (children 
born March 2003-February 2004) and 4,983 children aged 4-5 years (children born March 1999- 
February 2000) in a dual cohort cross-sequential design. Data for the first two waves of each 
cohort are now available. In what follows we focus on the older cohort, aged between 4 ^ and 
6 i  at the time of the two surveys. We then create our sample by selecting those children for 
whom data were collected at both waves.
4.4.1 Computer Access and Use
There are a number of variables that measure computer access/use by the child. In Wave 1 
parents were asked whether the study child had access to a computer at home and if so, how 
many hours the child used the computer on a typical weekday and on a typical weekend day. 
Unfortunately in Wave 1 the number of hours were recorded in bands and not in continuous 
form.  ^ Parents were also asked about the number of televisions at home and how many hours
^The 5 bands were coded as follow: 1. Five or more hours; 2. From three to five hours; 3. From one to three 
hours; 4. Less than one hour; 5. No use.
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the child spent watching TV (still distinguishing between a weekday and weekend, and with 
hours coded in bands). If the child attended school, interviewers would interview the school’s 
teacher, subject to parental authorization. Teachers were then asked whether the school was 
equipped with computers and how often the children used them. ®
In Wave 2 parents were asked the same questions though this time computer and TV use
were recorded as continuous variables. Moreover, in this second wave parents were also asked 
whether the children had access to a video game console such as Xbox, Playstation or Nintendo
and if so, how many hours ( weekd ay/weekend ) they spent using it.
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Figure 4.2: Home Computer Access and Use
Figure 4.2 shows computer access and use in waves 1 and 2. We distinguish between children 
who had no access to a computer (No access), those who had access but did not use it (No use) 
and those who had access and spent some time using it, where computer time is coded in 4 
discrete hour bands (<lhi', l-3hrs, 3-5hrs, 5+hrs). Children were more likely to have access to 
a computer in wave 2. By then only 11.67% of children could not access one. Perhaps parents
decided to let the children use the computer as the children became older and started school
^Provided the school was equipped with computers, frequency of use was coded as follows: 1. Two or more 
hours per day; 2. From one to two hours per day; 3. Less than one hour per day; 4. A few times a week; 5. A 
few times a month; 6. Less often; 7. Never.
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or it could be simply the result of the upward trend in computer ownership that we have seen 
in figure 4.1.  ^ On the other hand quite a large firaction of 6/7 years old children did not use 
a computer even if they had access to one. If we look at weekdays, the figure suggests that as 
they aged, children either did not use the computer at all or became heavier users of it. There 
is instead a clear increase in computer use during the weekend between the two waves.
Table 4.1: Media Access and Use
Wave 1
All Boys Girls
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
PC Access 0.77 0.41 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.41
PC hours weekdays 1.78 2.28 1.84 2.51 1.72 2.01
PC hours weekends 0.70 0.85 0.72 0.89 0.68 0.80
Number of TV ’s 1.80 0.85 1.82 0.87 1.77 0.84
T V /D V D ’s hours weekdays 8.30 4.73 8.33 4.71 8.26 4.75
T V /D V D ’s hours weekends 3.89 2.06 3.90 2.09 3.88 2.02
Wave 2
All Boys Girls
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
PC Access 0.88 0.32 0.88 0.31 0.88 0.32
PC hours weekdays 1.67 2.67 1.76 2.68 1.57 2.65
PC hours weekends 1.21 1.51 1.31 1.65 1.10 1.33
TV in bedroom 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.35
T V /D V D ’s hours weekdays 8.07 5.41 8.25 5.51 7.89 5.30
T V /D V D ’s hours weekends 4.81 2.89 4.93 2.97 4.69 2.79
video game console 0.53 0.49 0.68 0.46 0.39 0.48
VG hours weekdays 0.84 2.19 1.34 2.78 0.33 1.11
VG hours weekends 0.98 1.70 1.55 2.06 0.39 0.91
Observations 4464 2277 2187
In Table 4.1 we presents basic statistics on the use of computers, TV and video games. In 
wave 1 information on media use was not as precise as in wave 2. Hours spent using a computer 
or watching TV were coded in bands, parents were not asked about video games and we know the 
total number of TV’s in the house but not whether the child had one in his/her own bedroom. 
In order to construct the figures in table 4.1 (Wave 1) we recoded number of hours in continuous 
form. For both computer and TV hours, we used the median number of hours within each band 
from wave 2 and imputed that figure for wave 1 observations. The average child was using the 
computer for a total of 1.78 hours during the week, and a total of 0.70 hours during the weekend. 
Boys spent more time than girls using it, but this difference is not very large. Importantly, there
is evidence of variation over time. Not reported, the correlation between Ci and C2  is equal to
is not possible to disentangle this two effects with data from only one cohort. Nevertheless as soon as the 
younger LSAC cohort reaches age 4/5, we should be able to say more.
^®Say that in wave 2 the median number of minutes for those children in the ’1 to 3 hours’ was 150, then we 
would impute 150 minutes also for those children that in wave 1 fall within this 1 to 3 hours’ band.
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0.25. If Cl and C2  were to be multicollinear, estimation of equation (4.4) would be problematic 
resulting in large standard errors. In the appendix (table 4.12) we illustrate computer access/use 
variation over time, using the same coding as in figure 4.2. Children also spent 8 hours watching 
TV during the weekdays and almost 4 hours during the weekend. Once again boys stayed slightly 
longer than girls in front of a TV. In wave 2, when children were aged between 6 and 7 years 
old, almost everyone had access to a computer at home. Compared to wave 1, children used it 
less during the weekdays but more during the weekend, and a similar pattern exists also for TV 
use. Since in wave 2 children were aged 6 to 7 years old, and therefore all enrolled in school, 
it is possible that they had less home time during the week. Parents were also asked whether 
the child had his/her own TV in the bedroom. Almost one in five children had one. However 
no information was collected about the number of televisions at home. Finally in wave 2 more 
than half of the children had a video game console but boys spent remarkably more time than 
girls using it. Overall, at wave 2 an average (median) boy spent around 19 (17) hours using a 
combination of computer, TV and video games, while an average (median) girl spent 16 (14) 
hours.
Not reported in the table, the LSAC data also show that in wave 2 (wave 1) 81% (70%) of the 
schools had a computer in the classroom, though sample sizes are smaller, since not all children 
went to school (mainly in wave 1) or because the parents did not authorize the interviewer to 
go to the school.
Unfortunately the LSAC data does not contain information on what the children used the 
computer for. However, in 2006 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has conducted a 
survey of ’Children’s Participation in Cultural and Leisure Activities’, which includes information 
details on children’s use of computers and the internet for different age groups. In table 4.2 we 
report the main statistics. Children in the five to eight years group, our LSAC reference group, 
used the computer mainly to play games, followed by school or educational activities. The table 
also illustrates that as children age, less time is devoted to playing games while more and more 
time is spent in internet activities like browsing or emailing.
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Table 4.2: Home Computer Usage, Activities
5-8 yrs 9-11 yrs 12-14 yrs
Emailing or messaging 28.6 53.5 69.1
Other internet based activities 7.9 30.4 57.3
Playing games 87.7 80.7 69.9
School or educational 62.0 83.7 92.5
Other activities 3.3 2.9 3.8
Source: ABS. Study 4901.0 - Children’s Participation in Cul­
tural and Leisure Activities, Australia, Apr 2006.
Numbers in the table give the proportion of children carrying on 
that activity.
4.4.2 C ognitive and N on-C ognitive Skills
The LSAC children were administered three cognitive skill tests depending on their age.
•  W ho  am  I?  T est (Wave 1 only) The Who am I? is a direct child assessment measure 
that requires children to copy shapes (circle, triangle, cross, square, and diamond) and 
write numbers, letters, words and sentences. One item was added to the standard Who 
Am I? booklet for use in LSAC. It is used for the children at ages 4 to 5 years to assess 
the general cognitive abiUties needed for beginning school.
•  P e a b o d y  P ic tu re  V ocabulary  T est (Waves 1 and 2) A short form of the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT - III), a test designed to measure a child’s knowledge of 
the meaning of spoken words and his or her receptive vocabulary for Standard American 
English. This adaptation is based on work done in the United States for the Head Start 
Impact Study, with a number of changes for use in Australia. The Wave 1 and Wave 2 
versions of the PPVT contain different, although overlapping, sets of items of appropriate 
difficulty for children aged 4-5 years and 6-7 years. A PPVT stimulus book with 40 plates 
of display pictures was used. The child is not required to define words but to show what 
they mean by pointing to (or saying the number of) a picture that best represents the 
meaning of the word.
• M a tr ix  R eason ing  T est (Wave 2 only) Children completed the Matrix Reasoning (MR) 
test fi-om the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th edition (WTSC-IV). This test of 
non-verbal intelhgence presents the child with an incomplete set of pictures and requires 
them to select the picture that completes the set from 5 different options.
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Figure 4.3: Cognitive Skills
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the cognitive test scores. Each distribution is quite 
symmetric. The matrix reasoning score has a different scale from the other tests. Later we 
standardize each test score to have mean zero and standard deviation 1.
In the LSAC, non-Cognitive skills are measured through both parental and teacher assess­
ment. In the two waves parents and teachers were asked 25 questions about children’s behavior. 
However, teachers’ answers are available only if the child went to school and provided the parents 
authorized the interviewer to go to the school. Because of the larger sample size and in order to 
avoid sample selection (in school) problems, in the remaining of the paper we only use parental 
assessment. Most of the 25 questions did not change between the two waves and are described 
in the Appendix. From their answers LSAC data managers constructed five indicators of these 
skills.
• SDQ Prosocial Mean of 5 parent-rated items in the Prosocial subscale of the Strengths 
and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), assessing the child’s propensity to behave in a way 
that is considerate and helpful to others.
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SDQ H yperactiv ity  Mean of 5 parent-rated items in the Hyperactivity subscale of the 
SDQ, assessing child’s fidgetiness, concentration span and impulsiveness.
SDQ E m otional sym ptom s Mean of 5 parent-rated items in the Emotional Symptoms 
subscale of the SDQ, assessing a child’s frequency of display of negative emotional states 
(e.g. nervousness, worry).
SDQ Peers Mean of 5 parent-rated items in the Peer subscale of the SDQ, assessing 
problems in the child’s ability to form positive relationships with other children.
SDQ C onduct Mean of 5 parent-rated items in the Conduct subscale of the SDQ, assess­
ing child’s tendency to display problem behavior when interacting with others.
P e« f p rab lsm s -  W avs 1 Em otional sympL -  W ave 1 H yperactivity -  W ave 1
P ro so c ia l -  W av e  2 P e e r  prot)lem s -  W ave  2  Em otional sym pt. -  W ave  £ H yperactivity -  W ave 2 C o n d u ct -  W ave 2
Vertical lines show  m ea n  an d  + /-  1 s tan d a rd  deviation.
Figure 4.4: Non-Cognitive Skills
The non-cognitive scores are ordered such that a higher score corresponds to less behavioral 
problems, i.e. better non-cognitive skills. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the non-cognitive 
scores. These scores have right-skewed distributions (that is the majority of children do not have 
behavioral problems) and less variation than the cognitive scores. Non-cognitive scores are also 
standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation 1 before the estimation.
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Table 4.3: Skills Correlation Matrix 
Wave 1
ppvt wai soc hypr emot peer cond
ppvt 1.00
wai 0.29 1.00
soc 0.08 0.13 1.00
hypr 0.20 0.24 0.34 1.00
emot 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.20 1.00
peer 0.16 0.11 0.26 0.24 0.38 1.00
cond 0.12 0.11 0.38 0.46 0.28 0.26 1.00
Wave 2
ppvt 1.00
matrx 0.28 1.00
soc 0.06 0.03 1.00
hypr 0.11 0.15 0.32 1.00
emot 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.23 1.00
peer 0.07 0.04 0.25 0.29 0.41 1.00
cond 0.10 0.09 0.38 0.48 0.33 0.33 1.00
In table 4.3 we show the correlation matrix of the test scores for the two waves. The corre­
lations between the cognitive and non-cognitive scores are low and positive as expected. This 
is consistent with parental background driving skills, or with complementarities between these 
two kinds of skills. The correlation across scores is not particularly high suggesting that they 
capture different dimensions of cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
4.4 .3  O ther Variables o f Interest
The LSAC is a very rich data set. Plenty of information was collected about the child, his/her 
household, home and school environments. In Table 4.4 we report basic statistics for a few 
variables. Children were on average 57 months old (almost 5 years old) in wave 1, and 83 
months old (almost 7 years old) in wave 2. However there is a difference of 18 (22) months 
between the youngest and oldest child in wave 1 (wave 2), which can be quite important. These 
children had on average 1  ^ siblings and in 95% of the case there were at most 3 siblings. The 
average mother was slightly younger than 30 years old at birth, and the average father slightly 
older than that. Most parents had some educational qualification beyond year 12 (high school). 
Father’s income was substantially larger than mother’s income, also due to a low fraction of 
mothers working full-time. The fraction of mothers working either full or part time rose between
investigate this point further we also run a factor analysis using the principal-components factor method. 
At both waves we find three main factors. Upon rotation, the factor loadings suggest the following grouping: (1) 
PPV T and WAI scores; (2) SDQ Prosocial, Hyperactivity and Conduct scores; (3) SDQ Emotional symptoms 
and Peers scores.
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wave 1 and 2.
Table 4.4: Other Variables of Interest
Wave 1 
Mean SD
Wave 2 
Mean SD
Child’s Age (months) 57.40 2.62 83.66 2.97
Number of Siblings 1.47 1.02 1.58 1.03
Father Age (years) 37.50 5.86 39.48 5.97
Mother Age (years) 34.92 5.43 37.02 5.45
Father Higher Education 0.75 0.43 0.76 0.42
Mother Higher Education 0.64 0.47 0.68 0.46
Father Income (10 thous) 5.35 3.81 6.37 4.61
Mother Income (10 thous) 2.26 2.02 2.79 2.62
Mother Empl. Full-Time 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43
Mother Empl. Part-Time 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49
4-5 Results
In this section we provide estimates of the linear production functions in equations (4.2) and 
(4.4). Given the endogeneity problems discussed in section 4.3, and given that all estimators 
demand relatively strong assumptions, in what follows we report the parameters of interest of
(4.2) and (4.4) using différent estimators. All the test scores have been standardized to have 
mean zero and standard deviation 1. Computer time is measured as total weekly hours.
4.5.1 Period  1 E stim ation
In table 4.5 we present the estimated effects of computer use on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. 
The first column (OLSa) illustrates the estimated impact when controlling for some measures 
of family, school and other media inputs such as weekly hours in child care, indoor and outdoor 
activities involving a family member, hours spent watching TV. Children using the computer 
more often score higher in the Peabody Picture Vocabulary and Who am I? tests. With regard to 
the non-cognitive scores, the SDQ Prosocial, Hyperactivity and Conduct coefficients are positive 
and significant at 1% level. Their positive coefficients indicate that children using a computer 
have better non-cognitive skills.
In column OLSb we add a rich set of household characteristics such as parental education.
full list of the control variables used in this and later tables is available in the Appendix. Note that in 
table 4.5 media activities are given by the number of hours watching T V /D V D ’s while for wave 2 we also include 
hours playing with videogame consoles.
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Table 4.5: Production Function - Period 1
OLSa OLSb OLSc IVa Æ9R Future
Peabody Piet. Vocabulary 0.024** 0.022** 0.022** 0.053** 0.21 -0.008 0.22
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 3990 (0.011) 880
Who am I? 0.031** 0.029** 0.029** 0.045** 0.27 0.017 0.25
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 4396 (0.009) 979
SDQ Prosocial 0.016** 0.015** 0.015** 0.030** 0.07 -0.023* 0.07
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) 4453 (0.011) 999
SDQ Hyperactivity 0.013** 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.13 -0.014 0.13
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 4453 (0.010) 999
SDQ Emotional symptoms 0.006 -0.000 0.000 0.008 0.07 0.002 0.06
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 4452 (0.011) 999
SDQ Peers 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.030** 0.10 0.004 0.07
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 4453 (0.011) 999
SDQ Conduct 0.018** 0.013* 0.013* 0.038** 0.08 -0.021 0.08
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) 4453 (0.011) 999
Standard Errors in brackets. Stars indicate significance at 1% (**) and 5% (*) level.
OLSa: control for type of school, child home and outdoor activities with family members, child 
extra activities such eis sport and music classes, computer in school, home TV time.
OLSb: like OLSa plus control for household demographics, parental education and financial situ­
ation.
OLSc; like OLSb minus parental income and other indicators of financial distress. 
rV': like OLSb plus instrument computer time with computer access.
Future; like OLSb but explanatory variable is future computer time C2 rather than Ci and include 
only those children who did not have access to a computer in period 1.
income, number of siblings etc. None of the additional controls is a direct family (FI), school 
{SI) or other media (OM) input but we rather consider them as important determinants of 
these inputs. Since it is quite rare to observe all inputs, household characteristics are often 
used as proxies in similar studies. Overall the coefficients are smaller but with no large change, 
though among the non-cognitive scores only the SDQ Prosocial coefficient is now significant at 1% 
level. This result is quite reassuring and it suggests that our set of inputs is quite comprehensive. 
Some researchers have criticized the use of household characteristics, and particularly of parental 
income, as a prox\' of family or school inputs. They argue that an increase in the amount of 
an input holding income constant must imply a reduction in expenditures on other inputs. 
This could cause a misinterpretation of the coefficients. In column OLSc we then present the 
coefficients when excluding parental income and other indicators of financial distress from the 
set of control variables. The results are virtually identical to those in column OLSb. In the 
remaining of the paper we include parental income and other indicators of financial distress 
among the household characteristics.
To learn whether the effect is large or not we compare the computer coefficient in column
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OLSb to those of TV/DVD and child care weekly hours (not reported in the table). For the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary, Who am I? and SDQ Prosocial scores, the TV/DVD coefficients 
are, in order of test score, -0.002, -0.008** and -0.008**, i.e. smaller and of opposite sign to the 
computer ones. The child care coefficients are -0.004, 0.008** and -0.001, again much smaller 
than the computer coefficients. Clearly endogeneity problems might bias these latter coefficients 
as much as the computer coefficient. However, unless the bias is large and possibly of different 
sign (i.e. computer coefficients are upward biased while TV/DVD and child care coefficients are 
downward biased) there is evidence that computer time is an important input in the production 
function.
Next we move to the IV estimator. Since we are not aware of any institutional change (laws or 
similar) that might affect Ct our approach is to use computer access at home {HC\) to instrument 
C\. In section 4.3.1 we discussed under what conditions this estimator is consistent. To satisfy 
the exclusion restriction we need computer access to be uncorrelated with unobserved inputs and 
the abiUty endowment. Given the large fraction of children with access to a home computer, we 
expect that, if anything, only a few parents owning a computer deny access to their children. 
Therefore it is unlikely that HC\ is correlated with /x. In table 4.13 we then compare households 
with and without a computer over a number of observable characteristics. Households with 
a computer are on average older, better educated, richer and more likely to have the mother 
employed. Our assumption is that conditional on these and the other controls included in 
OLSb, households with and without a computer do not differ over any other unobserved input 
of the production function. With regard to the rank condition, a first stage regression of C\ 
on H C i  and all other control variables used in OLSb show that HCi coefficient is positive and 
significant (see table 4.14, in the appendix). By definition the HCi coefficient is simply equal 
to E {C i\X i,H C \ = 1). Back to table 4.5, we see that under the IV estimator the return to 
computer use becomes larger for all cognitive and non-cognitive scores. This result is consistent 
with attenuation bias caused by measurement error in Ci but not with omitted variable bias 
caused by unobserved innate abilities, which, at least in the case of cognitive scores, is expected 
to drive the coefficient upwards. It is also possible that the measurement error bias more than 
compensate the omitted variable bias, or that the IV estimator identifies a LATE.
^^Child care hours are given by the average weekly hours in school, kindergarten, pre-school or day care.
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The fifth column (i?^/N) reports the adjusted E? for the richest OLS regression (OLSb) and 
the sample size (N). The B? is larger for the cognitive scores production function.
Finally, we run a robustness test by estimating the effect of C2 on T\ (Future column). As 
discussed in section 4.3.1, conditional on Ci, future computer use C2  should have no correlation 
with T\ unless C2 is a function of (skill endowments) and Ui (unobserved inputs). If that was 
the case it is likely that E{VjiCi) ^  0. In order to properly control for current computer use 
we select only those children who did not have access to a computer in the first period. In 
our sample 14.83 % of the children gained aecess to a computer between the two waves. Only 
in the case of the SDQ Prosocial score C2  has a statistically significant effect. However, the C2  
coefficient is negative. If this is just an omitted variable bias, then the true 13ji  is actually larger 
and not smaller than the OLS estimates.
To recap, both the OLS and IV estimator indicate that computer use in period 1 (age 4/5) 
has a positive statistically significant effect on the cognitive scores and on the SDQ Prosocial 
and Conduct scores, with the OLS coeflBcients being relatively large compared to those of other 
inputs. The OLS estimator passes the robustness check where we test for the effect of C2 on Tji 
for all scores but the SDQ Prosocial. However in this case, the negative coefficient suggests that 
the omitted variables might actually downward bias the estimates.
4.5.2 Period 2 Estimation
In table 4.6 we show the parameter estimates for the period 2 production function (equation 
4.4). For every test score function we report the C2  (top) and C\ (bottom) coefficients. The first 
three columns are obtained like in table 4.5 by controlling for family, school and other media 
inputs (OLSa), household characteristics (OLSb) and using computer ownership in both periods 
H C 2 :i to instrument C2:i (IV). The only difference is that for all OLS and IV estimators we now 
control for both periods characteristics (V2:i) while in table 4.5 we controlled only for period 1 
(Xi). Conditional on Ci, current computer use C2 seems to have an effect only on the SDQ Peers 
score though the IV estimator is much smaller (in absolute value) and imprecise. The negative 
sign indicates that children spending more hours in front of the computer are more likely to have
Alternatively, we could simply condition on Ci. However, Ci might just be an imperfect proxy of current 
computer use.
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Table 4.6: Production Function - Period 2
OLSa OLSb rv VA R3 /N
Peabody Piet. Vocabulary C2 0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.21 0.005 0.34
(0.004) (0.004) (0.017) 4409 (0.004) 3960
Cl 0.021** 0.020** 0.028* — 0.011* —
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) — (0.005) —
Matrix Reasoning C2 0.008 0.008 0.016 0.09 0.006 0.16
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018) 4402 (0.004) 4347
Cl 0.030** 0.027** 0.058** — 0.021** —
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) — (0.005) —
SDQ Prosocial C2 -0.005 -0.007 0.003 0.07 -0.004 0.29
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018) 4342 (0.004) 4333
Cl 0.007 0.007 0.015 — -0.001 —
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) — (0.005) —
SDQ Hyperactivity C2 -0.000 -0.002 0.005 0.14 0.001 0.41
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018) 4341 (0.004) 4332
Cl -0.002 -0.001 0.007 — -0.006 —
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) — (0.004) —
SDQ Emotional symptoms C2 0.001 -0.001 0.025 0.08 0.001 0.25
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018) 4341 (0.004) 4331
Cl 0.008 0.003 -0.018 — 0.003 —
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) — (0.005) —
SDQ Peers C2 -0.012** -0.014** -0.003 0.10 -0.009* 0.25
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018) 4341 (0.004) 4332
Cl -0.004 -0.007 -0.014 — -0.009 —
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) —
SDQ Conduct C2 -0.002 -0.006 0.023 0-10 -0.003 0.31
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018) 4341 (0.004) 4332
Cl 0.009 0.008 0.023 — 0.001 —
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) — (0.005) —
Standard Errors in brackets. Staurs indicate significance at 1% (**) and 5% (*) level.
OLSa: control for t>TJe of school, child home and outdoor activities with family members, child 
extra activities such as sport and music classes, computer in school, home TV time.
OLSb: like OLSa plus control for household demographics, parental education and financial 
situation.
rV: like OLSb plus instrument computer time with computer access.
VA; like OLSb plus include lagged score on the right hand side.
peer problems. However C\ has a positive effect on both cognitive scores, with the IV estimator 
being larger than the OLS one. The fifth column (i?^/N) report the adjusted for the richest 
OLSc regression and the sample size (N). The Peabody Picture Vocabulary function is the one 
with the largest R? while the Matrix Reasoning and other non-cognitive scores functions have a 
smaller R^.
We then estimate the production function using the Value Added estimator (VA column). In 
section 4.3.2 we discussed the conditions under which this estimator is consistent. The estimates 
are obtained after augmenting the right hand side of each production function with the period 1 
test score. Most of the C2  coefficients drop, including the SDQ Peers coefficient, though the latter 
is still negative and statistically significant. The C\ coefficients drop too, but this is expected
1 0 2
since we are including the lagged score on the right hand side (see section 4.3.2, footnote 6). 
As we would expect the B? of the Value Added model is larger than the OLS estimator since 
the lagged score might be capturing the effect of unobserved innate abilities or past unobserved 
inputs. The sample size N is instead smaller since we only include those children for whom both 
periods scores are available.
We do not include the First Difference estimator instead mainly because the wave 1 computer 
hours were originally coded in bands. While it is already known that the First Difference 
estimator can exacerbate measurement error problems, in our case a AC variable created using 
our imputed continuous Ci would generate even more measurement error. If instead we were to 
code both C2 and C\ in bands, we would loose all the children that did not change band between 
the two waves, roughly half of the sample.
To summarize, the results from period 2 suggest that computer use at young ages has a 
long lasting effect on cognitive skills, while current use has no strong effect. Per contra, Cg has 
a negative effect on the SDQ Peers score, our indicator of the child’s ability to form positive 
relationships with other children. That would be compatible with the hypothesis that children 
substitute time with other children with computer time. These results are consistent across the 
OLS, IV and Value Added estimators.
4.5.3 Weekday vs Weekend
We now try to exploit the information in our data by separating Ct into weekday {C^^) and 
weekend (C^^) computer hours: Ct = C^^+C^^.  The Ct coefficient is expected to lie in between 
the C ^^  and C^^ ones. In table 4.7 we show the results. We only present the coefficients for 
the three cognitive skills and the SDQ Prosocial, SDQ Peers and SDQ Conduct non-cognitive 
skills, and report the OLSb estimator, column OLSb(Tt), and the value added estimator, column 
VA(T,).
Starting with the cognitive skills, we see that what is important is computer use during 
the weekend, with coefficients sensibly larger than those in tables 4.5 and 4.6. For the Matrix 
Reasoning test, C^^ has now a statistically significant effect, even using the VA estimator, while 
in table 4.6 C2 had a negligible effect. This is because the C2  coefficient is a weighted sum of 
^^This is true if C ov(C ^ ‘^ , >  0, which is the case in our sample.
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the C2 ^ and ones. But why is it weekend computer time that matters? On the one hand 
since parents are more likely to be home (i.e. not working) during the weekend, they might be 
spending time with their children using educational software or other programs. On the other 
hand, it is possible that computer time during the weekday displaces other positive inputs of the 
cognitive production function, such as homework or other educational assignments, producing 
a zero sum effect, while during the weekend computer time displaces activities that are not 
cognitive skill enhancing, such that computer time has a net positive effect.
For the non-cognitive skills, whether it is the weekday or the weekend time that matters 
depends on the skill. In the case of the SDQ Prosocial function, it is weekday time that is 
important, though with an opposite sign between the two time periods. In the absence of 
information on computer activities and displaced activities, we do not have a clear intuition for 
this result. The SDQ Peers function shows instead a negative effect of If children using the 
computer during the weekend are less likely to form positive relationships with other children, it 
could be that computer time is displacing time playing and interacting with siblings or friends. It 
is also worth noting that the weekend coefficients have a larger standard error than the weekday 
ones.
4.5.4 Heterogeneity in the Production Function
In this section we investigate whether the production function parameters are heterogeneous. In 
particular we look at differences based on the children’s sex and on their mothers’s education and 
labor market status. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 illustrates the results for the two periods. For clarity we 
only report the OLSb estimator. Given the results in section 4.5.3, we also distinguish between 
and and highlight the coefficients that were statistically significant in table 4.7.
For most scores, the impact of computer use is almost always larger for girls. There is some 
evidence that among teenagers, boys and girls use the computer differently, with boys spending 
more time playing games and girls using it more for emailing and chatting (see Subrahmanyam, 
Kraut, Greenfield, and Gross (2000)), though we do not know whether these differences in usage 
apply also to younger children. There is also evidence that boys and girls learn differently (see 
Gurian (2002)). However, a more complete investigation of these differences between boys and
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girls is beyond the scope of this paper.
Next, we divide our sample in three groups based on their mothers’s education: below year 11, 
year 11 or 12 (completed high school), higher education. As we mentioned in the introduction, 
computer time might matter depending on the content and/or depending on the activities that 
are displaced by it. On the one hand, if it is content that matters, than children with better 
educated parents should have a higher return to computer time. This would be the case if better 
educated parents are more aware of which computer usages are educational or if they are more 
computer savvy themselves, and can teach their children how to use computers. On the other 
hand, if the effect comes mainly through the displaced activities, than children with low educated 
parents might have the highest return, since computer time might be more educational than time 
with parents. For instance, Bernal and Keane (2008) find that the effect of child care is positive 
mainly for children with low educated parents. The authors point at the displacement effect to 
explain this result. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 suggest that both channels might be in place. For most 
of the cognitive scores the effect of computer time is highest either for the low educated or the 
high educated parents groups.
Finally, we also test whether there is heterogeneity depending on the mother’s working sta­
tus. We distinguish between full-time, part-time and not working, the latter including mothers 
looking for a job, in maternity leave or out of the labor force. One way to explain a stronger 
return for weekend versus weekday time is to assume that parents can guide computer use better 
during the weekend, since they are more likely to be home and have time for the child. If this is 
true, than we would expect the difference between weekend and weekday use to be largest among 
children with working mothers. The last three columns of tables 4.8 and 4.9 indeed indicate that 
the difference between the weekend and weekday returns is larger for those children with mothers 
working full or part time. This result is also in line with the hypothesis that content matters.
4.5.5 M ultim edia
Lastly, in this section we compare the return to computer, television and video games time. 
In Table 4.10 we present the result for the period 1 production function. The first columns 
correspond to the OLS return and is therefore identical to column OLSb in table 4.5. The
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second column (IV) differs from the one in table 4.5 because we now also instrument TV time 
with number of televisions in the house. That is we regress the scores on computer and TV time 
in the same regression and, for the IV estimates, instrument computer and TV time respectively 
with computer access and number of TV’s in the house. The last two columns show the return 
to TV time.
Testing whether computer and TV time have a different return is interesting in light of 
our previous discussion. Both computers and TV are media devices, both will have an effect 
on children’s skills depending on their content, on the activities they displace and on their 
intellectual stimulation. From table 4.10 it appears that computer and TV time have a very 
different effect. TV time has a statistically significant negative return an almost all scores, 
cognitive and non-cognitive. For both computer and TV time, the IV estimates are usually 
larger (in absolute value) than the OLS ones.
In table 4.11 we repeat the analysis for the period 2 production function. Now we also include, 
in the same regression, video game time, that is time spent playing games using consoles such 
as Xbox, Nintendo and Playstation. We only include period 2 media time and do not separate 
between current and lagged like we did in table 4.6 instead. This is because we do not observe 
video games time in period 1 but we want to keep the estimates comparable across the three 
media devices. The IV estimates are obtained instrumenting computer, TV and video games 
time respectively with computer access, TV in child’s bedroom (yes/no) and video game console 
Etccess. It is unfortunate that in period 2 we do not observe number of televisions in the house. 
It is quite unlikely that the presence of a TV in the child’s bedroom, as much as access to video 
game console, are uncorrelated with the child’s characteristics. Nevertheless we still include the 
IV estimates for completeness. We also show the Value Added estimates obtained by including 
the lagged score on the right hand side. Television has still a negative effect for most of the scores, 
no matter which estimator is used, though the Value Added estimates are generally smaller. The 
effect of spending time playing with video games is also mostly negative even though only for 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary score this effect is statistically significant.
do not include lagged computer, TV and video game time but we do include current and lagged measures 
for all other control variables.
106
4-6 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to investigate the effect of using a home computer for children’s 
cognitive and non-cognitive development. Data show that in OECD countries 70% or more 
of the households have a computer at home. Our Australian data also show that in families 
with young children this percentage can go up to almost 90% and that children do make use of 
computers even at very young ages. However not much is know about the effect of computers. 
Computers are a relatively new input in the children production function having entered the 
average household mainly in the last fifteen years. Previous research in economics has focused 
on the effect of computer on the adults’ wage production function (with controversial findings), 
on high school graduation (positive effect) or on the effect of computer use in school, the latter 
often specific to a particular computer-assisted learning program (mixed findings). Psychologists 
instead have already completed some studies on the effect of home computer usage but data is 
mainly available for teenagers and some of these studies do not deal with the endogeneity of 
computer time.
In our work we use data from an Australian cohort born in 2000, with information collected 
in 2004 and 2006. The advantage of using this sample is twofold. These children are very young 
and data is recent. The latter is an important characteristic since computers, software, internet 
availability and parental computer’s skills all have changed sensibly in the last two decades. We 
are not aware of any similar study.
For cognitive skills, our results indicate that computer time has a positive effect. The effect 
is long-lasting with early computer use showing an impact on test scores even two years later. 
This positive effect originates mainly from computer time during the weekend, is larger for girls, 
for children with low or highly educated parents and for children with working parents. The 
effect is large relatively to those of other inputs, such as child care, and is not shared by other 
media devices, such as television and video games which instead show a negative effect. This 
pattern of results suggests that the impact of computer time might be coming from different 
channels. First, by what computers are used for, i.e. content, since it is positive for children 
with highly educated parents and not for televisions and video games use. Second, because of 
the activities displaced by computer time, since the largest effect is found for children with low
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educated parents. Third, and again given the negative effect of television, because a computer 
is a very interactive device and therefore intellectually stimulating.
For the non-cognitive skills the evidence is more mixed, with the sign of the effect depending 
on the score and the age of the children. For the SDQ Prosocial score, which assess the child’s 
propensity to behave in a way that is considerate and helpful to others, we find a positive effect 
for children aged between 4 and 5 years. This effect is larger for girls, and for children with 
highly educated and working peirents. However two years later the effect turns negative. For 
the SDQ Peers score, which assesses the child’s ability to form positive relationships with other 
children, we find a negative effect in period 2, mainly due to computer time during the weekend. 
It is harder to interpret the mixed effects on non-cognitive skills. A negative weekend effect is 
however consistent with the displacement of time spent in company of other children or adults. 
Nevertheless, a more exhaustive investigation of the mechanisms behind the computer effect 
would demand information on actual computer activities, which are not available in our data.
We test the robustness of our results using OLS, IV and Value Added estimators. Generally, 
the IV estimates are larger and the Value Added estimates lower than the OLS ones. However 
the pattern of result is quite consistent. We also test for omitted variable bias by testing whether 
future computer time has any effect on current score. Only in the case of the SDQ Prosocial 
score we find evidence of a correlation with unobserved characteristics, but if anything, the bias 
might be attenuating the effect rather then reinforcing it.
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Tabl(> 4.7: Production Function - Weekday vs Weekend
C ognitive Skills N on-C ognitive Skills
§
o M W n r a m m VA0T2Ï 1 III m m
Peabody Piet. Vocabulary
. — 0.004 0.005 SDQ Prosocial — -0.013* -0.012*
— (0.006) (0.005) — (0.006) (0.006)
— 0.007 0.006 CT — 0.010 0.017
— (0.011) (0.010) — (0.011) (0.010)
c w d 0.009 0.021** 0.012 c w d 0.020* 0.009 -0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
0.073** 0.014 0.006 CT 0.001 -0.004 -0.009
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021)
Who am I?
— — — SDQ Peers — -0.006 -0.002
— — — — (0.006) (0.006)
— — — CT — -0.031** -0.024*
— — — — (0.011) (0.010)
c w d 0.015* — — c w d 0.00.3 -0.006 -0.007
(0.007) — — (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
CJ"' 0.078** — — CT 0.016 -0.006 -0.016
(0.020) — — (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)
Matrix Reasoning
— -0.005 -0.006 SDQ Conduct — -0.011 -0.005
— (0.006) (0.006) — (0.006) (0.005)
— 0.037** 0.034** CT — 0.006 0.005
— (0.011) (0.011) — (0.011) (0.010)
c w d — 0.016 0.014 c w d 0.011 0.001 -0.004
— (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
— 0.063** 0.044 CT 0.020 0.029 0.017
— (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020)
Standard Errors in brackets. Stars indicate significance at 1% (**) and 5% (*) level.
Table 4.8: Heterogeneity in the Production Function - Period 1
Boys Girls M low Edu M mid Edu M high Edu M work FT M work PT M not Wkg
Peabody Piet. Vocabulary
c w d 0.013 -0.007 0.015 -0.001 0.017 -0.013 0.011 -0.002
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016)
0.049 0.109** 0.098 0.044 0.072** 0.120** 0.081* 0.059
(0.029) (0.036) (0.072) (0.054) (0.028) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042)
N 2031 1959 542 856 2591 793 1502 1691
Who am I?
c w d 0.008 0.021 -0.006 0.020 0.024* 0.008 0.014 0.028*
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014)
e w e 0.077** 0.094** 0.151** 0.028 0.066* 0.072 0.103** 0.036
(0.026) (0.032) (0.056) (0.051) (0.026) (0.044) (0.032) (0.036)
N 2236 2160 599 938 2857 887 1650 1853
SDQ Prosocial
c w d 0.018 0.031* 0.009 0.040 0.022 0.043* 0.030* -0.007
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016)
e w e -0.011 0.005 0.054 -0.019 -0.010 -0.013 -0.056 0.070
(0.031) (0.035) (0.067) (0.059) (0.028) (0.046) (0.037) (0.041)
N 2268 2185 609 953 2889 898 1674 1875
Standard Errors in brackets. Stars indicate significance at 1% (**) and 5% (*) level.
Table 4.9: Heterogeneity in the Production Function - Period 2
Boys Girls M low Edu M mid Edu M high Edu^ M work FT M work PT M not Wkg
Peabody Piet. Vocabulary
0.003 0.013 -0.004 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.020) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.012)
0.008 -0.008 -0.060 0.009 0.005 0.011 -0.002 0.003
(0.014) (0.018) (0.037) (0.028) (0.013) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020)
c w d 0.021* 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.023* 0.018 0.010 0.052*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.022)
e w e 0.002 0.036 0.162* -0.052 0.003 0.006 0.052 -0.038
(0.029) (0.036) (0.079) (0.061) (0.027) (0.045) (0.035) (0.046)
N 2248 2161 551 843 3013 1122 1805 1481
Matrix Reasoning
-0.004 -0.008 -0.021 -0.008 0.004 -0.020 -0.012 0.021
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.022) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012)
0.047** 0.026 -0.001 0.043 0.032* 0.059* 0.046* -0.004
(0.015) (0.019) (0.035) (0.031) (0.014) (0.026) (0.019) (0.021)
c w d 0.010 0.030* -0.004 0.033 0.031** 0.006 0.007 0.045*
(0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.023)
e w e 0.039 0.109** 0.190* -0.069 0.054 0.091 0.107** 0.025
(0.032) (0.038) (0.076) (0.067) (0.030) (0.048) (0.038) (0.048)
N 2244 2158 552 843 3005 1117 1804 1480
SDQ Peers
-0.001 -0.012 -0.025 -0.072** 0.005 -0.012 -0.000 -0.012
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.022) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013)
-0.039* -0.028 0.024 0.010 -0.042** -0.012 -0.028 -0.052*
c w d
(0.016) (0.018) (0.041) (0.031) (0.014) (0.027) (0.018) (0.022)
-0.012 0.010 -0.022 -0.014 0.002 0.018 -0.014 -0.014
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024)
e w e -0.010 -0.016 0.169 0.047 -0.045 -0.065 0.030 0.008
(0.033) (0.036) (0.089) (0.072) (0.028) (0.048) (0.036) (0.052)
N 2220 2121 544 829 2966 1104 1794 1443
Standard Errors in brackets. Stars ind icate sign ificance a t 1% (**) and 5% (*) level.
Ikble 4.10: Multimediia Production Function - Period 1
PC TV
OLSb rv OLSb IV 1
Peabody Piet. Vocabulary 0.022*^ 0.053** -0.002 -0.056**
(0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.018)
Who am I? 0.029** 0.044** -0.008** -0.045**
(0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.016)
SDQ Prosocial 0.015** 0.030** -0.008** 0.006
(0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.017)
SDQ Hyperactivity 0.010 0.018 -0.014** -0.032
(0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.017)
SDQ Emotional symptoms -0.000 0.007 -0.012** -0.032
(0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.017)
SDQ Peers 0.005 0.030** -0.011** -0.004
(0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.017)
SDQ Conduct 0.013* 0.038** -0.016** -0.015
(0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.017)
Standard Errors in brackets. Stars Indicate significance at 1% (**) and 
5% (*) level.
IV: instrument computer time with computer access and TV time with 
number of televisions in the house.
Table 4.11: Multimedia Production Function - Period 2
to
--------- -— ■ - OLSb
PC
rv ------ T A *OLSb
TV
TV VA
VG
VA
Peabody Piet. Vocabulary 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.001 -0.064 0.002 -0.018** -0.016 -0.012**
(0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.002) (0.050) (0.002) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004)
Matrix Reasoning 0.013** 0.049** 0.009* -0.005* -0.090 -0.002 -0.004 0.036 -0.004
(0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.056) (0.002) (0.005) (0.024) (0.005)
SDQ Prosocial -O.OOfi 0.008 -0.004 -0.002 0.023 0.001 0,005 0.008 0.006
(0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.002) (0.050) (0.002) (0.005) (0.020) (0.004)
SDQ Hyperactivity -0.003 0,013 0.000 -0.006** -0.112 -0.001 -0.000 0.036 -0.002
(0.004) (0.018) (0.003) (0.002) (0.058) (0.002) (0.005) (0.024) (0.004)
SDQ Emotional symptoms -0.000 0.020 0.001 -0.005* -0.098 -0.005* -0.001 0.035 -0.001
(0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.058) (0.002) (0.005) (0.024) (0.004)
SDQ Peers -0.015** -0.004 -0.011** -0.002 -0.110 -0.000 -0.006 0.061* -0.008
(0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.002) (0.060) (0.002) (0.005) (0.025) (0.004)
SDQ Conduct -0.005 0.040* -0.002 -0.008** -0.130* -0.004* -0.002 0.035 0.002
(0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.002) (0.063) (0.002) (0.005) (0.026) (0.004)
Standard Errors in brackets. Stars indicate significance at 1% (**) and 5% (*) level.
IV; instrument computer time with computer access, TV time with television in child’s bedroom (binary) and video games 
time with video game console access.
Appendix
Variation in C om puter A ccess and U se Over Tim e
Table 4.12; Home Computer Access and Use Over Time
No access No use
Wave 2 
<1 hr 1-3 hrs 3-5 hrs 54- hrs Total
Wave 1 
No access 7.65 7.54
Weekday 
5.18 2.09 0.02 0.02 22.50
No use 1.68 9.15 5.95 1.93 0.02 0.02 18.76
<1 hr 1.97 17.52 22.14 6.89 0.07 0.07 48.67
1-3 hrs 0.38 2.27 3.97 2.98 0.07 0.00 9.67
3-5 hrs 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.31
54- hrs 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.09
Total 11.69 36.57 37.40 14.05 0.18 O il 100.00
No access 7.65 6.30
Weekend 
3.97 4.38 0.18 0.02 22.50
No use 1.79 8.73 6.62 5.81 0.25 0.02 23.22
il hr 1.79 9.94 13.73 14.63 0.43 0.07 40.59
1-3 hrs 0.43 2.22 2.63 6.82 0.81 0.09 12.99
3-5 hrs 0.00 O il 0.09 0.31 0.09 0.02 0.63
54- hrs 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07
Total 11.67 27.33 27.06 31.97 1.75 0.22 100.00
Numbers in table are percentages.
114
Inform ation used to  construct N on-C ognitive skills
Each skill score is equal to the mean of 5 parent-rated items. Some item scores are re-ordered for 
consistency. Whenever a question changed between the two waves, this is indicated by specifying 
the wave to which the question refers.
• SDQ Prosocial
1. Considerate of other peoples feelings;
2. Shetres readily with other children (treats, toys, pencils, etc);
3. Helpful if someone is hurt, upset or feeling ill;
4. Kind to younger children;
5. Often volunteers to  help others (parents, teachers, other children);
• SDQ Hyperactivity
1. Restless, overeuztive, cannot stay still for long;
2. Constantly fidgeting or squirming;
3. Easily distracted, concentration wanders;
4. Thinks things out before acting;
5. Good attention span, sees chores or homework through to the end;
•  SDQ Emotional symptoms
1 Often com plains of headaches, stomach aches or sickness;
2. Many worries, often seems worried;
3. Often unhappy, depressed or tearful;
4. Nervous or clingy in new situations, eeisily loses confidence;
5. Many fears, easily scared;
• SDQ Peers
1. Rather solitary, tends to  play alone;
2. Has at leetst one good friend;
3. Generally liked by other children;
4. Picked on or bullied by other children;
5. G ets on better with eidults than with other children;
• SDQ Conduct
1 Often loses temper;
2. Generally well behaved, usually does what adults request;
3. Often fights with other children or bullies them;
4. Often argumentative with adults (wave 1); Often lies or cheats (wave 2);
5. Can be spiteful to  others (wave 1); Steals from home, school or elsewhere (wave 2);
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C ontrol variables used in tables 4.5 and 4.6.
We use the abbreviations ’s.c.’ (study child), and ’no.’ (number).
•  OLSa:
F I : family member home activities w ith the s.c. in the laist week (read to s.c. from a book; told s.c. a story not 
from a book; drawn pictures or did other art or craft activities with s.c.; played music, sang songs, danced or 
did other musical activities with s.c.; played with toys or games indoors, like board or card games with child; 
involved child in everyday activities at home, such as cooking or caring for pets; played a game outdoors or 
exercised together like walking, swimming, cycling); family member outdoor activities with the s.c. in the 
last month (gone to  a movie; gone to  a playground or a swimming pool; gone to sporting event in which
child was not a player; gone to a live performance for children, like a concert or play; attended a school,
cultural or com munity event; attended a religious service, church, temple, synagogue or mosque; visited  
a library); s.c. regularly spoken to  in a language other than English by parents, babysitters or at child 
care/pre-school/ school; s.c. regularly attended special or extra cost eictivities that are not part of h is/her  
normal child care, pre-school or school activities in the last 6 months? (swimming; gym nastics/kindergym ; 
team  sport; musical instruments or singing; ballet or other dance; children’s religious group; other);
S I  : type of school attended by the s.c. (ckdjusted by age); grade or year level in school; does child go to a 
school, kindergarten, pre-school or a day care centre? (wave 1); no. o f hours on average per week s.c. goes 
to (school/ kindergarten/ pre-school/ day care) (wave 1); no. of different schools attended since beginning 
fulltime schooling (wave 2); computer in school (room has use of a computer; how often do the children 
have access to  the computer).
O M  : T V  hours; video game hours (wave 2).
•  O LSb: OLSa controls -t-age (child); state of residence; age (parents); s.c. relationship to parents (biological or
not); no. of people in home; grandmother in home; grandfather in home; no. of siblings; no. of young siblings; no. 
of same age siblings; no. of brothers; no. of sisters; no. of younger brother; no. of younger sisters; s.c. has a step- 
or half-sibling in home; s.c. has an adopted sibling in home; s.c. hets a foster sibling in home; parental education; 
parental work status; financial problems in the leist 12 m onths (could not pay gas, electricity or telephone bills 
on time; could not pay the mortgage or rent payments on time; went without meals; were unable to heat or 
cool your home; pawned or sold som ething because needed cash; sought assistance from a welfare or community 
organization); parents’ annual income; language parents first spoke as a child; country grandparents were born.
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Instrum ental Variable
Table 4.13: Comparing households with and without a home computer
Wave 1 Wave 2
Child’s Age (months) -0.024 0.003
Number of Siblings 0.028 -0.091
Father Age (years) 0.713** 0.782*
Mother Age (years) 1.819** 1.803**
Father Higher Education 0.085** 0.100**
Mother Higher Education 0.141** 0.139**
Father Income (10 thous) 1.120** 1.492**
Mother Income (10 thous) 0.211** 0.460**
Mother Employed Full-Time 0.020 0.083**
Mother Employed Part-Time 0.118** 0.121**
Numbers in table are E {X t\H C t  =  1) -  E {X t\H C t =  0). 
Stars indicate significance at 1% (**) and 5% (*) level. 
H C \  =  1: household with home computer.
H C \ =  0: household without home computer.
Table 4.14: First Stage regression
Cl C2
Computer Access (CA) 3.240** 3.474**
(0.099) (0.176)
Number of Siblings -0.041 -0.029
(0.134) (0.311)
Number of Younger Siblings -0.191 -0.212
(0.199) (0.356)
Father’s Income 0.008 0.024
(0.013) (0.017)
Mother’s Income -0.011 -0.013
(0.025) (0.029)
Standard Errors in brackets. Star at 1% {* 
{*) level.
*) and 5%
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